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Abstract 
 
Between 1919 and 1935, the lion’s share of the interwar era, the British government’s 
most important overriding task was constitutional reform of India.  The subcontinent’s 
importance to Britain was undoubted: economically as an important trading partner and militarily 
a source of fighting men and material, as demonstrated in the Great War.  However, scholars 
have relegated India to a relatively minor topic and instead have portrayed Britain’s interwar 
period as the era of appeasement.  Appeasement only became an issue in 1935 and a major topic 
with the Munich crisis of September 1938.  Voluminous press coverage of the India issue 
throughout the interwar period demonstrates that India was the major issue of the era, not just the 
final few years. 
This dissertation examines the coverage of the English press and the paramount issue in 
interwar Britain:  The press played an important role in the debate over the political future of 
Britain’s most important possession as newspapers and periodicals still enjoyed a veritable 
monopoly in disseminating information; radio was still in its infancy and television only existed 
in research laboratories.  The newspaper and periodical owners, editors, and leader writers, part 
of the “chattering class,” held enormous sway in setting the parameters and tone of the India 
debate: press views of the British imperial mission, Indians, as well as the reforms process 
colored the discussion over political changes on the subcontinent.  Press coverage of the India 
issue also helped mold the identity of the Conservative Party, and, ultimately, of imperial Britain 
between the wars. 
 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Flip through any general history book about interwar or twentieth-century Britain and one is 
left with the impression that the topic of appeasement dominated political affairs and public 
debate for the twenty years between 1919 and 1939.  Discussions of appeasement encompass 
scores of pages, if not entire chapters, in many British history surveys while the subject of India 
receives scant, if any, coverage.1  The comparison is even starker in terms of books specific to 
the subject.  Well over one hundred books on appeasement have been published in the United 
States and Britain in the past twenty years while I have only been able to find two books on 
British policy towards India in the interwar era.2  Other works on the National Government and 
the Labour Party have given India adequate coverage but amount to a mere puddle compared to 
the ocean of appeasement.3 
Yet a survey of the contemporary media of the 1920s and 30s reveals a very different picture: 
India is the dominant topic throughout the interwar era while appeasement only becomes an issue 
in 1935 and a major topic with the Munich crisis of September 1938.  The subject of 
constitutional reform in India, as well as pivotal events on the subcontinent, absorbed news 
                                                                 
1
 William Rubinstein, Twentieth Century Britain: A Political History (London, 2003).  Appeasement: 18 ½ pages, 
India 2 ½ pages.  John W. Young, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century  (London, 1997).  Appeasement: 
13 ½ pages, India: 1 ¼ pages.  Charles More, Britain in the Twentieth Century (London, 2007).  Appeasement: 6 ½ 
pages, India: ½ page.  Thomas Heyck, The Peoples of the British Isles, Volume III: From 1870-Present (Chicago, 
2002).  Appeasement: 3 ½ pages, India ½ page.  Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-2000 (New York, 
2004).  Appeasement: 6 ½ pages, India: 1 ½ pages.  Walter Arnstein, Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830-Present 
(Lexington, 1992).  Appeasement: 6+ pages, India: 1 ½ pages.  Noreen Branson and Margot Heinemann, Britain in 
the 1930’s (New York, 1971).  Appeasement: 15 pages, India: 1 page.  Martin Pugh, We Danced All Night: A Social 
History of Britain Between the Wars (London, 2009).  Appeasement: 6+ pages, India:  2 pages.  Malcolm Smith, 
Democracy in a Depression: Britain in the 1920’s and 1930’s (Cardiff, 1998).  Appeasement: 8 pages, India: 1 
sentence.  Also see Kevin Williams, Read All About It!: A History of the British Newspaper (London, 2010).  
Focused on appeasement and the abdication crisis as the major stories of the 1930’s; India is not mentioned.    
2
 Carl Bridge, Holding India to the Empire: The British Conservative Party and the 1935 Constitution  (New York, 
1986).  Andrew Muldoon, Empire, Politics and the Creation of the 1935 India Act  (Burlington, 2009). 
3
 Nick Smart, The National Government, 1931-1940 (New York, 1999).  Nicholas Owen, The British Left and India: 
Metropolitan Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1947 (Oxford, 2007).  Also see Chandrika Kaul, Reporting the Raj: The 
British Press and India, c. 1880-1922 (Manchester, 2003) and Chandrika Kaul ed., Media and the British Empire 
(New York, 2006). 
2 
 
stories and leaders in the daily and periodical press, as well as radio talks on the BBC, cinema 
newsreels and hundreds of books.  India was the major political, not just imperial, issue 
throughout the interwar period.  The British press recognized it as such at the time.  Why, then, 
have historians relegated India to a minor nuisance in British domestic politics and foreign 
affairs?  The reason is simple: World War II.  With the greatest conflagration the world has ever 
known, the question of the war’s origins, and the role that appeasement played in those origins, 
achieved new paramountcy.  But only a prescient few could see world war on the horizon up to 1 
March 1939; the process of granting greater self-government to Britain’s largest dependency 
seemed far more real and far more pressing.4 Conveniently, India receded in importance in the 
British press with the achievement of a new Indian constitution in August 1935. Two months 
later, with the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the attention of Britain’s political elites began to shift 
toward the prospect of war and, therefore, toward the ongoing policy of appeasement.5 
Until 1935, however, India dominated the political agenda—just as it played a dominant role 
in Britain’s economic and military security. India served as an important British trading partner 
and recipient of capital.  British trade in the interwar period was shifting away from foreign 
markets to the Dominion and colonies and India was the largest purchaser of British goods until 
the late 1930’s.  India also contributed to balancing Britain’s balance of trade by exporting gold 
to Britain.  The Great War demonstrated India’s military importance to Britain.  India supplied 1. 
4 million soldiers, tons of materials, and ₤100 million at the outset of the war and ₤20-30 million 
annually during the war.  The Indian Army was self-supporting, meaning that it was paid for by 
                                                                 
4
 The British press covered events like the Anglo-German Naval Accords (June 1935) and the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, but the press debate about appeasement did not truly begin until the Munich crisis.  
5
 See David Gillard, Appeasement in Crisis: From Munich to Prague, October 1938-March 1939 (New York, 2007).  
R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War  (London, 
1993).  The topic of appeasement did not gain the interest of the press until the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 
October 1935 and did not become a major issue until Munich in the autumn of 1938; I can find no contemporary 
books on the subject until after the start of the war.   
 
3 
 
Indian, not British, taxpayers, and served as the ―imperial fire brigade,‖ putting out ―fires‖ in the 
newly acquired British mandates in the Middle East. More generally, the subcontinent served as 
a vast British military base in South Asia and the foundation of British global power and 
prestige.6  The growing demand for Indian political independence threatened to deprive Britain 
of this base. 
The Government of India was in the hands of a Viceroy appointed to five year term, who, in 
turn, was responsible to a cabinet level official, the Secretary of State for India who was 
responsible to Parliament.  The Imperial Legislative Council, an all-British body, assisted the 
Viceroy while British Governors oversaw the eight provinces of the Raj.  Provincial councils 
made up of Indians appointed by the Government of India advised these governors.  The only 
major change to the structure of the Raj since 1858 was the Government of India Act of 1909.  
Also known as the Morley-Minto Reforms, this act, which allowed Indians to be elected to 
legislative councils, sought to co-opt educated politically minded Indians into cooperating with 
the regime.  At this point, few British politicians or policy-makers viewed Indian self-
government as anything more than a distant goal.  In India, however, nationalism was already a 
powerful force.  A.O. Hume established the Indian National Congress in 1885 to obtain for 
educated Indians increased opportunities for self-government.  Initially a loose confederation of 
Western educated professionals, not a political party, Congress petitioned for increased 
opportunities in the civil service and the legislatures for Indians.   
The experience of World War I radicalized Congress.  Great Britain’s declaration of war on 
Germany and Austria-Hungary automatically brought India into the war without consulting 
                                                                 
6
 See Judith Brown, Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy (Oxford, 1994); B.R. Tomlinson, The 
Political Economy of the Raj, 1914-1947 (London, 1979); Burton Stein, A History of India (Oxford, 1998); Percival 
Spear, The Oxford History of Modern India, 1740-1975 (Oxford, 1997); Sugata Bose & Ayesha Jalal, Modern South 
Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy (New York, 1999). 
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Indian leaders.  The Defense of India Act, passed in March 1915, allowed special trials without 
juries and the imprisonment of suspects without trial.  Approximately 1.4 million Indian and 
British soldiers of the British Indian Army took part in the war in numerous theaters: the Western 
Front, Mesopotamia, East Africa, Palestine, and Gallipoli.  India also contributed large amounts 
of money and supplies to the Allied cause.  Increased defense spending by the Government of 
India led to increased taxes on the Indian people.  The war, which cost India 74,000 men dead 
and 70,000 wounded, left India in flux.  Food shortages, inflation, and the influenza pandemic 
fed the growing political discontent.  During the Great War, Congress, led by Balawantrao Tilak 
and Englishwoman Annie Besant, set up Home Rule Leagues throughout the subcontinent.7 
The emergence of Mohandas Gandhi as a nationalist leader furthered the radicalization of 
Congress and transformed the Indian nationalist campaign from a minority concern into a mass 
movement.  Gandhi, who had immigrated to South Africa in 1893, returned to India in 1915 and 
embarked on a one year trip across the subcontinent to reacquaint himself with his homeland.  
During 1917-8 he started three local non-violent non-cooperation campaigns which established 
his reputation as an effective leader of mass agitations.  In 1919 Gandhi made his move into 
politics at the all-India level for the first time.  He united politically minded Hindus protesting 
the Rowlatt Acts (these extended the Defense of India Act into peacetime) with Muslims 
discontented with British and Allied treatment of Turkey, home of the Islamic Khalifat.  
Although Gandhi called for peaceful civil disobedience, outbreaks of violence did occur in 
Delhi, Bombay, and the Punjab and culminated in the horrific Amritsar massacre.  On 13 April 
                                                                 
7
 Sugata Bose & Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy  (New York, 1999). 
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1919 at Amritsar in the Punjab, Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer fired without warning upon a 
prohibited meeting in Jallianwalla Bagh killing 379 and wounding over 1,200.8   
In the midst of this turbulence, the British Government pushed through important reform 
measures.  Lloyd George’s Cabinet, to counteract growing Indian nationalism and war weariness 
as well as reward Indian loyalty in the war, agreed to accelerate India’s political progress.  Edwin 
Montagu, the Liberal Secretary of State for India, made the announcement, known as the 
Montagu Declaration, on 20 August 1917.  The declaration stated that the British Government’s 
goal was the gradual development of self-governing institutions to achieve responsible 
government for India within the framework of the British Empire.  Out of the Montagu 
Declaration came the Government of India Act of 1919, with its controversial provision for 
dyarchy, the division of the portfolios of provincial governments into reserved and transferred 
subjects.  The Governor’s Council retained control over the former, such as security and 
taxation, and elected Indian ministers assumed responsibility for the latter, which included 
education, health, and agriculture. The reforms passed Parliament and attained royal assent in 
December as the Government of India Act of 1919. 
In October 1919, the Government of India, under public pressure from Indians, appointed a 
committee under Lord Hunter to investigate the disturbances in Delhi, Bombay, and the Punjab 
the previous April.  Other than Hunter, the commission consisted of four British members and 
three Indian.  It was through the commission and its hearings that the British press and public 
heard the truth of what happened at Amritsar.9  General Dyer was ordered to resign by the 
                                                                 
8
 The press reported the disturbances but the incident at Amritsar was not revealed to the British press until eight 
months later; the India Office claimed that the delay stemmed from a broken telegraph cable in the Mediterranean 
Sea.   
9
 The committee published its reports in May 1920; commission members divided on racial lines with the British 
members submitting the Majority Report and the Indians the Minority Report.  Both reports severely censured Dyer; 
the majority only reprimanded Punjab Lieutenant-Governor Michael O’Dwyer while the minority condemned him 
as well.   
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Commander-in-Chief of India, Major-General Sir Charles Munro.  Winston Churchill, the 
Secretary of State for War, echoed this decision by stating that Dyer would be forced to resign 
from the army altogether. 
In spite of Dyer’s condemnation, Gandhi’s civil disobedience campaign and the Muslim 
Khalifat movement continued to cause trouble on the subcontinent during 1920 and 1921. When 
the Prince of Wales, the future Edward VIII, disembarked in Bombay in November 1921, the 
local Congress committee organized a hartal and a demonstration. Gandhi demanded non-
violence, but riots broke out.  Lasting four days, the riots left many Europeans dead or injured.  
The police opened fire on the protesters: fifty-three demonstrators lay dead and hundreds 
wounded.  Gandhi toured the city and was sickened by the devastation; he fasted for three days 
to make amends for the victims of the riots. Protests reached a violent crescendo only a few 
months later after the Prince’s departure.  In February 1922 at Chauri Chaura in the United 
Provinces, police fired on a procession and were attacked by an angry mob.  The twenty-two 
policemen took shelter in their station but were forced out when the mob set fire to the premises.  
The mob hacked the officers to death and threw their bodies into the flames.10 
The events at Chauri Chaura led to a temporary lull in mass nationalist campaigns. As a 
result of the massacre, Gandhi called off the civil disobedience campaign and went on a five-day 
fast in repentance. Nevertheless the Government of India arrested Gandhi and sentenced him to 
six years in prison. He served only two, but then relinquished his leadership role in Congress and 
instead devoted the next five years to his homespun and Hindu education campaigns.  At the 
same time, Muslims lost their major grievance against the British when Turkish president Kemal 
Ataturk abolished the Khalifat in 1924. 
                                                                 
10
 Judith Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope (New Haven, 1989).  B.R. Nanda, Gandhi and His Critics (New Delhi, 
1985). 
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In 1927, however, nationalist protests resumed, in response to what became known as the 
Simon Commission. A provision in the 1919 Government of India Act specified that a 
commission be formed after ten years to investigate the workings of the Act.  With elections due 
in 1929, the Conservative Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, feared that if the Labour 
Party won office and determined the make-up of the commission, it might grant India dominion 
status. In 1927, then, Birkenhead announced the naming of the body of inquiry two years ahead 
of schedule (thus ensuring that its members were chosen by a Conservative Government).  These 
members were announced in November 1927: Sir John Simon of the Liberal Party as chairman, 
two Conservative members and two Labour members (including the future PM Clement Attlee) 
from the House of Commons, and two Conservative Lords.  Furious that no Indian members 
were appointed, the nationalist movement in India protested the commission. A countrywide 
hartal and demonstrations greeted the Simon Commission when it disembarked at Bombay for 
its first tour of India in February 1928; protests also arose in other cities that the commission 
visited during its journey.  
After two tours of India and numerous consultations over two years, the Simon Commission 
presented its report to Parliament in two volumes on 10 and 24 June 1930.  The commission’s 
main recommendation was to scrap dyarchy in the provinces and introduce full ministerial 
responsibility at the provincial level; the central government would continue to remain fully in 
British hands.  The Simon Report, however, mattered little; it was essentially out of date on 
arrival because of the independent actions of the Viceroy, Lord Irwin.  With little confidence in 
the success of the Simon Commission, Irwin came up with his own plan supported by the Labour 
Government, one that he hoped would attach liberal Indian opinion to the Raj and split the Indian 
National Congress.  The Viceroy wanted to avoid a clash with Congress, with its demands 
8 
 
backed by the threat of civil disobedience.  The Irwin Declaration, issued on 31 October 1929 
(while the Simon Commission was still touring India and nine months before it issued its report), 
reaffirmed that dominion status was the ultimate goal of British rule in India; it also included a 
proposal for a series of talks between representatives of the British Government, British India, 
and the Indian Princes.11  Congress responded to the Viceroy’s offer with a declaration of 
independence at its annual conference on 31 December 1929. 
Nevertheless, the first set of talks, the first Round Table Conference, took place in London 
between 12 November 1930 and 19 January 1931.12  Representatives of all major Indian parties 
and the princes attended, with one glaring exception:  the Indian National Congress declined 
Irwin’s offer.  Unwilling to conform to a British agenda or to accept the princes as equal 
representatives of the Indian people, Congress instead prepared for a new round of civil 
disobedience to commence early in 1930.  This campaign included hartals, boycotts of British 
goods, picketing, a no-tax campaign and a no-rent campaign.   
On 2 March 1930, Gandhi, set out on his own satyagraha campaign from his home in 
Ahmadabad for a 240 mile walk to the sea in protest of the government monopoly on salt.  
Thousands joined him on his trek, including journalists from around the globe. The ―Salt March‖ 
became a true media event.  Gandhi reached the shore at Dandi on 5 April and ceremonially 
made salt on the beach in defiance of the law.13   
The Gandhi-Irwin Pact, essentially an armistice between the Government of India and 
Congress, was agreed to by the Viceroy and Gandhi after weeks of negotiations in early March 
                                                                 
11
 Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox: A Life of Lord Halifax (London, 1991).  Earl of Halifax, Fulness of Days 
(London, 1957).  Earl of Birkenhead, Halifax (London, 1965).  S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin 1926-31 
(Oxford, 1957). 
12 The main accomplishment of the meeting was the agreement that India should achieve dominion status as a 
federation of British India and the Princely States. 
13
 The Government of India largely ignored the proceedings. 
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1931.  Gandhi and the Viceroy came to the negotiating table as both feared that Congress would 
resort to violence to break the stalemate.  By the agreement Congress suspended its campaign of 
civil disobedience.  Gandhi agreed to attend the second Round Table Conference in exchange for 
the release of political prisoners, the return of confiscated property, and a relaxation of some 
emergency coercive powers.   By the terms of his pact with the Viceroy, Gandhi attended the 
second Round Table Conference (15 September to 1 December 1931) as the sole representative 
of Congress.  The meeting accomplished little; discussions quickly devolved into bickering over 
reserved seats for religious minorities.  The same was true of the Third Round Table Conference 
which took place between November and December 1932. 
Because of the failure of the second round table conference to decide the distribution of seats 
in the provincial and federal legislatures in the future federated India, the British Government 
made the Communal Award.  Announced by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald in August 
1932, the award granted separate electorates to minorities including Muslims, Sikhs, and 
untouchables.  Congress opposed the award because it removed untouchables from the Hindu 
electorate; Gandhi fasted in protest against it.  The award was superseded by the Poona Pact, 
concluded in September 1932 between Dr. Ambedkar, leader of the untouchables, and the 
leaders of the caste Hindus.  Untouchables kept their separate electorates but took their place 
under the umbrella of caste Hindus. 
The India White Paper of March 1933 encapsulated the agreements reached at the three 
round table talks and the Communal Award: it called for British India and the Princely States to 
combine into a single federation, with a Central Legislative Assembly elected by separate 
electorates.  The bill abolished dyarchy in the provinces, all government departments were to be 
controlled by elected Indian ministers.  However, thanks to the powerful safeguards, Governors 
10 
 
could dismiss ministries whenever they deemed it necessary.  The India White Paper became the 
basis of the Government of India Act, which received its official assent in August, 1935.  
Between the assent of the India Act and the outbreak of the Second World War in September 
1939, the only major event in India was the provincial elections of 1937.  In spite of the franchise 
being limited to property owners, Congress won control of seven of the eight British Indian 
provinces; in the following year it controlled all eight.  The Viceroy, however, still held supreme 
executive power, as evidenced by his entering India into the World War II alongside Britain 
without consulting Indian leaders. 
The ongoing crisis in India helped transform the Conservative Party.  In the wake of the 
Great War, British party politics changed dramatically as the result of two interlocking 
developments.  First, by the Representation of the People Act of 1918, which enfranchised 
virtually all men over 21 and women over 30, Britain finally became a democracy.14  The upper 
and middle classes of Britain had to confront the fact that they were no longer in control of the 
political game; the masses had the vote.  Second, the Labour Party replaced the Liberal Party as 
the party of the Opposition.  The prospect of an avowedly socialist party coming to power in 
Britain, especially after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, made the upper and middle classes 
practically swoon in terror.  Added to these major changes in politics was the continuing 
introduction of mass media.  Industrial printing techniques made the mass production of cheap 
newspapers possible and the railroad allowed for quick and easy national distribution.  And the 
advent of radio and cinema provided new avenues for politicians to reach the newly enfranchised 
electorate.   
                                                                 
14
 The electorate increased from 8 to 21 million voters ; approximately 13 million men versus 8 million women.  
Women received the vote at 21 by the Representation of the People Act of 1928 which increased the electorate to 29 
million.  Before the war only 10% of males 21 and over had the vote because of property restrictions. 
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In response, the Conservative Party had to change or confine itself to political irrelevance.  
The war undermined or erased the old causes of the Tory party: preservation of the union with 
Ireland, preservation of the Church, and tariff reform.  And change it did: the party confirmed its 
transformation from the party of the landed elites to the party of the commercial and business 
classes.  It did this by reorganization: developing mass organizations for women, young people, 
and wage earners.15  The Conservatives portrayed themselves as the party of free trade, Empire, 
and anti-socialism.  The reorganized Conservative Party became the dominant political party of 
the interwar era, controlling the Government, alone or in coalition, for all but three years 
between 1919 and 1939.  Conservatism remained strongly imperialist, nationalist, and anti-
socialist.  In spite of the official line of free trade, however, the party was deeply divided over 
the issue with some notable Conservatives favoring protective tariffs or an imperial customs 
union. 
 Imperial issues also divided the Conservative Party.  Three groups emerged: reformers, led 
by party leader Stanley Baldwin; the constructive imperialists, best exemplified by Leo Amery; 
and the romantic imperialists, also known as the diehards, unofficially led by Winston 
Churchill.16  Baldwin was the dominant character of British politics from 1924 to 1937 as leader 
of the Conservative Party, Prime Minister (1924-9 and 1935-7), prominent member of the 
National Government (1931-1935), and leader of the Conservative opposition (1924 and 1929-
31).  In 1929 Baldwin became an avid supporter of Indian constitutional reform; he, and other 
reformers such as Samuel Hoare, saw it as the surest way to cement peaceably India’s place 
within the empire.  Baldwin also worked to ensure that Indian reform was a bipartisan effort 
                                                                 
15
 See Neal R. McCrillis, The British Conservative Party in the Age of Universal Suffrage: Popular Conservatism, 
1918-29 (Columbus, 1998). 
16
 But not all diehards were Conservative.  A prominent diehard and frequent contributor to the Sunday Times, 
British Weekly, and Saturday Review was the Liberal Lord Meston.  Meston served in the Indian Civil Service at the 
turn of the century and served as Lt. Governor of the United Provinces from 1912 to 1918. 
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along with the Labour Party.  Amery and the constructive imperialists were more concerned with 
the economic development of British possessions in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia than 
they were with India.  In contrast, the diehards viewed events in India as pivotal – and feared a 
disastrous repeat of the Irish experience.  Churchill was willing to risk his political future on the 
issue: he resigned from the shadow cabinet in January 1931 in order to be free to speak out 
against the Indian reforms.17 
The split between Baldwin and Churchill was based on personality as well as opposing views 
of empire.  Churchill’s and Baldwin’s temperaments and personas were on opposite ends of the 
spectrum: Churchill was passionate and romantic, embracing causes, such as India or 
rearmament, deeply and zealously, while Baldwin was more pragmatic and even-tempered, 
doing what was practical and possible.  On the issue of empire, the divide was stark: Churchill 
was an imperialist while Baldwin was not; also, when thinking of the empire Churchill thought 
of India’s importance first while Baldwin viewed the White Dominions as most vital.  On the 
issue of India, Churchill’s vision of the subcontinent dated from his time there in the 1890’s as a 
subaltern in the British army; he wanted to identify the Tory Party with the 19th century empire.  
Baldwin wanted to adjust the Conservative Party’s conception of empire to post-war realities, 
namely the necessity of dealing with the Indian nationalist movement.   
Baldwin, and other Tory pro-reformers, looked to the precedent of Ireland: they believed that 
the British Government withheld reform from Ireland far too long resulting in a bloody civil war 
and the loss of southern Ireland.  They viewed reform as the means to secure peacefully India in 
the empire; no one contemplated a self-governing India any time in the near future, let alone an 
                                                                 
17
 K. Veerathappa, The British Conservative Party and Indian Independence, 1930-1947 (New Delhi, 1976).  
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independent India.  Baldwin wanted to maintain the empire in the background of his vision of the 
Conservative Party and to keep Indian reform out of the domestic political arena.   
In contrast, Churchill and the diehards saw reform, not the lack thereof, as the root cause of 
Ireland’s troubles.  The diehards, however, were not reactionaries.  They recognized the need for 
constitutional reform in India but their vision meant a much slower pace and less far-reaching 
measures.  A self-governing India, if the diehards had their way, would be centuries away.  
Convinced that the party, if not the entire country, sympathized with their views, the diehards 
wanted their image of India and empire forefront in the Conservative Party; they therefore sought 
to make Indian reform a domestic political issue.18 
In the interconnected struggles to shape the futures of both the Conservative Party and India, 
the press played a crucial role.  The interwar years were the golden age of British newspapers.  In 
the twenties, radio was in its infancy; the BBC did not become a major news source until the 
thirties.  Television was still in the developmental stages confined to research laboratories; 
hence, virtually everyone still got their news from the daily and periodical press.19 Although the 
London press dominated England, provincial papers such as the Manchester Guardian and 
Yorkshire Post also achieved national circulation.  The Daily Mail was the first true national 
daily, established by Alfred Harmsworth (made Lord Northcliffe in 1905) in 1896.  Changes 
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introduced by Northcliffe included a cheaper cover price, women’s and sports pages, and higher 
quality photographs.  The Mail’s rival, the Daily Express, established in 1900, innovated news 
on the front page, banner headlines, and full-page advertisements.  The war taught even quality 
papers, such as the Times, that urgent and important news deserved headlines and front page 
coverage.  
The interwar years were also the golden age of the British press lords.  Membership in this 
select group included Lord Burnham, who sold the Daily Telegraph to Lord Camrose in 1928, 
and Viscount Astor, who acquired the Times from Lord Northcliffe in 1922. The most notorious 
press lords, however, were Lord Beaverbrook of the Daily Express and Lord Rothermere, who 
acquired the Daily Mail from his brother Northcliffe upon his death in 1922.20  The press lords, 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere especially, attempted to use their newspapers to influence party 
politics and government policies. Beaverbrook and Rothermere blamed Baldwin for the Tory 
electoral defeat in 1929 and worked in tandem to unseat him from the leadership of the 
Conservative party.  The two press lords, however, differed on their views of India.  
Beaverbrook favored ―Empire Free Trade,‖ effectively an imperial customs union of the White 
Dominions and Britain; India did not figure into his calculations.  Rothermere, in contrast, 
considered the continued control of India as paramount to British prosperity and world power 
status.  Strongly opposed to Baldwin’s plans for increasing Indian self-government, Rothermere 
advocated a crackdown on the Indian nationalist movement. His United Empire Party combined 
his desire to oust Baldwin from his leadership perch with his interest in India. 
  The power of the press is undisputed but immeasurable.  It is taken as a given, but 
difficult to explain.  Scholars disagree over the degree to which the press mirrored and molded 
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public opinion.  However, there is a consensus that the press both mirrored and molded public 
opinion and politicians ignored the press at their peril.  Stephen Koss described press power as a 
―great force‖ and concluded that both newspapers writers and readers believed that papers were 
influential, that this influence was pervasive, and ―mistaken or not, this conviction created its 
own reality.‖21  Andrew Sharf contended that the press was considered to be a powerful and 
potentially dangerous political instrument ―and this in itself gave it power.‖22  Newspaper editors 
had the power to pick and choose, amongst the wide variety of topics of the day, which ones to 
concentrate upon and emphasize as important to their readers.  And in this case, from 1919 to 
1935 editors consistently selected India as an important issue.  India merited not only articles 
explaining current events in or about the subcontinent, but also leaders to explain the paper’s 
opinions on India.  Kevin Williams stated that newspapers played an important role in the lives 
of the British people as more newspapers per capita were bought in Britain than in most other 
countries; newspaper reading was, and remains, a major leisure activity in Britain.  Williams also 
contended that there is a strong correlation between social class and newspaper reading in 
Britain: ―newspapers have been…strongly divided along class lines.‖23  Martin Conboy 
described journalism as a complex intersection of conflicting relationships involving political 
and economic power and thus referred to it as an example of discourse.24  Julie Codell asserted 
that newspaper helped create and shape Britain’s imperial identity: readers ―derived their sense 
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of their own and others’ places and spaces from the press, which offered a major site for the 
production and re-production of national identities.‖25 
 Circulation of these papers and periodicals varied greatly.  These estimates are from 
1938:26 
Table 1: English Press Circulation 
Daily Express 2,329,000 
Daily Mail 1,580,000 
Daily Telegraph 637,000 
Daily Herald 2,000,000+ 
Observer 214,000 
Times 192,000 
Yorkshire Post 29,000 
Manchester Guardian 56,000 
Sunday Times 270,000 
 
Most British editors were the product of the middle class. Only George Lansbury, founder, 
editor, and proprietor of the Daily Herald and James Garvin of the Observer, came from 
working-class families. (Lansbury’s father was a railway timekeeper and Garvin’s was a poor 
Irish Catholic laborer).27  Geoffrey Dawson of the Times, Walter Layton of the Economist, 
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Charles Prestwich Scott of the Manchester Guardian, Arthur Mann of the Yorkshire Post, 
Kingsley Martin of the New Statesman, Evelyn Wrench of the Spectator, and H.A. Gwynne of 
the Morning Post all emerged from the British bourgeoisie.  Dawson’s father was a banker, 
Mann’s father was a merchant who also served as mayor of Warwick while Scott’s father was a 
partner in a coal company.  Other diverse occupations such as Congregationalist minister 
(Martin), professional singer (Layton), Irish land commissioner (Wrench), and schoolmaster 
(Gwynne) all fit under the middle class umbrella in Britain.   
Their educations also reveal their middle-class status. Scott attended Clapham Grammar 
School, Dawson was educated at Eton, Layton attended King’s College School (London), Martin 
went to Mill Hill School (London), Wrench attended Summer Fields Prep (Oxford), and Eton, 
Gwynne went to Swansea Grammar School and Mann attended the Warwick School.  Four of 
these editors not only went to university but to Oxford or Cambridge: Martin studied history at 
Magdalene College, Cambridge, Layton took degrees in history and economics from Trinity 
College, Cambridge; Dawson studied classics at Magdalen College, Oxford; Scott studied 
classics at Corpus Christi College, Oxford.  Again, Garvin and Lansbury are the exceptions: 
Garvin left school at 13 but continued his education on his own; he entered journalism as a 
proofreader for the Newcastle Daily Chronicle in his early 20’s.  Lansbury’s education was 
intermittent up to the age of 14; he left school to do a variety of manual jobs. 
Two future editors remained in academia early in their careers.  Layton went on to post-
graduate studies in economics at Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge, and eventually became a 
lecturer in economics there.  Martin was a visiting scholar at Princeton and became an assistant 
lecturer in politics at the London School of Economics.  Of the three who did not go to 
university, two were apprenticed to journalists after they completed their secondary education.  
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Gwynne, for example, began at the Times and moved to Reuters serving as a foreign 
correspondent for many years.  Wrench became a briefly successful entrepreneur out of Eton; he 
was introduced to the newspaper game as Lord Northcliffe’s private secretary, a job he held for 
eight years.  Two of the future editors served in the civil service.  Layton joined at the outbreak 
of the Great War and served in a variety of ministries including the Local Government Board 
under Seebohm Rowntree, the Board of Trade, and the Ministry of Munitions.  Layton also stood 
for Parliament as a Liberal unsuccessfully three times (1922, 1923, and 1929).  Dawson served in 
the Colonial Office under Joseph Chamberlain and in South Africa for the High Commissioner, 
Milner.  Garvin took, and failed, the civil service exam.   
Many of the editors’ biographies also highlight the connection between British journalism 
and parliamentary politics.  Lansbury ran unsuccessfully for Parliament in 1895 and 1900 as a 
Social Democratic Federation candidate, and in 1904 and 1906 as an Independent Labour Party 
candidate.  He served as Labour MP from 1910-12 and 1922 to his death 1940.  Many editors 
had prominent politicians amongst their regular correspondents.  Regarding India, Dawson 
frequently corresponded with Viceroy Lord Irwin, India Secretary Wedgwood Benn, and Tory 
leader and oft Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin.  Dawson essentially served as a sounding board 
and unofficial advisor for Irwin during his Viceroyalty.  Scott and Garvin frequently 
corresponded with Statutory Commission chairman Sir John Simon.  Gwynne exchanged 
numerous letters with MP’s associated with the India Defense League, an organization devoted 
to the diehard cause. 
As the above biographies make clear, many editors and contributors floated in and out of 
three arenas throughout their careers: teaching at university, serving in the civil service, and 
serving stints at major newspapers or periodicals.  Hence, these editors not only often had 
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contacts with the politicians and corresponded on a regular basis they also formed part of 
Britain’s political elite. They used their papers to publicize and popularize the upper and middle 
classes views of India and its place in the British Empire.   
To discover what the press thought about India and the reforms processes between 1919 and 
1935 I examined eighteen English newspapers and periodicals.  The papers under investigation 
were overwhelmingly Conservative in their political affiliation or leaning: the Times, Sunday 
Times, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, Observer, Yorkshire Post, Truth, Spectator, Saturday 
Review, Daily Mail, and Daily Express.  Only two papers were affiliated with Labour – the Daily 
Herald and New Statesman -- while the Manchester Guardian and Economist remained loyal to 
the Liberal Party.  Three papers remained somewhat anomalous: the Nation & Athenaeum 
(merged with the New Statesman in January 1931 to form the New Statesman & Nation) can be 
best be described as Liberal/Labour, Time & Tide described itself as above party but tended to 
side with the Conservatives, and the British Weekly identified itself as a Christian paper with no 
overt political party affiliation.  For simplicity (and sanity’s sake), I concentrated my research on 
twenty-four ―hot points,‖ key events in India or in the making of British policy toward India 
between 1919 and 1935.  These were events where the majority of papers commented upon, as 
opposed to incidents that only a few papers remarked on, while most did not, such as when 
Baldwin named Irwin Viceroy and the publication of the Nehru Report. 
Table 2: ―Hot Point‖ Events In or Concerning India, 1919-1935 
Disturbances in the Punjab April 1919 
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms  May, June, 
November, 
December 1919 
Dyer Controversy December 1919; 
May & July 
1920 
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Prince of Wales Visit November 1921 
Chauri Chaura February 1922 
Simon Commission Named November 1927 
Simon Commission Arrives in India February 1928 
Irwin Declaration and Aftermath November 1929 
Congress Declaration of Independence January 1930 
Gandhi’s Salt March March & April 
1930 
Simon Report  June 1930 
First Round Table Conference November 1930 
& January 1931 
Gandhi-Irwin Pact March 1931 
Second Round Table Conference September & 
December 1931 
Communal Award August 1932 
Poona Pact September & 
October 1932 
Third Round Table Conference November & 
December 1932 
Indian White Paper March 1933 
India White Paper Report November 1934 
Queen’s Hall Debate December 1934 
White Paper Debate December 1934 
India Bill Introduced February 1935 
India Bill Passed August 1935 
India Bill Enacted December 1935 
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Writing about Britain in the 1930’s, A.J.P. Taylor quipped that ―if the importance of a 
subject were to be measured by the columns which it took up in Hansard, the entire nation would 
seem to have been obsessed with the intricacies of India’s constitutional future.‖  Taylor went on 
to insist, ―This was not so.  India was a specialist affair,‖ although he admitted, ―an important 
one all the same.‖ 28  While the entire nation was not obsessed with India, Britain’s politicians 
and policy makers – as well as the press, saw India as a central concern.  The press debate over 
the future of India was a closed debate between and among the upper and middle classes of 
Britain broadcast via newspapers across the country.   
This dissertation addresses five major points.  First, it shows the essential lack of debate in 
the press concerning the future of India.  There was no divergence of opinion across the political 
spectrum or across the seventeen years under investigation over the British imperial mission or 
perceptions of India and, ultimately, only minimal differences over the pace and scope of reform.  
Second, it highlights the differences between assumptions explained and those left unspoken.  
Many assumptions, such as the eternal animosity between Hindus and Muslims, are explained at 
great length while others, such as that of race and the benefits that control over India brought to 
Britain are left tacit.  This is likely a result of a combination of assuming the reader already 
knows these facts as well as editors avoiding sullying the British imperial mission.  Third, the 
dissertation shows the paradoxical relationship between the diehards and democracy both in 
Britain and India.  The diehards, adjusting to the new reality of universal manhood suffrage in 
Britain inaugurated in 1918, attempted to use the issue of India as a means of co-opting new 
voters and retaining existing ones as well.  Churchill and the other India diehards believed that 
the new voters shared the same traditional views of India and empire and were only ignorant of 
what the Conservative leadership’s and Labour’s reform plans meant to the Raj.  Once the 
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general public found out the truth, the diehards believed, the voters would demand a change in 
Tory leadership and an imperially centered Conservative Party most likely led by a diehard.  
Fourth, this study wades into the debate between John MacKenzie and the ―Manchester school‖ 
and Bernard Porter and the imperial skeptics by examining the limits of Britain’s imperial 
culture.  MacKenzie sees empire as prevalent in British society and argues that a pervasive 
imperial culture included the working class while Porter disputes the existence of an imperial 
culture and claims that empire was only of interest to Britain’s upper and upper middle classes.   
This work shows that an imperial culture did exist, but even so empire was only of interest to the 
chattering classes.  Fifth, this study demonstrates that India was the major issue of concern to 
those chattering classes in interwar Britain.  The press recognized its importance through its 
voluminous coverage of events on the subcontinent and reforms processes.  As will be seen, the 
press discussed India a lot, and this dialogue helped determine the identity of the Conservative 
Party – and of imperial Britain between the wars. 
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Chapter 2 
The Raj at Bay, 1919-1922 
Under the protection of the existing system the Indian must learn the art of self-
government in the only way possible – by practice.  This is the beginning, as we 
are proud to think, of the great and difficult period of „handing over‟ in India. 
 “The Blessed Word „Dyarchy.‟” Editorial. Observer. 8 June 1919: 10a. 
What an irony that this should be the moment when in a fit of indecision and at 
the bidding of a capricious, wilful, undecided, and over cultivated politician, we 
should take the first step in withdrawing the benefits which Western methods of 
rule have brought to India – the land which till British rule was established 
therein never knew any period of peace and prosperity longer than one 
generation. 
 “National Mismanagement: The New Indian Constitution,” Spectator, 6 Dec. 1919, 758. 
 
In 1919 the British Empire was under siege.  In January Sinn Fein MPs refused to take their 
seats at Westminster, set up their own parallel government in Dublin, and proclaimed Ireland a 
republic.  The “Troubles” began in early summer with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the 
paramilitary wing of the Sinn Fein government, instituting a violent campaign against the Royal 
Irish Constabulary (RIC).  The IRA murdered policemen, attacked police stations, and burned 
RIC barracks.  In Egypt, a mass movement for the full independence of Egypt and Sudan 
organized by the Wafd Party at a grassroots level, using the tactics of civil disobedience.  In 
March the British authorities arrested the Wafd leadership and exiled them to Malta.  
Demonstrations, strikes, and a violent uprising in the countryside spread like wildfire across 
Egypt bringing normal life to a halt.  By July, 800 Egyptians were dead and 1,600 wounded.  
Against the backdrop of this imperial turbulence, Gandhi made his move into politics at the 
all-India level for the first time.  In 1919 he united politically minded Hindus protesting the 
Rowlatt Acts with Muslims discontented with British and Allied treatment of Turkey, the Islamic 
political power.  The Rowlatt Acts extended the Defense of India Act into peacetime.  Although 
Gandhi called for peaceful civil disobedience, outbreaks of violence did occur in Delhi, Bombay, 
and the Punjab and culminated in the horrific Amritsar massacre.  On 13 April 1919 at Amritsar 
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in the Punjab, Brigadier-General Reginald Dyer fired without warning upon a prohibited meeting 
in Jallianwalla Bagh killing 379 and wounding over 1,200. In the midst of this turbulence, the 
British Government pushed through important reform measures. Edwin Montagu, the Liberal 
Secretary of State for India, pushed his reforms through Parliament culminating in the 
Government of India Act of 1919, with its controversial provision for dyarchy, the division of 
the portfolios of provincial governments into reserved and transferred subjects.  The empire 
survived 1919 intact (though both Southern Ireland and Egypt were lost by 1922) and imperial 
resolve in India, as will be seen, remained undiminished.  The English press consensus across the 
political spectrum was already in place by 1919 as Liberal, Conservative, and Labour papers 
express like views of the imperial mission, Indian society and nationalists; themes that will 
continue to 1935.  This period also witnesses the creation of the India diehards who resisted the 
1919 India Act as a betrayal of Britain‟s imperial mission.  The debate over Conservative and 
British imperial identity came under fierce debate during the 1919-1922 period especially over 
the Amritsar massacre and Dyer trial.  Also in this turbulent atmosphere the Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms navigated its way through Parliament to become the Government of India 
Act of 1919, the Prince of Wales visited the subcontinent on an imperial tour, and the unrest 
climaxed with the gruesome murder of twenty-three policemen by an angry mob in the town of 
Chauri Chaura. 
The English press did not feel overly compelled to justify British rule in India; the justice of 
that rule is largely assumed.  Primarily the papers had to explain the occurrence of disorder in 
India.  Press leaders explained the tumult as the result of variables beyond Britain‟s control, 
rather than either specific British policies, such as the Rowlatt Acts, or British rule over India in 
general.  Both pro-reform and anti-reform papers portrayed India as a divided land and Indian 
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nationalists as irresponsible agitators.  The Raj was necessary, according to the press, as it 
established and preserved peace and order on the subcontinent; pro-reform papers highlighted the 
benefit of tutoring Indians on the skills of self-government.  On the subject of Indian 
nationalism, the press placed nearly all of its focus on one man: Gandhi.  Focusing on one man 
seemingly made it easy for the press to marginalize and discount the Indian nationalist 
movement as a temporary phenomenon that was incapable of peacefully taking charge of the 
Indian government.  The press also sought to use the Prince of Wales, who visited India in 
November 1921, as a contrast with Gandhi or to demonstrate the loyalty of the Indian masses to 
the Raj.  No paper attempted to make domestic political hay with the issue of India.  Perhaps 
there was just a common assumed agreement in the press to keep India out of the domestic 
political arena. 
 The most popular scapegoats for the turmoil in India were the Bolsheviks.  The belief in 
communist complicity was so strong that many papers continued to support it even after the 
Hunter Commission found that there was no organized conspiracy behind the disorders, let alone 
involvement by the Bolsheviks.1  Bolsheviks were behind the war with Afghanistan with the aim 
of weakening the British Empire and “Bolshevist propaganda” helped to cause the troubles in 
India; papers charged that either the Government of India or the India Office blocked this 
information from reaching Britain.2  Because of the Bolsheviks‟ skill at propaganda it was not 
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“extravagant to suppose they have got into touch with seditious elements in India”3 and that 
Bolshevik misinformation took root in the soil of ignorance in India.4  Even the normally staid 
Times had its conspiracy theory about the disorders in India: “The tentacles of the conspiracy 
extend far beyond India, and the secret leaders are now unquestionably in touch with the Russian 
Bolshevist movement.”5  This theory was repeated verbatim in the Times eight months later in 
December 1919.6  The British Weekly and New Statesman also stuck with their Bolshevik 
conspiracy theories in spite of the findings of Lord Hunter.7 
 Two papers saw the external causes not in Bolshevism but in one of Britain‟s enemies 
during the war, the Ottoman Empire.  These papers contended that Britain‟s troubles with the 
peace treaty with the Turks, the Islamic power, led to Indian Muslims joining forces with Hindus 
in demonstrations against the Raj.  Blaming the Turks also helped to explain similar disturbances 
occurring simultaneously in Egypt, and why Muslims were joining Hindus in the disorder.  The 
Yorkshire Post cited the difficulties surrounding the Treaty of Sèvres led to troubles with 
Muslims not only in India but also in Egypt.8  Inflammatory language by Gandhi about Egypt 
was evidence that the disturbances arose from religious causes.  The New Statesman also claimed 
the work of Turkish agents during the war to induce a rising of Muslims against the British was 
bearing fruit.9  The Statesman saw the defeat of the Turkish Empire as a reason Indian Muslims 
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were up in arms against the British,10 though the paper would also contend that all of the troubles 
of India would disappear once the reforms materialized.11 
 Other papers did not point to a single conspicuous cause of the unrest but to a litany of 
sources.  The Observer, Daily Mail, and Manchester Guardian described the world war as 
triggering a world revolution which affected India as it did elsewhere.  The Guardian portrayed 
the Indian tumult as “symptoms of a political and spiritual unrest which we cannot in the full 
sense hope to estimate” unleashed by the “prodigious forces of upheaval which have been 
working through the world during the past five years,” forces that included the influenza 
outbreak, food scarcity, and high prices. 12  The entire world was remaking itself after the Great 
War according to the Observer: 
It is not the West only which is painfully recasting itself under the break-up of 
forms and theories which have done duty for a century.  The East is stirring in the 
same process of dissolution and renaissance.13 
 
The Daily Mail blamed the riots in India on the “wave of unrest that has spread over the whole 
world since the close of the war” which was also the cause of troubles in Egypt, Ireland, and the 
Continent.14   
While British papers had differing explanations of the source of post-war India‟s unrest, 
they agreed that the Rowlatt Acts were not to blame, with one exception: the New Statesman.  
The Times, Daily Mail, and Morning Post each stressed that the Rowlatt Acts were the pretext 
for and not the cause of the unrest.  The Times described the opposition to the acts as “never very 
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sincere” and attributed the disturbances to “inflammatory agitators.”15  The acts, the Daily Mail 
asserted, were “measures which any right-thinking or loyal Indian might have been expected to 
support.”16  Looking back from December 1919, the Morning Post claimed that the Rowlatt Act 
was “made necessary by the attempts to overthrow British rule during the war” and that 
“agitators seized upon this measure to organize an agitation which threatened the very existence 
of British rule in India.”17   
 The press could not conceive of Indians themselves wanting to overthrow the Raj 
because of all the benefits that British rule conferred to the people of the subcontinent.  
Unsurprisingly, or perhaps ironically, considering the strife afflicting India, the press highlighted 
maintenance of peace and order as first and foremost amongst British achievements.  The 
Yorkshire Post summed up Raj‟s role of providing stability and protection to India in describing 
why Indians in the army and police stayed loyal during the disorders: 
It may be that they know the advantages, internal and external, which India 
derives from her connections with the British Empire, and that they recognize the 
inability of the people of India, as a whole, to themselves resist invasion by some 
other Power, if the safeguarding hand of the British Empire were removed.18 
 
This sentiment was effectively echoed in the Spectator: 
India throughout her history has been cursed by the demon of anarchy except 
during the period of our rule.  It is our greatest claim to the gratitude of mankind 
that we stopped anarchy among the vast populations of India.19 
  
The British had made themselves responsible for the “security and happiness of a great part of 
the human race in India”20 and if the British withdrew from India “there would be chaos, 
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confusion, and decimation indescribable.”21  Therefore, the first duty of the Government of India 
was the restoration of order and the prevention of further danger of disturbance.22  Sections of the 
press highlighted the need for peace and order to be restored first before the reforms process 
could be carried out.  This idea was best expressed by the Yorkshire Post: 
At a time when the Indian people are being trusted with a larger measure of self-
government, and have yet to show how far they are ready for such 
responsibilities, it is more than ever essential that a strong hand should be taken 
against those who are out to wreck all possibility of peaceful, orderly, progress.23 
 
Domestic order, to the Daily Telegraph, was a sine qua non of “the most elementary measures of 
constitutional development.”24 
 Other benefits of British rule received much less attention during the 1919-1922 period; 
the press only mentioned education and the instruction in self-government.  The Observer noted 
that Indians were finally coming to embrace Western ideas: “Indian interest has turned eagerly in 
the direction in which it has been our policy to guide it.”25  The instruction of Indians in the 
difficult art of self-rule was another important benefit of the Raj.  This was best stated by Truth 
in May 1919: 
There is no justification for British rule in India that will in these days stand 
debate before a democratic electorate, except this – that we simply remain in India 
for the purpose of putting the Indian people in the way of learning to govern 
themselves, in this performing a duty which has devolved upon us, and which we 
cannot repudiate without inflicting grievous misfortune upon the Indian people.26 
 
The Observer concurred, claiming that the Government of India was “working more and 
more…for its own supersession” and that it was the goal of British rule was “to devolve 
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responsibility upon Indians.”27  Britain was “carrying a long step farther the doctrine which is at 
the base of our Indian policy,” namely self-government for India, according to the Manchester 
Guardian.  The paper concluded that the justification of the Raj was that “the peoples of India 
shall derive benefit from it.”28  The most ostentatious language describing Britain‟s tutelage of 
Indians came from the usually serious Times: 
The task of Great Britain is still, as in the past, to guide them onward march, with 
unresting zeal, with prudent boldness, and in a faith indomitable that the reward 
of sacrifice to pure ideals is sure.29 
 
 The press devoted more space highlighting dominant British perceptions of India and its 
peoples.  In its pages India appeared as a land of divisions, divisions based on mistrust if not 
outright hatred, and particularly on a seemingly impassable gulf between Hindus and Muslims. 
The assumption of permanent sectarian divisions, however, presented leader writers with a 
problem: editors could not explain how Hindus and Muslims were able to work together in 
demonstrating against the Raj in the spring of 1919. 
Most press leaders agreed that the divisions of India, especially the gulf between Hindus 
and Muslims, were a major stumbling block to reform.  The Yorkshire Post wondered aloud 
whether it was possible to transfer power to Indians “due to the variety of language, caste, and 
social conditions.”  To illustrate this point the Post pointed to the condition of Russia, going 
through a brutal civil war at the time, even though it was more unified with no religious 
differences.30  The Daily Mail saw a subcontinent “seething with a newly born race-
consciousness” growing in an atmosphere of “acute political unrest.”31  The Morning Post 
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worried most about the threatened dominance of Hindu lawyers in a self-governing India.  The 
Post condemned the “politically minded class whom Mr. Montagu misrepresents as the „people 
of India.‟  They are not the people, but the enemies of the people.”32  India as a whole was loyal, 
but Montagu‟s machinations with the “educated and wealthier classes” led to unrest.  The paper 
concluded that the Indian masses would fare worse if power were transferred from the British to 
Indian lawyers and landowners.33   
 The English press blamed Indian nationalists for inciting the uneducated masses by 
spreading lies about the Raj.  Those Indians who rioted were nothing but “the foolish dupes of 
agitators who sought „naked revolution,‟ and nothing less.”34 The riots did not reveal a people 
united for political freedom; instead, they resulted from the vicious efforts of a, “minute and 
selfish minority, chiefly composed of an arrogant priestly caste;”35 merely a collection of “half-
educated…native journalists and lawyers who are not more than 5 per cent of the population.”36  
These agitators aroused support by blaming all of India‟s ills on the “wilful malevolence on the 
part of the British”  and spreading “poisonous falsehoods” about the Rowlatt Acts, describing the 
acts “as giving sanction to the most atrocious and irresponsible tyranny.”37 They corrupted the 
minds of illiterates who, “understanding little of the points at issue, interpreted their instructions 
in their own way,” that is to say, through violence.38  In the Sunday Times, Lord Sydenham 
asserted that since Congress had been taken over by extremists, who also controlled the Indian 
press, “the growth of anti-British feeling among the turbulent classes of the towns and even in 
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the country villages was continuous.”39  The Times discounted the possibility of passive 
resistance when “the passions of the credulous populace have been stirred up by the 
dissemination of wilful lies.”  Only the Sunday Times put the onus of responsibility for 
constitutional progress in India on Indians themselves; the paper meant that Indians needed to 
work out all of their internal disputes before properly working towards self-government.  The 
paper claimed that “liberty, reform, and progress” depended on “the political ability and good 
sense” of the Indian people.40 
Gandhi personified all that was wrong with India in the English press.  So fixated was the 
press on the person of Gandhi that in all of the press leaders in this period, the name of the Indian 
National Congress appeared only once.41  Anything remotely positive about Gandhi in the press 
was immediately qualified.  Editors saw Gandhi motivated by a “mixture of shoddy 
sentimentality and anti-British venom”42 who incited the masses to violence and fasted in 
contrition afterwards.  This “well-known and bitter critic of the Indian Government”43 was 
unprincipled, reckless, and unstable, “one of the deadliest and most unscrupulous enemies of our 
country and everything it stands for.”44  A “crude idealist,” he has been “driven to wring his 
hands in despair over the blazing up of a fire to which he has put the match” and was “a grave 
menace to society.”45  As the Times insisted, Gandhi was “a misguided and excitable person, 
who is used by others as a stalking horse.”46  The Times depicted Gandhi as weak and without 
principle: “he stirs up some section of the ignorant masses to tumult, finds he cannot control 
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them, expresses regret, and after an interval of quiescence behaves in the same way again.”47  
Similarly William Joynson-Hicks, in the Sunday Times, condemned Gandhi as “the great 
Bombay agitator” who professed to be the leader of a peaceful movement, though “men who 
committed arson and assaulted women did so with his name upon their lips.”48   
Many papers predicted appalling consequences in India if “the hatreds and jealousies of 
race and creed which Mr. Gandhi affects to ignore were indeed loosed under cover of his 
teaching.”49  Press portraits of Gandhi also focused on the impossibility of his political and 
economic programs. The Spectator, for example, declared that Gandhi‟s goal of revolution 
without violence was impossible,50 while both the Observer and Time and Tide condemned 
Swaraj, Gandhi‟s goal of Indian economic self-sufficiency, as nostalgic and unrealistic: “The 
return to a golden age of handlooms and Vedic virtue is a principle which would, were it put in 
practice on any scale, beggar India.”51  The Nation & Athenaeum and the New Statesman 
dismissed Gandhi as “Tolstoyan.” 52 
 Some papers, however, expressed qualified praise, or at least sympathy, for Gandhi.  
Warning that passive resistance was “a very dangerous idea,” the New Statesman conceded that 
Gandhi possessed “enough practical capacity to realise that if the movement becomes violent it 
must fail.”53  Though the Daily Mail regarded Gandhi as “a misguided man,” it admitted that 
those who knew him best were convinced of his honesty and sincerity.  The Mail added that 
when Gandhi apologized for violence carried out in his name: 
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it is not because he is a coward trying to evade responsibility but because he 
really feels that his policy is bad, and is having disastrous consequences and 
wishes to express his contrition.54 
 
 Time & Tide praised Gandhi as “a fine man” as he was able to admit his failure in creating “the 
sort of spiritual movement of which he dreamed.”55  The Manchester Guardian declared that 
Gandhi tried to quell the Bombay disturbances following the arrival of the Prince of Wales and 
make amends through fasting.  The Guardian also stated that Gandhi admitted civil disobedience 
was not possible “until all who believe in it are prepared to practise it without violence.”56  The 
Times called Gandhi “an emotional but sincere agitator” who was “entirely well-meaning” but 
“becomes an unconscious foe to peace and order."57  The Daily Herald argued against the arrest 
of Gandhi as he was a genuine pacifist who used his great influence to prevent violence.58   
 The British press used the Prince of Wales, visiting India as part of his tour of the empire, 
to demonstrate the continuing allegiance of the Indian masses as well as a contrast to Gandhi.  
The prince disembarked in Bombay in November 1921; the local Congress committee organized 
a hartal and a demonstration. Gandhi demanded non-violence, but riots broke out.  The press 
used the Prince‟s visit to demonstrate the loyalty of the masses, thus discounting the alleged 
popularity of Indian nationalists.  Many papers stated that the Prince received a magnificent 
welcome “from Indians of every race, religion, caste, and colour,”59 and claimed that “the heart 
of the people beats with the loyalty – the free and willing loyalty – which their fighting-men 
showed during the war.”60  Others predicted that “all disorders will vanish in well-ordered 
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progress” thanks to the Prince‟s arrival.61  The New Statesman claimed that the Prince 
overshadowed Gandhi and Gandhi‟s prestige suffered a blow as “half the population of the city 
disobeyed him by gathering to welcome the Prince with remarkable enthusiasm.”62 The Prince 
was used as a contrast to Gandhi; progress versus backwardness.  The press associated the Prince 
with peace and order, advancement, and growth while it connected Gandhi with mysticism, 
chaos, and disorder. 
 In sharp contrast to the unrest on the subcontinent in April 1919 in Britain the Montagu-
Chelmsford Report was introduced to Parliament.  The Report wound its way through Parliament 
and Parliamentary committees during the summer and autumn 1919 to emerge as the 
Government of India Act of 1919 in December of that year.  The most controversial provision in 
the reforms and eventually the Act was dyarchy, the division of the portfolios of provincial 
governments into reserved and transferred subjects.  The Governor‟s Council retained the 
former, such as security and taxation, and elected Indian ministers assumed the latter, which 
included education, health, and agriculture. The majority of the press supported the reforms, but 
the measure generated little enthusiasm in even pro-reform papers.   
The pro-reform press insisted that that the lack or the slow pace of reform led to the 
violence; hence, reforms must be enacted swiftly, though only after order had been re-
established.  This view was contrary to that of the diehards who contended that the unrest was a 
direct result of the reforms process.  Reform in the face of native resistance made British 
authority appear weak which simply incited the agitators to commit further violence.  The 
diehards wanted draconian means to suppress agitation not only in India, but also Egypt and 
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Ireland.  The Manchester Guardian and Truth argued that reforms must be carried forward in 
spite of the political disaffection on the subcontinent.63  Truth added that using the riots as a 
pretext to postpone reforms would disappoint a large section of loyal Indians.64  But the 
Guardian was prepared for extraordinary measures to quash the unrest: 
if there should be any material extension of the disturbance we must be prepared 
to hear of drastic executive action, coupled with a demand for unqualified support 
from Parliament and the British public for any policy which, in the opinion of the 
Viceroy‟s Government, it may be necessary to adopt.65 
 
The Observer stated that the reestablishment of order was necessary but claimed any “negative 
policy of „firmness‟” would only aggravate the turbulence.  The paper concluded that there was 
“a far greater danger of our being scared away from than being stampeded into execution of the 
Montagu-Chelmsford proposals.”66  On the other hand, the Times suggested that order and 
punishment of the guilty were necessary before reform could be enacted.67   
Even pro-reform papers viewed the proposed changes as a great experiment, a fact that 
tempered their own enthusiasm for the measure.  While both the Observer and the Times advised 
moving forward with the reforms as “senile caution in India would be the real danger,”68 the 
Daily Telegraph stressed the importance of measured progress: responsibility should be 
rewarded only gradually as Indians gained political experience.69 The British Weekly, too, 
expressed optimism in the reforms but declared that much depended on “the wise extension of 
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local government throughout India.”70 The New Statesman argued that the disturbances resulted 
from, and could be resolved by, British actions: 
Indians were impatiently waiting for Mr. Montagu‟s schemes to materialise, we 
gave them the Rowlatt Bills…if the Viceroy of India and the Home Government 
can make up their minds to modification of the Rowlatt Bills, accompanied by a 
speeding up of the promised reforms, the unrest will subside in India.71 
 
Admitting that the bill was a good start, The Daily Herald warned that “until it provides for 
responsible self-government, for which India is clamorous, it will never be enough.”72  The 
Herald hoped that Labour MPs would attempt to amend the Bill in order to widen its scope as 
the legislation did not meet what Indians asked for: the right of self-government.  Nevertheless, 
the Bill, “a definite break with the past,” provided the assurance that “once the Labour 
movement comes into power, a full and complete measure will be passed.”73   
Pro-reform papers were not entirely happy with the provision for dyarchy, the 
introduction of limited self-government at the provincial level.  However, with no alternative 
available, these papers feared having to restart the reforms process from scratch.  Both the 
Observer and the Manchester Guardian praised the Bill as the fulfillment of Indian aspirations, 
with dyarchy as the first step in the “transfer of power from a despotic Executive to Ministries 
responsible to elected representatives.”74  While not entirely pleased with dyarchy, the Guardian 
concluded that it was “so completely woven into [the Bill‟s] texture that no amendment short of 
disruption would seem to be possible.”75  The Observer defended dyarchy as an experimental 
measure that would transfer a share of power so Indians could learn the art of self-government by 
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practice.  The paper viewed this as the first part of “the great and difficult period of „handing 
over‟ in India and dyarchy would last “until India can…assume full responsibility for her place 
in the line along with the other nations of the Commonwealth.”76 
The name of the author of the reforms, Edwin Montagu, appeared in pro-reform accounts 
much less frequently than in the anti-reform papers.  Perhaps the pro-reform papers attempted to 
disassociate the man from the legislation as he proved to be such a lightning rod for criticism.  
Montagu, who came from a rich Jewish family, attended the Universities of London and Oxford, 
where he started his connection with the Liberal party.  He was elected to Parliament in 1906 and 
held the seat until 1922.  Montagu‟s connection with India began in 1910 when he became 
undersecretary to the India Office; he visited India on a tour two years later.  At the outbreak of 
war he moved to the Treasury and eventually to the Ministry of Munitions.  Montagu joined the 
Cabinet in 1915, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and the inner War Committee of the 
Cabinet in July 1916 as Minister of Munitions.  He followed Lloyd George with the fall of 
Asquith and the new Premier named him Secretary of State for India in July 1917.  Montagu 
served as the head of the Indian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference but was compelled to 
resign his position in March 1922 for violating the principle of collective Cabinet responsibility 
by publishing the views of the Government of India on revising the Treaty of Sèvres.  He died 
two years later of a combination of arteriosclerosis and septicaemia coma.  John Maynard 
Keynes, the eminent Liberal economist, described Montagu as possessing a “remarkable 
personality” but suffering from “violent fluctuations of mood” ranging from reckless courage to 
abject panic and dejection.  Montagu‟s status as an outsider in English society and politics was 
summed up by Keynes, an admirer: 
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he was an Oriental, equipped, nevertheless, with the intellectual technique and 
atmosphere of the West, drew him naturally to the political problems of India, and 
allowed an instinctive, mutual sympathy between him and its peoples.77 
 
Although he was not a practicing Jew, Montagu was seen as the “other,” an Oriental in Western 
dress with a Western education, but certainly not English.  His supposed Eastern heritage was 
perhaps the reason why he was given important roles in the India Office.  The existing literature 
on Montagu sheds little light on why he was such a lightning rod for criticism; the best 
explanation comes from the Dictionary of National Biography: “antisemitism was a constant 
undermining factor in his political life.”78 
Montagu‟s greatest enemy in the press was the Morning Post.  Much of the Post‟s 
distrust and revulsion of the ethnically Jewish Montagu may have stemmed from the anti-
Semitism of its editor, H.A. Gwynne.79  The Morning Post chided Montagu for attempting to 
impose democracy on India and place power in the hands of “politically-minded lawyers and 
seditious Brahmans and Bengalis” who would exploit the masses.  The recent disturbances, with 
the loss of European lives, offered a glimpse of what was going to happen when Montagu had 
finished with his plans.80  Montagu committed the Government and country to a program they 
had never fully considered.81 Dyarchy meant disaster: 
what Mr. Montagu has succeeded in doing is to introduce a vicious principle into 
the government of India – the principle of division.  That principle, however it 
may be modified and whatever safeguards may be imposed upon it, must 
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inevitably work mischief.  Sooner or later we shall either have to get rid of this 
principle or get rid of India.82   
 
Dyarchy could only “create confusion, discord, delay, and weakness within the Government.”83   
Along with the Morning Post, other papers attacked the reforms by targeting Montagu. 
The Spectator blamed the unrest on the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the “impatience of the 
Secretary of State for India.”  Trying to apply Western democratic methods to an undemocratic 
Eastern society was bound to promote confusion and conflict.84  The Sunday Times also made a 
direct attack against Montagu, comparing him unfavorably with the Rudyard Kipling character 
Padgett, M.P.: 
Mr. Montagu…differs from „Padgett, M.P.‟ in the capacity for greater evil which 
goes with political power; and evidently he has handled Indian affairs with all the 
ingenuousness of his prototype.  The result is widespread unrest punctuated by 
local rebellion and outrage.85 
 
Declaring that it was an extreme misfortune for India and the empire that Montagu should be the 
head of the India Office, the Spectator accused the secretary of pulling a confidence trick on the 
country as the reform measure before Parliament was Montagu‟s Bill alone: 
It has all of the marks of his personality and mental equipment.  His busy 
colleagues have taken it from him on trust, and now Parliament is being guided, 
pressed, nay „herded,‟ to take it also on trust and in the hope that bad as it looks, it 
will turn out all that Mr. Montagu says it will.86 
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Similarly, Truth described Montagu‟s proposal as a “huge liability” that carried “risks which can 
hardly fail to bring us trouble of one kind or another.”  As a result, Truth concluded “a good 
many people are strongly opposed to the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms on principle.”87 
Praise for Montagu in the press was rare and far outstripped by criticism.  The Daily Mail 
and Observer praised Montagu; the Mail was encouraged that “Indian affairs should be in the 
hands of a Secretary of State so firmly imbued with a spirit of sympathy, and wielding a courage 
equal to the force of his conviction.”88  The New Statesman commended Montagu as “an able 
man” and urged the Cabinet to give him its backing.  However, the Statesman admitted that “it is 
clearly impossible at the present stage to forecast the fortunes of a measure which must be 
regarded as the most significant in our imperial history.”89  While the Herald declared the Bill 
overly complicated and hoped it was bolder and clearer and based on Indian self-government, it 
acclaimed Montagu as a sincere man who aimed for the gradual transfer of power to Indians.90 
Only the Yorkshire Post and Saturday Review were able to oppose the reforms without 
mentioning the Secretary of State.  The Yorkshire Post feared that the proposed extension of self-
government to India would have similar consequences to the passing of Home Rule Act in 
regards to Ireland, namely civil war.  The Post also considered the Russian Revolution as a 
possible example: “If the transference of power from a bureaucracy to the masses has led to 
disorder in Russia, and its proposal to disorder in Ireland, what may we expect in India.”91  The 
Saturday Review described the proposed legislation as a “revolutionary Bill” and the entire 
reforms scheme as an untried experiment and a leap in the dark.  The Review added that “every 
step in [the reforms] may lead us far down a slippery slope; and no step, however rash, once 
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taken can be retraced.”92  The Saturday Review also disputed the contention that Indians would 
learn self-government through experience: 
The logic of the proceeding is on par with that of a man who should place a bomb 
in the hands of a child or a savage in the certain expectation that the experience 
would teach him its explosive qualities.93 
 
The strangest paper concerning the 1919 reforms was undoubtedly the Times.  The paper 
supported the reforms (but only because of the lack of any alternative) but disliked Montagu and 
disapproved of his methods.  Montagu‟s constitutional modification scheme was not the cause of 
the unrest but the Secretary had only himself to blame for falling 
into the arms of unpractical idealists with very little knowledge either of India or 
of the Asiatic atmosphere.  He made the error of permitting experienced 
administrators to be thrust aside while he kept at his elbow, in India, [and] at the 
India Office…men who had no sound qualifications for advising him.94 
 
Nevertheless, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, containing as it did “a great deal of dreamy and 
even dangerous nonsense,” was fundamentally sound.  The Times expressed disquiet over 
dyarchy: “we have always regarded [dualism] as a clumsy expedient, and have been inclined to 
doubt its practicability.”  It doubted that Parliament would change the Bill as amendment “would 
necessitate the reconstruction of the whole measure, which in turn would mean a delay of several 
months.”  Unconvinced of Montagu‟s defense of dyarchy, the paper still approved the measure 
as there was no alternative to reform.95  Referring to the continued unrest in India, the paper 
stated that “never…was a greater experiment about to be made in circumstances more deeply 
disquieting.”  But in spite of the disorder, it agreed with Montagu that the reforms should 
proceed as “to draw back now, to be intimidated by recent disturbances, would be fatal.”96   
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In October 1919, the Government of India, under public pressure from Indians, appointed 
a committee under Lord Hunter to investigate the disturbances across northern India the previous 
April.  The Hunter Commission and its hearings brought the truth of what happened at Amritsar 
to the British press and public.  Press reaction to the Dyer controversy revealed a divided nation.  
All papers, with the exception of the Daily Herald, expressed sympathy for Dyer.  The press split 
fairly evenly over the general‟s actions.  The Morning Post, Spectator, Daily Express, Yorkshire 
Post, Saturday Review, Daily Telegraph, and Sunday Times viewed Dyer as the savior of India 
who prevented a second mutiny, and thus preserved the entire British Empire.  The Manchester 
Guardian, Times, Observer, Daily Herald, Daily Mail, and British Weekly condemned the 
general‟s actions as unnecessarily barbaric and essentially “un-British.”  Both Truth and the New 
Statesman tried to take both sides simultaneously: they condemned Dyer and his methods but 
stated it was unfair that the general was “thrown overboard” by the Government of India for 
showing poor judgment.97 
The difference between the two opposing camps depended on their conception of empire 
and British rule on the subcontinent.  Was a revolt fomenting in India at the time of the Dyer 
massacre?  Some papers insisted yes; others disagreed.  Another crucial question was whether 
the shooting at Jallianwalla Bagh was necessary, given the situation.  Even some papers that 
conceded that armed force was needed condemned the general for continuing the fire until the 
ammunition was depleted.  Many papers portrayed Dyer as the real victim of the incident.  The 
general faced a situation beyond his means and his only mistake was firing too long, as the initial 
shooting was necessary to disperse the crowd.  Press opinion of Montagu helped determine the 
tenor of the press coverage.  Typically, editors that condemned Dyer defended Montagu, and 
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vice versa.  Papers that supported the general, especially the Morning Post, sought to portray the 
controversy over the incident at Amritsar as a conflict between Dyer and Montagu.   
What was the nature of British rule on the subcontinent?  Papers divided into two camps: 
depending upon whether the paper believed the shooting at Amritsar was necessary. Papers who 
viewed the shooting as unnecessary claimed that government should be based on cooperation, 
while those who did see the shooting as necessary based British rule on force.  The Times, 
Manchester Guardian, Daily Mail, Observer, and Truth all judged Dyer‟s actions as indefensible 
and renounced the “Dyer doctrine” or the “Dyer school” as the foundation of the British Raj.  
India would be held to Britain by understanding and respect (according to the Guardian) and by 
loyal consent (according to the Daily Mail).98  The Observer and Truth contended that the India 
Bill, not Dyer, embodied British imperial rule.99  The Times was able to condemn Dyer by finally 
renouncing its conspiracy theories after the Hunter Commission report found no evidence of a 
revolutionary plot.100  These papers, however, did not renounce the use of force in India (or the 
empire) entirely.  The Manchester Guardian declared the importance of maintaining order but 
without unnecessary severity while other papers claimed that Dyer took reasonable force too far 
and used it indiscriminately, if not barbarically.101  To these papers the confrontation at Amritsar 
was an isolated incident and Dyer was unrepresentative of British rule in India, or elsewhere in 
the empire.  The Daily Herald also condemned Dyer but found it atrocious that the general‟s 
punishment only consisted of retirement at half pay. 
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The papers that defended Dyer -- the Yorkshire Post, Sunday Times, Daily Telegraph, 
Morning Post, Saturday Review, and Daily Express -- believed that British authority ultimately 
rested on force; the shooting at Jallianwalla Bagh in the end was necessary.  Most of these papers 
regretted that the general allowed his troops to fire too long, but argued that Dyer‟s error in 
judgment did not warrant the end of his military career.  The exception here was the Daily 
Express, which agreed that the shooting was necessary but conceded that Dyer should be 
punished, as he “allowed just punishment to become cruel slaughter.”102  The pro-Dyer papers all 
argued that, contrary to the findings of the Hunter Report, the Punjab was in open rebellion in the 
spring of 1919.  The Morning Post, in fact, attempted to discredit the commission itself by 
describing it as an unqualified body that ignored the causes of the outbreak of violence.  The 
paper considered the presence of three “natives” on the Hunter Commission to be a great outrage 
since the committee essentially put the general on trial.103  Lord Sydenham in the Sunday Times 
disputed the Hunter Report: “there is no other reasonable explanation of the facts which the 
Committee records than that there was a far-reaching, though not completely organised, 
conspiracy.”104  
In the picture painted by the anti-reforms press, the Punjab in 1919 resembled northern 
India in 1857.  General Dyer “saved Northern India from a danger comparable only to the Indian 
Mutiny,” the Post asserted.105  The entire Punjab was in open rebellion incited by Gandhi, 
according to the Daily Telegraph.  Inaction on the part of the general would have led to a full-
scale revolt; the Telegraph added that “there would have been no Indian Mutiny in 1857 if there 
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had been a General Dyer at Meerut.”106  Joynson-Hicks in the Sunday Times declared that 
without Dyer‟s actions the mob would have taken over the entire Punjab and possibly other parts 
of India; a peril only comparable to the Mutiny.107   
The danger had not passed, according to the Yorkshire Post, Saturday Review, and Daily 
Telegraph; the condemnation of Dyer would have dire consequences for not only India but also 
the empire as a whole.  The Yorkshire Post feared that anti-British revolution could flare up 
again at any time on the subcontinent.  The Post, like the Daily Herald, described the general as 
a scapegoat blamed for everything that happened when “British rule was in serious danger, and 
the safety of large numbers of our own race was threatened by the growing frenzy of the native 
population.”108  British soldiers, seeing the fate of General Dyer, “may be tempted to hesitate in 
action at the crucial moment” with consequences the editor did not want to even contemplate.109  
The Saturday Review stated that for his “courage, promptitude, and knowledge of the native 
character, General Dyer has been censured by the Commission, and retired by the Government.”  
The fate of the general caused the Review to question “What British officer in the future will dare 
to defend the British Raj in India?”110  Prestige was crucial to British authority in India, 
according to the Yorkshire Post: “it would be a fatal mistake…to give that vast population any 
ground for the assumption that our authority is weakening and our administration discredited.”111  
The fate of the general, according to the Daily Telegraph, would have far reaching consequences 
not only in Britain and the subcontinent, but also the empire: 
this decision…will excite loud approbation on the one hand and deep resentment 
on the other, and a heated controversy which will do little service to the 
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maintenance of British authority in India or in any other part of the Empire where 
British rule rests ultimately on British force and resolution to govern.112 
  
Opinions of Montagu also played a role in the press debate over General Dyer.  Debate 
focused on the Secretary of State for India‟s culpability, or lack thereof, in the news blockage on 
the Amritsar massacre for eight months.  The Times and Manchester Guardian both expressed 
their support for Montagu and his contention that he was ignorant of the atrocity until it was 
revealed in the press that December.  The Guardian questioned why the man responsible for 
India to Parliament would have been kept in the dark on the matter.  But the paper did not 
speculate who was responsible or why it was done.113  Since Montagu was uninformed of Dyer‟s 
actions, the Times reasoned, the Viceroy must have been responsible for the news blackout; the 
paper did not comment on the matter again.114  The Daily Mail blamed the Government of India 
for keeping the incident a secret and claimed that a full disclosure should have been made as 
soon as martial law in the Punjab was removed.  In the Daily Mail‟s coverage, Montagu emerged 
as the hero and a counter to the villainous General Dyer, and the personification of British rule in 
India.  The Secretary of State symbolized the British ideal of ruling the subcontinent by loyal 
consent while Dyer represented rule by terror.  In addition, the Mail claimed that the British 
public supported Montagu: “British opinion will not support or countenance fretful attacks on 
Mr. Montagu for his firmness in upholding the ideals of our Empire.”115  Truth best summed up 
the Dyer debate: 
What engendered so much heat in this debate was the conviction that the General 
„saved India,‟ and resentment of Mr. Montagu‟s audacious doctrine that in these 
days India can only be lost, not saved, by the Dyer method.  That Mr. Montagu 
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and his colleagues are right about this no one who understands the spirit of the 
times can doubt.116 
 
 On the other side of the debate, the Morning Post rejected Montagu‟s claim of ignorance; 
the paper asserted that the Secretary of State knew what happened in April, and that he 
manipulated the Army Council in order to force Dyer to resign from the armed services.  The 
Post declared that Montagu should have defended Dyer instead of condemning him.  Montagu‟s 
promise of reform encouraged the seditionists, the paper asserted, and the insurrection Dyer 
crushed would have discredited the Secretary of State for India and his reform agenda.117  The 
Daily Telegraph did not directly accuse Montagu of withholding information about the massacre 
but claimed that the delay in disclosure loaded the dice against Dyer.  As a result of the 
postponement, the public “got a very ill-balanced account of what had taken place, and many 
people were led to suppose that the bloodshed at Amritsar was due simply to the inexcusable 
ferocity of the British general in command.”118  The Saturday Review described Montagu as 
“that radical Secretary of State for India” and could not comprehend why he would want to 
“break an officer for the prompt use of military force in suppressing a rebellion.”119  The 
Spectator demanded Montagu‟s resignation or removal for his “incorrigible timidity” in giving in 
to conspirators and agitators.120  Montagu‟s Jewish ethnicity added to the distrust and aversion 
that certain sections of the press felt for the Secretary of State, as private letters by Gwynne of 
the Morning Post reveal.  In a letter to Lt. General Sir Bryan T. Mahon, Gwynne defended the 
Dyer fund as the “only way left to show that England does not agree with the misadministration 
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of India by the Jew – Montagu.”121  The Saturday Review was considerably more blatant in its 
description of Montagu‟s anti-Dyer speech in Parliament: 
There was a tang of vindictiveness about the speech, a subconscious echo of the 
passion of the emancipated Ghetto, which might have come very well from a 
Russian or even a Prussian Jew, but came with a bad grace from an English one.  
In short, Mr. Montagu seemed to be taking sides with the races of the East against 
the white man of the West, and the performance jarred the nerves of the House of 
Commons.122 
 
 The Chauri Chaura incident in February 1922 brought together opinions of the reforms 
process, Montagu, and Gandhi in one episode.  In the United Provinces, police fired on a 
procession and were attacked by an angry mob.  The twenty-two policemen took shelter in their 
station but were forced out when the mob set fire to the premises.  The mob hacked the officers 
to death and threw their bodies into the flames.123  As a result of the massacre, Gandhi called off 
the civil disobedience campaign and went on a five-day fast in repentance.  Much controversy 
was aroused by Montagu‟s decision to suspend the arrest order of Gandhi before the incident. 
The Manchester Guardian and Daily Express criticized attacks on Montagu in the House of 
Commons.  The Guardian labeled the assailants as “a reactionary section in Parliament” while 
the Express depicted them as “those who have learned nothing and forgotten everything about 
India.”124  The Daily Express added its support for Montagu‟s policy to keep India loyal via 
peaceful evolution.  The Nation & Athenaeum also defended Montagu‟s policies, blaming the 
causes of India‟s unrest as beyond the Secretary‟s control and arguing that the policies that the 
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diehards advocated would produce “still more dangerous ferment and even wider discontent.”125  
The Observer agreed: “The Die-Hard thesis that „trouble‟ in India is the consequence of 
unnecessary meddling with Indian opinion by humanitarians in Whitehall in the last few years is 
too easy to be true.” 126  
The Manchester Guardian, Daily Herald, and Sunday Times supported Montagu‟s decision 
to suspend the arrest order for Gandhi.  The Guardian claimed that the Secretary postponed the 
arrest order because Gandhi called off his civil disobedience campaign; “to punish such a man is 
to increase his power.”127  Arresting Gandhi could do nothing but provoke disaster since he was 
a “genuine pacifist and uses his great, his comparable influence to prevent violence,” the Daily 
Herald contended.128  The Sunday Times declared that Britain was “strong enough to be tolerant 
[of Mr. Gandhi]” and to allow the reforms to continue unabated.129 
 On the anti-Montagu side of the debate, the Daily Telegraph criticized the reforms and 
Montagu, though not by name: 
a change in the spirit of administration is required; and it is the voice of national 
opinion which insists to-day upon the taking of measures which are necessary for 
reinstating the authority of the British Government and upon ending a course  of 
tolerance and indecision which has done nothing but strengthen the elements of 
mischief and anarchy.130 
 
The Morning Post also advocated a change in personnel at the India Office in order to end the 
unrest on the subcontinent.  The paper stated that “justice, truth, strength, and honour are 
required for the government of India, and in the present administration these qualities are not to 
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be found.  Hence the trouble.”131  The Daily Mail hoped that Parliament would force Montagu to 
resign and “put a full stop to the policy of drift and ensure the maintenance of British interests 
with a firm hand.  There has been weakness.  A stronger man than Mr. Montagu is needed at the 
India Office in these times.”132 
 The Times blamed the Viceroy, not Montagu, for not arresting Gandhi.  But the Times 
argued that peace in India was impossible as long as Gandhi was “free to range through the 
country at will” and claimed the Chari Chaura incident was “solely due to Mr. Gandhi‟s 
incitements.”133  The Times added that “neither Mr. Montagu‟s evasions nor Mr. Gandhi‟s sham 
retraction will satisfy the British public, who are becoming gravely alarmed about the condition 
of India.”134  The Saturday Review described Montagu‟s action of withdrawing Gandhi‟s arrest 
order as unpardonable.  The Review contended that revoking the order 
implied…that Gandhi‟s action in bringing British India to the verge of revolution 
was to be overlooked and condoned.  It is difficult to imagine a weaker or more 
humiliating policy.135  
 
The Morning Post expressed disappointment that the House of Commons did not force Montagu 
to resign, but predicted Parliament‟s confidence in the minister would only last until the next 
outrage.  The Post was also disheartened that Gandhi had not been arrested as this led the man to 
believe he was immune from arrest and encouraged him to grow bolder in his antics.136  The 
Daily Mail wanted Montagu out but continued to support the reform process.  Parliament needed 
to “put a full stop to the policy of drift” by firing the Secretary of State for India.   The paper also 
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believed that Gandhi should have been arrested as the reforms were unable to work in an 
atmosphere of chaos.137 
 After the Chauri Chaura incident the unrest in India quieted down: the time of troubles in 
the Raj was over for the moment.  The Government of India arrested Gandhi, put him on trial, 
and sentenced him to six years in prison, though he only served two.  He thereafter relinquished 
his Congress leadership role and devoted the next five years to his homespun and Hindu 
education campaign.  Indian Muslims lost their major grievance against the British when the 
Turkish president Kemal Ataturk abolished the caliphate in 1924.  In 1927, however, a new 
period of disturbances began.  As will be seen in the following chapters, the basic themes of the 
1919-22 period are echoed in the 1927-35 one across party lines: the unflinching faith in 
Britain‟s imperial mission, a negative view of Indian society and Indian nationalists, and 
opposite conceptions of reform: the fulfillment or betrayal of Britain‟s imperial mission in India.  
The debate over post-war Conservative and British imperial identity came under fierce debate 
during this period, most notably with the Amritsar and Dyer controversy. 
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Chapter 3 
“Our presence in India is essential to the Indians”:  
The British Imperial Mission, 1927-35 
 
[It is] the sincere and honest wish of all parties in Great Britain to 
develop Indian self-government as rapid ly as may be compatible with 
the welfare o f India itself and with the t ime needed to devise and create 
stable and workable democratic institutions in a country which has never 
known democracy. 
 “The Simon Commission,” New Statesman, 12 Nov. 1927, 133. 
 
Nobody has ever dreamt  of a Constitution that would be used to take 
India out of the Empire.  The contest is one as regards words and 
sentiments rather than present realities, for the conditions in which India 
could attain the fu ll status of a Dominion cannot be reached in any period 
measured in less than decades. 
 “India Within the Empire.” Editorial. Daily Telegraph. 12 Feb. 
1935: 12b. 
 
 The same basic conceptions of Britain‟s imperial mission in India structured British 
editorial comments regardless of support for or rejection of the reforms process. Labour, 
Liberal, Conservative, independent, London-based and provincial papers alike all toed the 
imperial line: Britain ruled the subcontinent for the benefit of Indians.  It did not matter if 
readers received their information about India or governmental policies dealing with the 
subcontinent from the popular Daily Mail, the left of center Daily Herald or the fervently 
Tory Times, the basic conceptions of the imperial mission remained constant throughout. 
Politically diverse papers appear virtually indistinguishable when describing the various 
virtues of the imperial mission. Words associated with the British themselves, the rule of 
the Raj, and the imperial mission in general include: “progress,” “rational/reasonable,” 
“improvement,” “prosperity,” “practical,” “realistic,” “facts/truth,” “impartial,” 
“opportunity,” and “justice.”  In this standard view, British rule  provided not only 
Western education and material gains, but also peace, order, and justice.  Essentially, 
India needed Britain.  So much in the imperial project in India had been accomplished, but  
so much more needed to be done.  This was best summed up by the Morning Post in 1931: 
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If India were a nation, or could govern itself by any form of 
democracy…there would be no need for any conference on the subject; the 
Government would have shaped itself long ago in the only place where it 
could shape itself, that is to say, in India, and England would have retired 
gracefully from the scene in which she had become superfluous.1 
 
 These sentiments were echoed more generally by Lionel Haworth in the Saturday Review 
in 1933: 
It has been the Conservative boast that the Empire was the greatest agent for 
good that the world possesses, or has possessed.  Apart from the material 
benefits which we have conferred upon the countries under our sovereignty 
we have given them the inestimable benefit of British justice.2 
 
Three common themes shaped the discussion of the imperial mission in the English press: 
the British government‟s responsibility for India, the benefits of the Raj, especially Britain 
as an impartial referee, and generosity in offering Indians opportunities for demonstrating 
their ability for increasing self-government.   
 Implicit British responsibility, explicitly appearing as Parliament‟s final 
accountability for India sounds like a clarion across the English Press.   Disagreements 
flared over the pace of the reforms (see chapters five and six) but no paper or periodical 
disputed the final authority of Parliament or the Viceroy.  This sentiment was best 
summed up by the Yorkshire Post : “Parliament is responsible not merely for the 
satisfaction of genuine political aspirations…but also for the precautionary 
safeguarding…of the happiness and welfare of the politically voiceless millions of 
Indians.”3   
 The most explicit references to Parliament‟s final responsibility for India occurred 
with the naming, in November 1927, of the Statutory Commission to judge the workings of 
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the 1919 Government of India Act.  The Government appointed the commission‟s 
members: Sir John Simon of the Liberal Party as chairman, two Conservative members and 
two Labour members (including the future PM Clement Attlee) from the House of 
Commons, and two Conservative Lords.  In reaction against the decision to exclude any 
and all native representation, Indian political parties announced that they would boycott the 
Commission.  The English Press repeatedly reaffirmed the Conservative Government‟s 
decision to appoint a purely Parliamentary body as the correct choice.   
The Times, Sunday Times, New Statesman, Economist, Spectator, and Saturday 
Review contended that since Parliament was the final arbiter for India, then a Commission 
made up of M.P.s from all parties could best translate its findings into legislation 
acceptable to the Commons and Lords.4  The Times, Economist, and Saturday Review 
dismissed the criticism of Indian political leaders that none of the Commissioners had any 
prior experience in Indian affairs by arguing that the Commissioners‟ very lack of 
experience would allow them to be impartial and detached, able to look at the situation in 
India with fresh eyes unencumbered by long-held preconceptions or biases.5  No paper or 
periodical addressed Indian complaints about lack of representation on the investigative 
body other than to stress that there would be provision for Indian legislators, both central 
and provincial, to have their say to the Commission during its travels.  Press frustration 
with Indian protests is almost palpable.   
Press unanimity, however, quickly broke down with the Irwin Declaration in 
October 1929.  To avoid a clash with Congress and, with the threat of civil disobedience 
                                                                 
4
 “The Simon Commission.” Editorial. Times. 9 Nov. 1927: 10c, Lord Meston, “India‟s Constitution,” 
Sunday Times, 13 Nov. 1927, 16, “The Simon Commission,” New Statesman, 12 Nov 1927, 133; “A 
Statutory Commission for India,” Economist, 12 Nov. 1927, 825; “The Threatened Boycott in India,” 
Spectator, 11 Feb. 1928, 182, and “The Comedy of Westminster,” Saturday Review, 12 Nov. 1927, 654. 
5“The Simon Commission.” Editorial. Times. 9 Nov. 1927: 10c, and “The Comedy of Westminster,” 
Saturday Review, 12 Nov. 1927, 654. 
 56 
 
looming, the Viceroy issued a statement reaffirming that dominion status was the ultimate 
goal of British rule in India; this “Irwin Declaration” also included a proposal for a series of 
talks between representatives of the British Government, British India, and the Indian 
Princes.  Instead of debating the pros and cons of the declaration and its effects on the 
subcontinent, the press debated who had the power to govern India: Parliament (through 
the Commission) or the Viceroy?  The Daily Telegraph, Sunday Times, and Manchester 
Guardian criticized the Viceroy for flouting the authority of the Commission and therefore 
essentially attempting to overrule Parliament.  The Sunday Times labeled Irwin‟s actions 
as a serious breach of the committee‟s authority as the Simon Commission‟s mandate was 
both established by law, as stipulated in the Government of India Act of 1919, and had the 
support of all political parties.  The Daily Telegraph, however, argued that the Labour 
Government, not the Viceroy, violated the understanding that the Commission was 
appointed.  It added that no decisions over India should be made until after the 
Commission reported.6   
On the other side of the debate, the Daily Herald, Observer, Economist, Times, 
Yorkshire Post, and Nation and Athenaeum argued that the declaration in no way interfered 
with the Commission‟s authority or anticipated its report.  They reasoned that the Viceroy 
did not intend to flout the commission (Yorkshire Post), that nothing in the statement 
interfered with the investigative body (Economist and Nation and Athenaeum), anticipated 
the report, or “question[ed] the undivided responsibility of the Imperial Government in 
framing proposals for the consideration of Parliament” (Times).7  The Daily Herald took a 
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tougher line in defense of the Viceroy and Labour Government: “The suggestion that the 
opinion of Sir John Simon should have been allowed to overrule that of the Viceroy and the 
Secretary of State is a grotesque one.”8  The Observer tried to put a positive spin on the 
whole affair by declaring that the Commission emerged from the controversy “with its 
paramount moral authority not only restored but enhanced,”  and added, with typical 
overstatement, that the Commission was “one of the most important bodies that ever sat in 
all political history.”9 
 During the period of the Indian Round Table Conferences, from 1930 to 1932, 
press unanimity on the issue of Parliamentary authority over India was restored.  The first 
Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930 and 19 January 1931, without Congress, 
agreed that India should achieve dominion status as a federation of British India and the 
Princely States.  The second and third rounds of the talks, in 1931 and 1932 respectively, 
accomplished little.  Papers such as the Times, Sunday Times, Yorkshire Post, Daily 
Telegraph, and Manchester Guardian all declared that although the conferences were 
important means of consultation, the agreements made at the meetings were ultimately 
subject to the approval of Parliament.  The Morning Post viewed Parliament as the only 
means of preventing the round table conferences from committing Britain to “crazy 
schemes” for India. 10   The Morning Post believed that most M.P.s, along with the 
majority of the nation, objected to the Conservative Cabinet‟s schemes for Indian 
government reform and would apply the brakes once they realized what was really going 
on at the conferences. 
 The second theme of British press opinion in discussions of imperial rule was that 
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of the benefits of the Raj for Indians.  The press stressed Britain‟s role in providing unity 
to the subcontinent, introducing Western education and ideas, such as democracy, and, 
most importantly -- judging from the amount of lines written on the topic -- maintaining 
peace and enforcing order.  These discussions emphasized that the Raj was educating 
Indians in the intricacies of self-government.   
 Without the British presence, the press contended, India would lapse back into the 
civil war and disorder that had supposedly dominated Indian affairs before the onset of 
British rule.  Britain provided the only source of unity for India with its numerous 
divisions in geography, religions, and languages, according to the press.  The Observer 
contended that the Raj created the “illusory phantasm of accomplished nationhood.” 
Without the unifying force of the British, there were “real possibilities of conflict, terror, 
and disruption in India were it torn by a hundred discordant voices, each trying to carve out 
a sphere of its own.”  This sentiment was echoed by the Sunday Times and the Daily 
Telegraph; the Sunday Times added that the English language was the only one that could 
be understood by educated persons across the entire country.  The Sunday Times was 
particularly vehement in denying that India was a single nation; only the Raj held the 
disparate nation together.  The Saturday Review compared India to a feudal state in 
medieval Europe with Britain acting as the necessary overlord to hold the disparate 
elements together in peace.  The Review added: “those divisions which first invited the 
British to intervene in Indian affairs and in the end have made the British Crown their 
supreme regulator, are still persistent and deep.”11  And the Daily Mail stated that if the 
British had not arrived in India, it “would still be in a state of semi-barbaric anarchy.”12 
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 Another key benefit of British rule according to the English press was that the Raj 
acted as an impartial referee between all of the contentious peoples of the subcontinent.   
Impartiality and justice went hand- in-hand, in the eyes of English editorialists.  This was 
best expressed by the Daily Mail: “Our mission in India is to assure even-handed justice for 
all her varied peoples.”13  Britain, equipped with “British fair play,” alone was able to 
establish a modus vivendi between “warring interests and religions” of the subcontinent.14  
The Sunday Times thought it ironic that while Indians were demanding self-government, 
“they have been forced to come to Britain and ask her to settle their own differences.  We 
cannot agree, they have had to admit; will you arbitrate between us?”15  This sentiment 
was echoed in the pages of Truth in its discussion of the Irwin-Gandhi pact: “our position 
now is that of a benevolent umpire keeping the peace while the other parties try to set their 
house in order.”16  Truth also contended that Indians would continue to depend on the 
British after the new Act came into force as the British were “most capable of imp artiality 
in any conflicts that may arise.  Otherwise anarchy might well succeed the firm and 
orderly government that has directed the life of India for the last 150 years.” 17   The 
Spectator contended that Indians would be unable to advance towards democracy without 
“the strong assistance of experienced and impartial Great Britain.”18   
The press portrayed the Simon Report as the embodiment of British impartiality.  
After two tours of India and numerous consultations over two years, the Simon 
Commission presented its report to Parliament in two volumes on 10 and 24 June 1930.  
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The commission‟s main recommendation was to scrap dyarchy in the provinces and 
introduce full ministerial responsibility at the provincial level; the central government 
would continue to remain fully in British hands.  Lord Meston, writing in the British 
Weekly, stated that the dominant theme of the report was its lack of favoritism to any race, 
interest, class, or section of India; instead, the document focused on the Indian masses,  
“those hundreds of millions of mankind whose well being is now in the balance.”19  The 
Spectator described the approach of the report as “characteristically English” which it 
claimed to mean that the Commission was determined to “ascertain the facts before 
proceeding to judgment.”  “There is nowhere any trace of preconception or prejudice” in 
the report, the Spectator continued, and “no doctrine is assumed into which the facts have 
to be fitted.”20  The Daily Telegraph claimed that despite the boycott of the Commission 
by “organised Nationalist opinion,” the extremists “could not have any effect in the 
withholding of truth.”21   The Economist praised the Simon Report for its realism in 
dealing with the “‟hard facts‟ of the subcontinent‟s vast problems.”22 
In the picture drawn by press opinion, the Raj also introduced human rights and the 
protection of minorities to India, and stood up for the masses of illiterate Indian peasants.  
The Spectator contended that Britain‟s task was just starting in India: “the work of social 
amelioration, of hygienic betterment, of irrigation, of education, of emancipation which 
might be achieved in that country with the help of British men and women is only 
beginning.”23  Lord Meston, writing in the Saturday Review, claimed that Britain was 
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responsible for “the well-being and the real progress of India‟s peoples.”24  In the same 
paper, Sirdar Iqbal Ali Shah contended that the Indian masses, three-fourths of the 
subcontinent‟s population, simply wanted to be left alone in peace and wanted no part in 
India‟s political struggle.  Khan concluded that the Raj was better equipped than the 
“wildest enemy of British rule” (i.e. the Congress Party) to “better the lot of the 
impoverished husbandmen.” 25   The Sunday Times repeated Khan‟s sentiments by 
claiming that British “rule has bettered the lot of the masses of the people.”26  The Nation 
& Athenaeum stated its pride that Britain were the protectors of the Indian “ryot.”27    
Time & Tide disputed Gandhi‟s claims that Congress represented “the interests of the 
300,000,000 inarticulate peasants” by stating it was doubtful that Congress “could run 
India in a manner better calculated to safeguard the interests of the dumb millions than the 
British.”28   
British domestic politics intruded into the issue of Raj‟s role as protector of India‟s 
minorities via the Morning Post.  The paper attempted to place the empire as paramount in 
the identity of the Conservative Party.  The Post placed the Conservative party front and 
center as having the interests of the “loyal minorities” of the subcontinent and would never 
agree to any coercion of them or the surrender of Britain‟s position in India. 29  The paper 
seemed to be looking back to previous centuries when the Tories, the party of the 
aristocracy and gentry, stood as the paternalistic protectors of their social inferiors in 
exchange for deference. 
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Western education and ideas were a major contribution to India via the British 
according to the press.  Supporters of the reforms process pointed to such Westernization 
as a major justification for the extension of self-government to India.  Time & Tide argued 
that the diehards, Conservative opponents of Indian reforms,  could not “turn back the  
clock” in India as Indians had already “come under the influence of Western political 
ideas.”30  The Manchester Guardian echoed this view: “the diffusion of education and the 
growth of a national spirit make it unsafe for the British Parliament to seek to prolong 
indefinitely its present control over India.”31   
Press opinion also linked the Indian nationalist movement to Westernization.  The 
Sunday Times in 1930 described the unrest in India as not an indigenous movement “trying 
to throw off the yoke of alien ideas” since “the impulse and direction of change are 
borrowed entirely from us.”  In 1935 the paper harkened back to Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, who established English-style higher education in India, and concluded: “We 
have educated the Indians in Western ideas and taught them to believe in representative 
institutions.”32  Britain acted as India‟s benevolent schoolmaster and guardian, according 
to the Sunday Times in 1934, with the Indian nationalist movement as its product: 
All India‟s ideas of politics and progress are ours.  If she believes in 
representative institutions, we have taught her to believe; if she believes in 
liberty, it is due to our education, if she is beginning to be conscious of a 
national unity, our rule has formed that ideal.33 
 
The Spectator described the Indian nationalist movement as “our own creation” as many 
native politicians had been “taught in our own educational institutions” and were “the ripe 
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fruit of close association with us and our liberty- loving institutions.” 34   The New 
Statesman & Nation seemed to criticize the imperial mission regarding education in order 
to refute the diehard‟s unofficial leader: “Mr. Churchill…referred to the uneducated 
millions of India -- forgetting or ignoring the fact that their illiteracy and ignorance are 
nobody‟s fault but ours.”35 
 The English press highlighted the material benefits that British rule had brought to 
India by describing in general terms Indian prosperity and economic progress under the 
Raj.  Prosperity went hand in hand with British- imposed peace and British-mandated 
order.  The Saturday Review and Daily Mail claimed that the Indian market and trade were 
British creations built over two centuries with British capital and investments.  Indian 
trade now reached all corners of the globe thanks to British merchants and ship owners.  
Slipping backwards economically, diminished material prosperity, would be a result if 
India severed its relations with Britain.36  The Morning Post argued that if India achieved 
independence the economic infrastructure, such as railways and harbors, “would be taken 
over, mismanaged and destroyed.”37  The Yorkshire Post contended that with British rule 
came reduced famine mortality on the subcontinent; an uncalled for by-product of 
economic prosperity with peace and security: overpopulation in certain areas.   
 The English press trumpeted the Communal Award as the most salient example of 
British impartiality, justice, and its role in protecting minorities.  To expedite the reforms 
process and to grant Indians a greater share in their own government, the British 
Government declared the untouchables a separate minority. Untouchables, together with 
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other minorities such as Muslims and Sikhs, received their own electorates with their own 
special seats.  The award granted the Depressed Classes basic human rights; many in the 
press hoped this would be the first step for the untouchables gaining full equality.  Truth 
emphasized that the British believed that the untouchables “should be accorded their rights 
as human beings and as a step towards the complete fulfilment of the emancipation from 
their ancient wrongs, that they should be given special representation in the new 
Constitutional scheme.”38  The British Weekly contended that Britain justly stepped in “as 
the high caste Hindus had shown themselves unwilling to release the unhappy millions 
who suffered under cruel bondage.”39     
Press accounts emphasized that the award was forced upon the Government as 
Indians could not agree upon representation amongst themselves; an imposed settlement 
was inherently unsatisfactory, but viewed as the only way to break the logjam in 
constitutional progress.40  The failure of Indians themselves to solve the conundrum of 
communal representation proved, according to the Sunday Times, that the communal issue 
was real and “not the invention of interested British statesman anxious to ‟divide and 
rule.‟”41  The Manchester Guardian also sought to dispute Congress accusations of divide 
and rule.  The Guardian claimed that the British Government gave every possible 
encouragement to Hindu and Muslim leaders to settle their differences. 42   The Daily 
Telegraph argued that the award was cogent proof of the “sincerity of British intentions in 
the matter of Indian reform.”  The Yorkshire Post repeated this idea by stating that the 
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award illustrated “once more the fundamental justice of British intention.”43 Britain took 
responsibility for solving the communal problem, though reluctantly, according to the 
Times, as the only alternative was scrapping the entire reforms movement.44   
The English press also depicted the Poona Pact as an English achievement, 
although Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar actually negotiated the pact.  According to this 
argument, the pact was only made possible by the Communal Award.  The Times, for 
example, contended that the “Poona agreement owes its inspiration to British support of 
the just claims of a long-suppressed minority.”45 
 In the typical British newspaper leader, peace--defense against potential foreign 
invaders-- and order--domestic tranquility and maintenance of the law-- were major British 
contributions to the subcontinent.  Many segments of the English press were convinced 
that enemies with covetous eyes were waiting for the British to leave India so they could 
swoop in and take the subcontinent for themselves.  Britain‟s presence in India was 
necessary, according to the New Statesman, as the divided peoples of the subcontinent 
were “neither willing nor able to accept responsibility for…the protection of their own 
frontiers.”46  Time & Tide stated that the “fighting tribes” on India‟s northern frontiers 
“who despise the talkers and lawyers” (once again referring to Congress) “would sweep 
down and subjugate those territories and peoples if the strong hand of the British were 
removed.”47   For Truth the danger came from further north; if Britain abandoned its 
paternal rule of the subcontinent “the Bolsheviks will march in at once.”48 
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British impartiality maintained the stout defense of the subcontinent, according to 
the press.  Truth believed that if the army were Indianized, “the races from whom the 
personnel of the army is drawn would not consent to be governed by those who are 
destitute as a fighting class.”  The Daily Mail contended that “in present circumstances an 
all-Indian army would be totally unable to maintain order or protect India against attack.”49  
Though not explained by the Mail, one can infer that internal divisions in Indian society, 
especially communalism, rendered India incapable to defend itself.  What was left 
implicit in the Daily Mail was explicit in Time & Tide; creating a native army commanded 
by Indian officers “proof against the virus of communal rivalry” would be a miracle.  
Until that miraculous day came Britain “shall have to retain a certain responsibility for 
India.”50 
 As all elements of the press viewed internal peace as the sine qua non for the 
reforms process, and the question of who should control the police was a major bone of 
contention in the debates over the reforms; order was an important issue for the press.  
Maintenance of British control of the police was a given.  Churchill, writing in the Daily 
Mail, asserted that Britain rescued “India from ages of barbarism, intestine war, and 
tyranny” and that “the withdrawal of British protection would mean the immediate 
resumption of mediaeval wars.”51  The Saturday Review had a similar view of India‟s 
history.  The Review stated that before the British arrived, India “was continuously under 
the sway of foreign military adventurers.”52  The Observer concluded that in India, with 
its millions of “variegated elements, many of them conflicting,” a strong executive was 
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needed to uphold law and order.53  The New Statesman and Spectator claimed that India‟s 
fragmented society meant that Indians themselves were not able to maintain internal law 
and order.54  Without the “Pax Britannica…the more warlike races would swallow up the 
less warlike, who, as it happens, are the most political.”55  The Mail, too, maintained that 
“India needs British administration as the safeguard of her internal peace and justice.”56  
This sentiment was repeated by the Sunday Times: “our presence in India is essential to the 
Indians.  Were we to go, not only we, but they too, would suffer: their country would be 
plunged into chaos.”57  The spread of anarchy and terrorism would be absolutely certain, 
argued the Morning Post, “if the British hold on the administration of law and order is 
relaxed.”58 
 The reforms process itself carried important implications for the question of 
maintaining civil order.  Press supporters of the reforms wanted to increase Indian 
self-government, i.e. grant Indians more responsibilities in ruling themselves.  But to 
achieve this end, many in the press advocated a crackdown on political protesters.  
Essentially the logic ran that since the British knew what was best for Indians, the Raj must 
use force at times to give the people of the subcontinent what was necessary for them, 
though they may resist.  The British also firmly believed that “reasonable” Indians 
supported the Raj in their endeavors.  This idea was best expressed by the Sunday Times:   
There is only one way to deal with this kind of thing [civil disobedience 
campaign], and that is to oppose it firmly and put it down.  There can be no 
compromise in a matter of this sort…  Britain is full of good will to India, 
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and is proving it by her policy of reforms; but the tactics o f the extremists 
are bound, if they persist, to make her enforce her will absolutely.  
Lawlessness can only be met by rigid enforcement of the law.59 
 
In the Saturday Review, Lord Meston argued that the reforms process could not move 
forward “unless there is peace and order in India.  And there can be neither peace nor 
order until the law is asserted against those who are preparing to defy it.”60    
The press also portrayed British rule as the protector of India‟s Muslims.  Truth 
stated that the Raj was necessary for protecting the interests of the Moslems “until 
Moslems and Hindus compose their differences.”61  The Morning Post claimed that the 
Raj was the protector of Muslims on the subcontinent:  
The Mohammedan knows well that nothing less than his right to exist in 
India is at stake.  Were the British to go, he would have to fight for his life, 
and in that fight there could be no permanent truce until his community 
remained as conquerors or fled as fugitives.62 
 
The New Statesman noted that it was paradoxical that anti-British agitators depended 
“almost entirely on the preservation of the British Peace by British guns and bayonets” and 
pointed out that Congress leaders “would not have much chance of being heard if the 
Mohammedans and the Sikhs and the hill tribes were set free to deal as they pleased with 
the Hindu „Pundits‟ of Bengal.”63   
Both supporters and diehard opponents of the reforms process agreed on the 
importance of civil order and on Britain‟s key role in creating that order in the first place. 
They disagreed on the implications of various reforms measures for civil stability. The 
Morning Post contended that the Gandhi-Irwin Pact lowered British prestige among 
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Indians and so “the cause of law and order (which is a great cause) weakened.”64  The 
pro-reform papers, however, insisted that Irwin had made no concessions to Gandhi on the 
important issue of law and order and that law breaking or disorder “must and will be firmly 
met.”65  Not only the British Parliament but also “the vast majority of responsible Indian 
opinion” would support any crackdown by the Government of India against any 
resumption of civil disobedience by Congress. 66   The Yorkshire Post urged the 
Government of India to take “whatever measures it may feel compelled to take to maintain 
order and to resist attempts to undermine its authority.”67  Giving in to Gandhi‟s demand 
for Indian independence was the recipe for disaster as without British protection India 
would be plunged “into a whirlpool of chaos and bloodshed.”68  The Daily Telegraph 
reported that the restoration of internal order in India was a prerequisite for success at the 
second round table conference held in London as a term of the pact committed Congress to 
attend the meeting.   
 The Daily Telegraph also supported the new Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, Irwin‟s 
replacement holding the office from 1931 to 1936, and his efforts to “stamp out terrorism 
and quell the spirit of lawlessness which has run across India in a wave of hysteria.”69  The 
Daily Mail backed the new Viceroy as well for his “drastic measures against terrorism” 
that, the paper claimed, were also supported by moderate minded Indians.  The Mail 
maintained that “the first duty of the Government in India is to govern.”70   The Times 
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argued that there was nothing inconsistent between the Viceroy‟s crackdown on disorder 
and the simultaneous pursuit of peace through negotiations at the round table conference.  
Equating Willingdon‟s repressive measures with the “suppression of murder,” the Times 
contended that they “should be welcomed most by those Indians who look forward to 
proving their own capacity for civilized administration.” 71   The Daily Herald, too, 
supported the maintenance of law and order, but with a caveat that it should not be “based  
on fear and repression.”72 
 Teaching Indians the difficult and delicate art of self-government was the 
culmination of all British endeavors on the subcontinent according to the English press.  
Implicit within the entire eight-year reforms project was the idea that the purpose of the Raj 
was to run day-to-day operations in India until the Indians could sort out their own 
problems and India could become a self-governing dominion within the empire like 
Canada or Australia.  The timeline for this goal, according to the diehards, was measured 
in centuries.  Time & Tide stated it was the duty of the British to protect the vast 
subcontinent and tutor “its 320,000,000 people of divers races and creeds” in 
self-government.73  The Sunday Times viewed the British system of education as key to 
instructing Indians in the arts of self government.  It concluded that “our system of 
education in India has been one long training in the Western idioms of political thought, 
and there is a long vista of promises that India should advance to liberty along the same 
road as ourselves and as the Dominions.”74   The Saturday Review affirmed Britain‟s 
pledge to guide India to the goal of self-government within the Empire, but argued that 
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“self-government is not an easy art, or one that is learned in a day.”  The Review 
concluded that steps should be taken incrementally and “the pace of advance should be 
determined by the capacity for political progress which India may develop as she moves 
along.” 75   This was the same path the other Dominions took, the Saturday Review 
asserted.  The Sunday Times also concluded in 1935 that India was following the same 
path as the other Dominions in an empire it described as “a free association of peoples.”  
This was due, according to the Sunday Times, the “faith in the traditional evolutionary 
methods of British rule and democratic government.”76   
 The English press wrote at considerable length of the various and genuine 
opportunities offered to Indians for self-rule.  Implicitly, all proposals for Indian 
governmental reform were viewed as chances offered to India for constructive progress 
towards self-government.  Ultimately, according to the press, it was up to Indians to 
accept or refuse their chances, and to develop the values, abilities, and will to participate in 
the constitutional experiment.  Editorialists seemed to plead with Indians to accept British 
opportunities for cooperation as legitimate and responded with exasperation when these 
generous concessions were ignored or rejected out of hand.  The frustration expressed by 
many papers is seen in the New Statesman: “If Indian politicians want to make the most of 
their present opportunities they must realise that [British honesty of purpose] is truth and 
not blarney.”77 The Spectator summed up the British sentiment towards India: 
In whatever degree the Indians demonstrate their ability to live together in 
peace and to manage their own affairs to the same degree will the pressure 
of the ruling hand be lightened.78 
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 The first such opportunity was the chance to work with the Statutory Commission 
to investigate the workings of the 1919 Government of India Act.  The English press 
expressed surprise that Indians would not work with the Commissioners, despite all of the 
obvious advantages that cooperation would bring to India.  No offence was intended in 
excluding Indians from the Commission; Indians simply overreacted according to both 
supporters and opponents of the reforms process.  Time & Tide argued that a mixed 
Commission was simply an impossibility.79   Lord Meston, in the pages of the Sunday 
Times blamed Indians themselves for their lack of inclusion on the Commission.  He 
argued that the British Government had been pleading for years for Indians to come up 
with their own draft constitution to no avail.  Meston concluded that it was “the tragedy of 
Indian Nationalism that it so often misses its greatest opportunities.”80  Papers insisted 
that even though Indians were not directly represented on the Commission committee s of 
the Central and Provincial Legislatures would be consulted.  This method would allow 
“the less extreme Indian elements” (Time & Tide) or “authoritative and responsible 
representatives of the Indian people” (Economist) to cooperate and have their views fully 
heard by the Commissioners.81  The Times stated that Indians would also be able to advise 
the Joint Select Committee of the House of Commons that would ultimately review the 
Commission‟s Report before it was translated into legislation.  This would o nly be 
possible “if the elected representatives do not squander their extraordinary 
opportunities.”82  The Spectator seemed exasperated with the demonstrations greeting the 
Simon Commission when it disembarked in Bombay in February 1928.  Indians were 
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running a “terrible risk” and had two roads before them: one led to political liberty, the 
other to political death.  The Spectator concluded that “we feel a peculiar dismay at the 
prospect of India refusing to accept the help which is in earnest offered to her.”83   
In contrast, the Manchester Guardian and Time & Tide blamed the British 
Government for the Indian uproar over the Statutory Commission.  These papers 
contended that if the proposals for consulting Indian opinion were released at the sa me 
time as the announcement of the all-Parliamentary commissioners, Indians would have 
cooperated with the body.  Instead, the Government‟s actions “gave rise to suspicions 
which were unjustified.”84  The Manchester Guardian reasoned that “whatever errors of 
judgment there may have been in the appointment of the Commission it is now too late to 
address them” and therefore “to reject the crucial opportunity…would be a lamentable 
error.”  By rejecting “a wonderful opportunity,” Indian leaders worked “only to retard 
their cause and plant stumbling blocks in their own path.”85 
 Supporters of the Irwin Declaration viewed the proposed round table conference as 
an excellent opportunity for Indians.  The Daily Herald argued that Indians had been 
pleading for years for Dominion status and a round table conference; the Viceroy‟s 
declaration gave them assurances for the former and an invitation to the latter.  The door 
was wide open to a new era of cooperation.86  The Times and Manchester Guardian  also 
described the declaration as a door opened to new opportunities.  The Times considered 
Irwin‟s statement as clearing the air of distrust and discord, while the Guardian viewed the 
conference offer as an opportunity for “all those Indian politicians who have felt unable to 
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deal with the Simon Commission” to discuss “constitutional questions with the British 
Cabinet.”87  This idea was also expressed by the Yorkshire Post which stated that the 
round table forum offered “an opportunity for the less hot-headed of Indian leaders to offer 
more moderate counsels.”88   Anticipating the commencement of the first round table 
conference, the Daily Telegraph hoped that Indian politicians would seize the opportunity 
extended to them by Parliament to play “a decisive part in the enormous labour of 
constructive policy.”  The Telegraph expected, as a result, that Indians would “be moved 
to a more responsive temper.”89  Truth contended that little could be accomplished on the 
road to responsible self-government without the cooperation or good will of Indians.  If 
these conditions were offered by Indians, according to Truth: “then the road stretches clear 
before us, along which Indians and Britons can walk side by side towards the fulfilment of 
their common destiny.”90   
At the conclusion of the conference, supporters of the reforms process placed their 
hopes in the Indian delegates returning to the subcontinent to translate agreements made at 
the meeting into concrete actions on the ground.  Much depended on the ability of the 
delegates to convince their fellow Indians, especially the Congress Party, to accept the 
results of the Round Table.  The Times saw the possible results in Manichean terms: 
the uphill road to complete self-government lies open to them if they have 
the courage to face it, and that it rests in their hands to convince their 
countrymen that it is a better road to travel than the slippery slopes of 
revolution.91 
 
The Economist expressed hope that “the Congress leaders will have the patriotism, the 
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courage, and the wisdom” to accept the conclusions of the conference, though they did not 
participate in the proceedings.  It argued that Congress should congratulate the returning 
delegates as they “obtained the free and willing verdict of this country in their favour.”92  
The Daily Herald desired that Congress would “respond to the hand of friendship held out 
to them” by ending its civil disobedience campaign.  They would then be invited to “join 
in the final framing of the new Constitution that will give their country that very freedom 
for which they have been fighting.”93  The Spectator stated that the safeguards agreed to at 
the conference were necessary to protect imperial interests, but would “gradually disappear 
in proportion as Indians prove their capacity for complete autonomy.”  The paper 
questioned: “are the Indians going to let slip such a glorious opportunity?” adding 
ominously “if the opportunity is lost it may not recur.”94 
 The Communal Award was also presented an excellent opportunity for Indians to 
settle grave social issues peacefully amongst themselves.  The British Government 
claimed that it was ready to modify the award if the communities involved unanimously 
agreed.  The press hoped that the unpopularity of the award would spur Indians to 
cooperate in order to change the imposed settlement.  Time & Tide described the award as 
a “ballon d’essai” produced “in the hope that its critics may produce something better.”95  
The Economist concluded that the success of the award depended less on the settlement 
itself than on the Indians developing “a real will to make a constructive experiment in 
constitutional government within the limits of what is to-day practically realizable.”96 
 During the remainder of the reforms process the press speculated over whether 
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Indians, or more specifically the Congress Party, would ultimately accept and work with 
the final form of the constitution.  The key question was over safeguards.  Britain could 
only do so much; in the end success would depend on Indian readiness to work with the 
reforms scheme.  The constitution would be the greatest opportunity and the press hoped 
that the Indian leaders would set aside their wrecking tactics and embrace the chance to 
achieve a workable democracy.   
  English press coverage of the Indian reforms process from 1927 to 1935 was 
steeped in the rhetoric of the imperial mission.  It asserted that Britain had brought peace 
and order to the formerly chaotic subcontinent; anarchy would return, as well as foreign 
invaders, if Britain relinquished its role as paramount power in India.  The Raj provided 
many benefits for Indians.  It served to unify diverse communities, provided material 
economic benefits, and introduced British education and Western ideas, especially 
democracy.  The most important role for the Raj, according to the press, was as imperial 
arbiter over the varied peoples of India: the British alone were able to be impartial amongst 
the elements of Indian society constantly at odds with each other.  Objective, detached, 
and imbued with the rational conception of Western justice, the Raj protected the 
numerous minorities of India and introduced the concept of human rights for all.  Because 
of these constructive qualities, Britain‟s Parliament justly cla imed final authority for India, 
according to the press.  The British knew what was best for India and its people, and, via 
Parliament, they could impose reforms that would, in the end, be for the ultimate benefit of 
Indians.  The British offered several opportunities for Indians to cooperate along the road 
of reform, demonstrate their qualities and aptitude for self-government and eventually 
achieve Dominion status within the empire.    
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Chapter 4 
“Divided by differences of religion, language, custom and race” 
Perceptions of India, 1927-35 
 
A country two-thirds the area of the United States, with two and a half 
times its population; speaking more than 200 languages, divided by 
profound relig ious differences subdivided into innumerable castes -- 70 
millions of Moslems standing immovably in opposition to 200 million 
Hindus; 60 millions of Untouchables on the fringe of the Hindu system 
disinherited and oppressed by the privileged castes within; vast deserts 
of illiteracy…a closely organised Brit ish India surrounding 700,000 
square miles of Indian  States, paternally ruled  under medieval customs, 
and standing stiffly on their treaty rights. 
  ―The Simon Report,‖ New Statesman, 14 June 1930, 297. 
 
No doubt if men were perfectly rat ional Indians would demand at least 
one hundred years for education and training before consenting to 
undertake the risks and responsibilities of self-government. 
 ―The Indian Debates.‖ Editorial. Manchester Guardian. 8 
November 1929: 10b. 
 
 The exasperation felt by British editors towards Indian resistance to the reforms 
process is often palpable.  They found the actions of Congress politicians who stymied 
British reform at every turn utterly baffling.  And as the press was unanimous in its 
conception of the imperial mission, it was equally agreed in its view of India.  Newspapers 
and journals of all shades of political opinion and from London to the provinces held the 
same presumptions about the subcontinent and its people.  In the composite British press 
portrait, India appeared as a mind-boggling huge geographic mass with a staggeringly 
enormous and extremely diverse population, at stages of development so varied that 
―almost every stage of civilisation is represented within its borders.‖1 In general, India was 
backward; its politicians were irrational and irresponsible; its people divided and 
motivated by religious hatreds. 
The implicit wish of most papers and journals (though not necessarily the diehard 
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press), though only explicit in some, was that Moderate/or Liberal (the English press used 
these terms interchangeably) Indian politicians would finally opt for cooperation with the 
British and take over the political leadership from Congress.  Indian Moderates and 
Liberals, according to the press view, would cooperate with the British Government ; the 
evolution of India toward Dominion status depended on such an environment of 
cooperation and trust.  Few editors had any hope that Congress politicians could or would 
create such an environment. 
 Some papers went further and questioned whether democracy would ever suit 
India.  With its own long and glorious history and special conditions, India should perhaps 
develop its own forms of government rather than be forced to accept a British-style 
constitution.  Some papers stressed how different the subcontinent was in comparison to 
the other Dominions.  Therefore, India could not simply follow the same course as, say, 
Canada or Australia; new modes of government would have to be created and adapted to 
India‘s unique circumstances.  Needless to say, India‘s distinctive diversity would make 
this a long and arduous process.   
 The implicit inferiority of the ―Indian/Eastern mind‖ was a key assumption in the 
English press.  A key part of Eastern minds was ―a kind of mystical or emotional 
attraction which results in a kind of ecstatic enthusiasm neglectful of practical problems 
and material responsibilities.‖2  Hence, ―Oriental human nature‖ contained ―an element of 
fanaticism which cannot easily be captured by the net of reason and calculation.‖3  The 
Oriental and the Occidental stood in sharp contrast: 
Mass opinion in the East is not so decidedly influenced by the logic of facts, 
and is far more liable to be affected by ‗whispering campaigns‘ of false 
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propaganda than is public opinion in Western countries.4 
 
In the British press Indians appeared almost as naughty little children who refused 
to do their lessons or eat their vegetables; willful, obdurate, overly emotional, and prone to 
tantrums.  Like schoolchildren, Indian nationalists probed their tutors and protectors for 
weaknesses that they could exploit.  Sometimes the schoolboy analogy was used 
explicitly, as in this instance by the Saturday Review: 
Britain must beware of finding herself in the embarrassing position of a big 
boy who, having begun justifiably smacking a small boy‘s head for cheek 
finds that chastisement elicits sobs intermittently interrupted by the 
obstinately repeated cheek.  Such obstinate perseverance in ill-doing quite 
unreasonably wins the sympathy of the bystanders and disheartens the 
punisher of the incorrigible.5 
 
The worst schoolboy of them all in India, according to the press, was Gandhi.  
Gandhi argued ―with more than Eastern subtlety‖ but his goals were entirely impractical: 
preaching pacific rebellion and non-violence would only provoke disorder.6  Thus, the 
Sunday Times argued that Lord Irwin‘s moderation in not arresting Gandhi during his salt 
march could be misinterpreted by Indians.  The Viceroy‘s 
restraint may be misunderstood by the Eastern mind; and if it be 
accompanied by an apparently undue deference to the wishes of men who, 
whatever they are granted, will always demand more, may easily be 
mistaken for weakness.7 
 
The Daily Mail echoed this sentiment.  Toleration ―is not understood in the East, where 
weakness has never been honoured or respected.‖8   
Not surprisingly, the diehards attempted to use the East/West dichotomy to put the 
brakes on the reform movement but the pro-reform papers like the Economist admitted that 
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Oriental ―temperament and tradition needs quite a different form of government.‖9  The 
Daily Mail was the most fervent and vocal critic of imposing democracy upon India.  The 
Mail argued, with typical overstatement:  
To transplant from this country to a tropical region of Asia a form of 
government which even here is breaking down, and is entirely alien to 
Asiatic tradition seems one of the saddest experiments that history 
records.10 
 
On the pro-reform side of the argument, Lord Peel, writing in the Sunday Times, 
recognized that transferring ―Western Parliamentary institut ions into the old soil of India is 
a daring constitutional effort.‖  He contended that the Commissioners in the Simon Report 
did their best to trim and adapt Western ideas and institutions to their new surroundings.11 
 Papers on both sides of the political divide argued that India was unlike any other 
part of the British Empire and was especially dissimilar to the White Dominions.  
Therefore, some papers argued, India and Dominion status were entirely unsuited for each 
other, while others contended that India would need to take a new route along the road to 
self-government.  Some papers suggested sidestepping the communal electorates issue by 
setting up ―more personal forms of government, or look[ing] for other forms of 
representation such as might be developed from political seeds that were indigenous.‖12  
The reforms process was an advance into the unknown where ―self-government in India 
may not necessarily develop altogether on Western lines.‖  This was because ―India has 
yet to show whether the full British conception of self-government is suitable to Indian 
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character, tradition and conditions.‖13  According to the Simon Report, India presented a 
―constitutional problem…unlike any other in history and calls for a solution adapted to her 
own special circumstances.‖14   The first round table conference had to deal with the 
―special needs and difficulties of that vast country of three hundred millions of people‖ as 
well as India‘s relationship with the Indian States and the British Empire. 15   The 
subcontinent was a ―land of infinite diversity‖ and ―the heir of ancient but almost forgotten 
civilisations, whose soul has been harried for centuries by foreign domination and internal 
strife.‖16  India had never formed ―one organic body-politic.‖  Instead ―throughout the 
ages this aggregate of territories has never been subject to one rule, has never formed one 
State‖ not even under the Mauryas or Moghuls.17  Dominion status was ―a process of 
growth and not a gift‖ and India was still lacking ―in certain obvious spheres of 
self-government.‖  A key prerequisite of Dominion status meant ―the bridging by Indians 
themselves of their deep cleavages of race, caste, and religion.‖18 
 The topic of India achieving Dominion status became even more contentious after 
the Irwin declaration.  The term ―Dominion status‖ was not precisely defined by law until 
the Statute of Westminster of 1931.  The Balfour Declaration of 1926, later encapsulated 
in the Statute of Westminster, defined Dominions as  
autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no 
way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external 
affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely 
associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.19 
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Some papers attempted to portray Dominion status as inappropriate or even a step down in 
position for India; the subcontinent should find its own form of self-government better 
suited to its own conditions.  India was a ―great and proud Empire‖ and it was ―almost an 
outrage to propose that she should be reduced to the status of a Dominion.‖20  Communal 
divisions and the separation between British India and the Native States made Dominion 
status inappropriate for India.  India could  
never, as far as it is possible to look forward into the dim future, have a 
constitution that would be in any way comparable to the constitutions of 
Canada or Australia or New Zealand…The thing is simply not possible, 
either now or probably a hundred years hence.21 
 
Even difficult cases for Dominion status, such as South Africa or the Irish Free State, were 
―very small and simple propositions by comparison with India.‖ 22   Dominion status 
implied ―a form of Indian Constitution which may not prove to be the best development of 
Indian political genius or best adapted to the diverse conditions of the Peninsula.‖23  This 
sentiment was best summed up by the Times: ―The conditions of India differ in essence, 
and not merely to degree, from the conditions of Canada, New Zealand, and the other 
countries known as British Dominions; that a self-governing India of the future may find 
some more appropriate form of expression.‖24  India‘s religious diversity ensured that it 
could never ―have a Constitution even resembling that of any other Dominion.‖25    
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Editors frequently emphasized that these divisions constituted major stumbling 
blocks to Dominion Home Rule.  The Daily Mail, for example, described India as ―the 
most diversified, discordant, confused complex of Oriental peoples and religions existing 
in the world.‖26  The British Weekly agreed: 
The time has not yet come when administrative and legislative 
independence can be granted to a country which includes many races and 
religions, a powerful caste system, and a group of native States each 
governed by its own ruler.27 
 
The Daily Telegraph contended that democracy could never succeed on the subcontinent 
because of India‘s divisions.   
[S]o divided by nature and man is the semi-continent, so inapt for any unity 
not imposed by a paramount and impartial influence; so manifold, intricate, 
double-crossed are the rival forces and ideals.  Neither democracy, nor 
anything like democracy, will rule India in this century.28 
  
Press leaders on the controversy over the Statutory Commission tended to focus on these  
divisions as the primary reason why Indians were not—and should not 
be--Commissioners. 29   The divisions of India were also the reason why the British 
Government needed to resort to the Communal Award according to the press.30 
 The English press also stressed the high illiteracy rate on the subcontinent, although 
press reports of this rate varied.  The Saturday Review contended that only eighty-two out 
of every thousand on the subcontinent could read or write.31  The Daily Mail placed the 
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illiteracy rate at 95 percent in 1930 and 86 percent in 1932. 32  No reason was given for the 
discrepancy by the Mail (perhaps a mass literacy drive).  The Economist did not mention 
exact numbers but described the people of India as ―a largely illiterate population.‖33 
 Not only were Indians divided and largely illiterate, these divided and backward 
peoples were in constant conflict with each other.  The situation on the subcontinent as 
―congeries of peoples divided by racial and religious hates‖ and also ―divided by 
differences of religion, language, custom and race.‖34  The Times saw in the Simon Report 
an India having ―more linguistic and racial differences and deeper social cleavages than 
Europe.‖35  This sentiment was also seen in the Observer: India contained ―contrasts of 
races and creeds and systems more numerous than in Europe; the inward antagonisms of 
religion and breed more vehement.‖36   The subcontinent was ―a warring sect-ridden 
continent of peoples pretending to be a nation.‖37  Separate electorates were necessary on 
the subcontinent as ―the lambs and the lions in India will not lie down together.‖38  While 
democracy worked in Britain, the Morning Post argued, because of its united electorate 
and responsible government, in India ―all the minorities have insisted upon separate 
representation.  In fact, every part has cried out in fear of the domination of the others.‖39 
 The most important and crippling division in India according to the English press 
was the supposedly age old conflict between Hindus and Muslims.  The press took a 
largely negative view of Hinduism.  Hinduism was depicted as anti-Western: irrational, 
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immoral, an obstacle to progress.  The most damning condemnation of Hinduism came 
from Lord Meston in the Sunday Times: 
There exists in India…a section of Hinduism -- able, insidious, and 
powerful -- which will never be reconciled to British control.  No political 
concessions will appease it,  no compromise will abate its demands.  It has 
no use for our ideas of democracy; it detests the whole scheme of Western 
civilisation; it hankers after the restoration of its own ancient rule of life…It 
survived and absorbed the reforming faith of Buddha; it survived and 
defeated its Moslem conquerors; it believes it can survive and eradicate 
British rule.  Its strength lies in the fears and superstitions of the millions.40 
 
A few months later, Meston presented orthodox Hinduism as diametrically opposed to 
Western values.  To Meston, the Simon Report embodied British ideals such as liberty and 
human rights, while to orthodox Hinduism ―neither equality or opportunities nor liberty is 
consistent with its views of life and eternity.‖41  Hinduism stood as the greatest barrier to 
reform, and contrary to British benign influence:  
That our Western culture and Western creeds will shake its domination is its 
constant fear; and it is ill-disposed to a political system which brings 
Western influences in its train.42 
 
The Saturday Review viewed Hinduism as a veritable cancer of the subcontinent 
and the Congress Party as simply a Hindu organization.  It described the history of India 
as ―the history of a country paralysed by the cramping Brahmin system and unable to make 
any effective resistance against invaders.‖  Hinduism, a type of ―Bolshevism in dress 
clothes‖ was ―suave, seductive, and sinister.‖  It ―has first attracted and then ruined 
everything with which it has come in contract -- everything except Islam.‖  Hinduism 
stood for ―laxity of thought and principle and practice.‖ 43  To the Hindu, even ―murder 
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and sodomy are not sins…They are religious rites.‖44    
This depiction of Hinduism as extreme perversion appeared in other papers as well.  
Both Truth and Time & Tide referred positively to the American Katherine Mayo‘s book 
Mother India (1927), a sharp critique of Hindu culture that sought to expose the 
―disgusting and immoral‖ religious rites and domestic habits of many of the Hindu castes, 
as an authority on Hindu culture.  Time & Tide concluded, with considerable 
understatement, that the book ―is not calculated to influence public opinion in favour of 
large extensions of Indian home rule.‖45   
The caste system particularly troubled British journalists.  This ―most rigid social 
system‖ obstructed meaningful social and political change. 46   The Sunday Times 
described the caste system (in a not-so-oblique reference to the Labour Party) as ―a 
petrified trade and professional unionism from which there is no escape for anyone who is 
born into it.‖47  Untouchability, an ―unparalleled curse imposed on one-fifth of the Hindu 
multitudes,‖ constituted the most vicious aspect of caste.48 
The untouchables, Truth asserted, since ―the dawn of history have been treated by 
their ‗brother‘ Hindus with greater harshness than a self- respecting European would show 
to the meanest of the dumb creation.‖49   The Statesman declared Untouchability, an 
abominable system ―which condemns forty millions of Indians to lifelong hereditary 
degradation,‖ to be incompatible with a democratic constitution.50  Churchill, in the Daily 
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Mail, agreed: Dominion status could ―not be attained while India is prey to fierce racial and 
religious dissensions‖ and while Hindus treat ―fellow human beings…as 
‗Untouchables.‘‖51  
This negative portrait of Hinduism reinforced the British press‘s contempt for the 
Congress Party.  Many British editors viewed ―Hindu‖ and ―Congress‖ as synonymous. 
The Morning Post, for example, declared that ―the Congress doctrine of ‗Nationalism‘ has 
no place for the Mohammedan any more than for the British: it is based on Hinduism and 
invokes the Hindu gods.‖52  In a not-so-veiled reference to Congress, Truth noted that the 
―extremist Hindus who chatter so incessantly about democracy and the rights of the 
oppressed (i.e. themselves) have never done anything to alleviate the wretched lot of the 
Untouchables.‖53 Gandhi‘s campaign against untouchability received little notice.  The 
Daily Mail, which claimed that Indian politicians considered the depressed c lasses ―worse 
than dogs,‖ 54 even argued that Gandhi sought ―to exalt the Hindu race and religion above 
all the other races and religions of India.‖55 
The depiction of Indian Muslims contrasted sharply with the very negative 
portrayal of Hinduism in the British press. A ―strong minority‖ surrounded by a 
―threatening sea of Hinduism,‖ -- Muslims were praised for their religious purity and 
political unity. 56   The Saturday Review, for example, described Indian Islam as ―for 
religious, moral and political discipline, for a strong government as against anarchy‖ and 
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for a ―faith [kept] pure from Hindu seduction and defilement.‖57  In a similar vein, Time & 
Tide depicted the Muslims as ―a minority but conscious of their military superiority and of 
a fellowship with all Islam beyond the peninsula.‖ 58   The paper also portrayed the 
Muslims as ―the most powerful and united of the Indian minorities.‖59   
The English press attempted to depict Indian Muslims, both tacitly and overtly, as 
natural allies of the British Raj against a common enemy, ―the rule of a revolutionary 
minority of Hindus.‖ 60   The Muslims, ―apart from Mr. Jinnah…form a definite 
conservative group.‖61   The Daily Mail encouraged the Muslims to insist upon ―a larger 
measure of segregation‖ beyond simply their recognized separate electorates. 62   The 
Muslims and the Princes [of the Native States], the Saturday Review argued, were the 
―only two forces which can hope to stand out against the Congress.‖63  Truth asserted that 
Muslims were understandably obdurate about minority representation because ―bitter 
experience has taught them what to expect when Hindus are in the majority on any public 
body.‖64  Muslims ―would be the biggest fools in the world to put their heads in the lion‘s 
jaws after the warning they have had and they will not do it.‖65  
Muslim opposition to Congress and wariness of Gandhi‘s leadership were repeated 
themes. The Times, describing the boycott of the arrival of the Simon Commission, 
observed that the Muslims refused to join.66  The New Statesman contended that Muslims 
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were ―ice cold‖ to Gandhi‘s salt march67 while Truth warned that Muslim opposition 
meant ―it is a fairly safe prediction that the civil disobed ience march will, at the best, not 
pass off without communal collisions.‖68  The New Statesman & Nation argued that the 
Muslims were uncomfortable with the Gandhi-Irwin Pact and were watchful of further 
British moves that could undermine their position.69    
The British press saw the divide between Muslim and Hindu as a ―gulf which is 
already so wide and deep that it has never been bridged.‖70  The Muslims and the other 
minorities ―were quite unable to find any modus vivendi with the Hindu majority.‖71  The 
minorities of the subcontinent, especially the Muslims, would never accept a Hindu Raj nor 
would the Muslims would ever ―consent to be ruled by the very unwarlike Hindus.‖72  
Lord Meston saw the Hindu-Muslim divide ―as intractable.‖  He added ominously that 
―some settlement must be reached before a federal Government becomes possible; 
otherwise there seems no escape from civil war.‖ 73   The Morning Post painted an 
apocalyptic picture of a communal bloodbath if the British abandoned its paramount 
position on the subcontinent: 
The Mohammedan knows well that nothing less than his right to exist in 
India is at stake.  Were the British to go, he would have to fight for his life, 
and in that fight there could be no permanent truce until his community 
remained as conquerors or fled as fugitives.74 
   
 Papers stressed the need for a peaceful resolution to the communal conflict as a 
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precondition for any political advancement.  Yet the press downplayed the bloodshed and 
emphasized the link between political policy and communal violence.  In 1927, for 
example, Truth predicted a ―spate of invective‖ to flow over India before the Statutory 
Commission could report, as the Hindus were ―hated and despised by the Moslem 
minority.‖ 75   Similarly, the Morning Post blamed the Montagu reforms for creating 
―racial favouritism‖ which resulted in ―fierce and bloody conflicts between Hindu and 
Moslem.‖76  Two years later, the Daily Mail contended that the communal hostility had 
―grown more violent and murderous since the era of so-called reform began.‖77  The 
Spectator, too, linked reform and communal violence as ―this rivalry, as was only natural, 
has to a large extent fed upon the very political ambitions stirred by the reforms so far 
granted.‖ 78   Even the Manchester Guardian claimed that reform led to increased 
communal tensions: ―The prospect of self-government fills the Moslem and Hindu 
communities with anxieties, ambitions, and mutual suspicions.‖79 
 Faced with the absolute ―Otherness‖ of India, British editors turned to a more 
familiar, slightly less ―Other‖ other: Ireland. The Observer depicted Islam as India‘s 
Ulster; Muslims would ―never accept in any shape or form the rule of a Hindu majority.  
Never.  No certainty in the whole world is more definite and formidable than this.‖80 The 
Morning Post noted that the British government was unable to force Protestant Ulster to 
submit to rule by the majority Roman Catholic Irish population and warned that ―the 
division between these two was a shallow ditch compared with the Himalayan gulf which 
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separates Hindu and Mohammedan.‖81   
 The need for a peaceful resolution to the communal conflict became a particular 
issue with the second round table conference as the issue of communal representation 
remained unresolved at the meeting.  The Saturday Review concluded that both groups 
must show that ―the new constitution will be proof against the attacks of one community 
upon another.‖82   Muslims and Hindus must resolve their age-old differences, Truth 
stated, as ―a fuller measure of self-government must remain an ideal of the future until the 
Moslems and the Hindus reconcile their differences.‖83  The Yorkshire Post accused the 
communal conflict for torpedoing the second conference.  The Post concluded: 
the Indian peoples continue in the paradoxical position of being offered 
very large extensions of liberty, which they much desire, but find 
themselves unable to take because of internecine disagreement over the first 
step.84 
 
In contrast, the Manchester Guardian insisted that the reforms might ultimately bring the 
conflicting communities together.  It described the Hindu-Muslim feud as ―the wound that 
cripples‖ India which could ―be healed by quiet, constitutional exercise at home.‖ 85  
Truth, in 1934, also contended that the coming constitution would bring the Hindus and 
Muslims together.   
Once the communities, ceaselessly watchful of one another are brought to 
the point that they must either work this Constitution or leave to their 
opponents the spoils of office there will be a quick acceptance of 
actualities.86  
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 The British press felt the Raj had another strong ally, along with the Muslims, 
against the threat of the Hindu dominated Congress: the Indian Princes. Editors viewed the 
princes not as Eastern despots but as politicians with whom the British could work.  
Hence, the Daily Mail argued that the Conservative Party should ally with the Indian 
princes to settle the question of India‘s future government. 87  Each side on the reform 
debate sought to co-opt the princes into their camp.  Both sides, however, treated the 
princes as another significant minority, much like the Muslims or untouchables, opposed to 
the potential prospect of Congress rule.   
Diehards promoted the idea that a natural alliance between Britain and the princes 
existed.  According to the Daily Mail, the princes ―who know their own race intimately,‖ 
advocated diehard policies against Congress.  They ―are always telling us that we have 
shown too much indulgence to British India.‖ 88   These friends of Britain would be 
―dominated by Hindu lawyers‖ in an Indian federation and so ―should not surrender one jot 
of their authority to a Hindu intrigue.‖ 89  Truth concurred with the Daily Mail‘s 
assessment: ―the great princes…have no more intention of being ruled by a debating 
society of Hindu lawyers and journalists than being governed by Stalin or Feng.‖90  
The Daily Mail and the Morning Post as well, continued to back the princes up to 
late 1934.  The Mail declared that the princes disliked the reforms process to such a degree 
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―that they have to be bribed or threatened into a show of acceptance of its blessings.‖91  
The Mail and Morning Post asserted that the princes opposed the Joint Select Committee 
proposals:  ―the Princes do not want them.‖ 92   Insisting that the Government was 
attempting to railroad Britain into accepting the reforms process in spite of the opposition 
of the princes, the Post argued that at the Conservative meeting at the Queen‘s Hall, 
various speakers claimed that the princes ―were in favour of a scheme which, as the 
Government must now know, they are by no means disposed to accept.‖93   
The pro-reform press, however, claimed that the princes were major proponents of 
the reforms process —a claim that became a prominent issue with the arrival of the princes 
at the first Indian conference in the autumn of 1930.  The New Statesman described the 
princes‘ position at the first round table conference as very close to the principles o f the 
British Indian delegates and noted that the princes were ―taking pains to make it known that 
they and their followers do not in the least fit into the popular notion of an Oriental 
potentate, enslaved by drink and the zenana.‖94  Content to recognize the paramount 
position of the British Crown, these Maharajahs were not unreasonable in their 
unwillingness ―to recognise the authority of popular Calcutta lawyers.‖ 95   The 
Manchester Guardian concurred.  Just as unsatisfied with the political status quo on the 
subcontinent as Congress or the Indian Liberals, the princes would likely support the swift 
creation of an All-Indian federation – and Britain would benefit: with a quarter of the seats 
in the Central Legislature granted to the princes, and a third of the seats allocated to 
Muslims and other minorities, ―the danger of a Congress-dominated Legislature would no 
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longer arise.‖96   
Other pro-reform papers agreed that the inclusion of princes into the proposed 
federation was vital as they would provide both balance and stability.  The combined 
forces of the princes and Muslims would be ―so strong that the Congress extremists who 
would sweep India into tumult will have no chance of a majority.‖ 97   With princely 
cooperation, the Federation of India could be a ―va luable influence for steadiness and 
stabilisation, including resistance to secession propaganda and anarchical intrigues.‖98  
The Times declared that the princes‘ position was in flux.  The Maharajahs emphasized 
their loyalty to the imperial connection but ―have lately shown themselves more and more 
sympathetic with British Indian aspirations, so long as their own sovereign rights are 
generally maintained in a federal India.‖99   
Another group, much less organized than the Muslims or princes, that the British 
press hoped would be a bulwark against Congress were the moderates, also known as the 
Indian Liberals.  In British press leaders, the terms ―moderates‖ and/or ―Liberal‖ referred 
to any Indian willing to cooperate and work with British authorities.  The 
moderates/Liberals did not form any popular political party or even a cohesive group.  
While diehard politicians contended that the moderates were simply more mild-mannered 
extremists, most sections of the press agreed that cooperation with the moderates was  
necessary for the reforms to work.  Pro-reform papers expressed faith that the 
moderates/Liberals would be able to influence the extremists to cooperate, if not able to 
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take control of Indian politics themselves.100 
The pro-reform press viewed the Indian moderates, implicitly, much like Western 
politicians: rational, in favor of progress, practical, reasonable, responsible, and 
cooperative.  These men were the antithesis of the extremists who populated the Congress 
Party: 
Congress attracts its followers by appeals to the emotions.  The moderate 
cannot hope to compete with the extremist in these.  He can only hold the 
country by showing it a severely practical policy evidently likely to yield 
practical results.  It is plain that the moderate cannot hope to achieve 
results except by securing the co-operation of the British Government.101 
 
The Spectator considered British support for moderates essential.  At the conclusion of 
the first round table conference it stated that the Indian Liberals ―will have a difficult and 
hazardous time before them‖ on their return to the subcontinent ―but they may be assured 
that they will have the constant sympathy and support of all British well-wishers of 
India.‖102 
 When faced with Congress boycotts of the Simon Commission, Irwin‘s reform 
plans, and the first Round Table Conference, the pro-reform press turned with hope to the 
Indian moderates.  Even the diehard Saturday Review hoped that the moderates would 
support the Simon Commission.103  Truth contended that the Congress boycott of the 
Commission was irrelevant as many Indian moderates offered their cooperation.  It stated 
that  
responsible leaders of opinion, like Lord Sinha, have expressed their 
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willingness to help the Commission in every way, and their co-operation 
will have much more influence with the people of India than the hysterical 
hostility of the extremists.104 
 
The Daily Telegraph gave its seal of approval to the Irwin Declaration and the proposed 
Indian conference as ―all sections of moderate opinion‖ in India ―hailed it with relief and 
even with rejoicing.‖105  Time & Tide praised the moderates for their work at the first 
round table conference while simultaneously criticizing Gandhi and Congress: 
opinion in this country has been impressed as never before with the 
seriousness of Indian claims and the political capacity of India‘s 
statesmen…There should  be little vitality left in the legend that political 
consciousness in India is confined to a small group of saintly irresponsibles 
and embittered intellectuals.106 
  
But the pro-reform support of the moderates was not unconditional.  The New 
Statesman regarded cooperation with the moderates as essential but they noted that they 
―have not yet shown themselves very helpful.‖107  The moderates were a chaotic political 
group, the Manchester Guardian conceded; they had ―many distinguished leaders but they 
have no organised party and no agreed, definite, and practicable policy.‖108  
 The diehard press view of the Indian moderates was best expressed by the Daily 
Mail: 
Our politicians delude themselves with the idea that there exists in India a 
‗moderate body of opinion‘ which will prevent the extremists from carrying 
out the policy that they publicly avow their intention of pursuing.  Yet this 
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‗moderate body‘ invariably surrenders to the extremists.109 
 
The Morning Post disputed the ―touching faith‖ that Irwin and Hoare held in the Indian 
Liberal Party in order to attack the reforms process.  The Post argued that ―even if these 
Indian politicians had all the virtues which we have not noticed in our own, they have 
neither organisation nor hold in India.‖110   
 The English press was unanimous in the belief that Indians were ultimately 
responsible for causing India‘s problems and therefore accountable for solving them, 
underscoring the need for continued British rule.  In the end, all sections of the press 
agreed that Indian progress depended entirely upon the capacity of Indian leaders for 
leadership and capability in exercising responsible government.  The Manchester 
Guardian, for example, stated that Indians needed to resolve their own issues and seize the 
opportunities offered to them:  
If the leaders of Indian opinion can settle their own differences and 
construct a policy which faces the facts of the situation they have to-day a 
wonderful opportunity.111 
 
There were difficulties to be overcome before Indian self-government could become a 
reality and Indian leaders ―know them as well as the Viceroy or the Secretary of State.  
They are invited to co-operate in overcoming them.‖ 112   The Herald pleaded with 
Congress to set aside their obstructionist tactics and cooperate following the inaugural 
round table conference:   
Is it too much to hope that the Congress leaders will respond to the hand of 
friendship held out to them?  If they will cease their civil disobedience 
campaign, there will…be an amnesty.  They will be invited to join in the 
final framing of the new Constitution that will give their country that very 
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freedom for which they have been fighting.113 
 
Churchill, writing in the Daily Mail, stated that India‘s progress toward Home Rule 
―depends upon the self-discipline and self- regeneration of the Indian peoples themselves.‖  
Churchill added that British ―faithful and friendly aid‖ will always be offered to Indians at 
every stage.114  If Indians refused to work with a constitution including safeguards ―the 
choice will be theirs,‖ the Daily Telegraph contended.115  Indians had the power, the 
Economist declared, to achieve their goals within their grasp, if only they would recognize 
that fact: 
the constitution she demands and…the realisation of the dignity of status to 
which she aspires depends solely on the use to which she puts the 
tremendous responsibility entrusted to her hands.116 
 
The Economist also held Gandhi personally accountable for determining India‘s future 
path: 
upon [Gandhi‘s] shoulders now rests a tremendous responsibility.  A 
future which will fulfil Indian ambitions is within India‘s grasp.  Is it 
possible that Mr. Gandhi will deliberately choose to place impediments 
between the hand and the prize?  Or…will he abandon the policy of 
obstruction which might spell years of disturbance, suffering and 
disappointment for millions of his fellow-countrymen…India‘s future lies 
in Indian hands.117 
 
Lord Meston, in the Sunday Times, upbraided Indians for essentially excluding themselves 
from the Statutory Commission: 
For this rebuff they have only themselves to blame.  Time after time have 
they been invited…to show exactly what they want, to produce their own 
draft of a constitution.  There has been plenty of tall talk, but no draft 
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constitution…It is the tragedy of Indian Nationalism that it so often misses 
its greatest opportunities.118 
 
Truth concluded in imagery seemingly more suitable for a fairy tale: ―we can do 
little without the good will of Indians.  If that is forthcoming, then the road stretches clear 
before us, along which Indians and Britons can walk side by side towards the fulfilme nt of 
their common destiny.‖119  The Saturday Review used Cinderella- like imagery in order to 
describe Dominion status and India.  The Review stated that Dominion status was 
not an incantation to be uttered by Britannia with a wave of her wand as the 
prelude to a transformation scene.  It is the outward symbol of a conscious 
unity which India herself must achieve.120 
 
Truth, again, opted for rhetoric redolent of the folk tale and the trope of the young hero on 
a quest: ―for better or worse India has attained its manhood; it must now show by acts -- 
and not by words as hitherto -- that it can acquit itself as a national unit.‖121  Truth also 
claimed that the success or failure of the eventual India Act depended ―on the loyalty and 
patriotism with which the various sections of Indian opinion work together for one 
common end.‖  Truth added with a hint of drama: ―The hour of India‘s opportunity has 
struck.  Will her sons‘ patriotism and brains rise to the argument?‖122 
 A key assumption, largely implicit, in the English press was that Congress was 
unrepresentative of all the varied peoples of the subcontinent.  It viewed the Congress 
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Party as just a noisy minority that represented Western educated Hindus, a miniscule 
proportion of the Indian population.  Congress catered only to its narrow interests and 
aimed to exalt Hindus over all the minorities of the subcontinent.  The British Raj, 
therefore, was the true representative of the Indian masses because of its impartiality and 
commitment to Western justice.  This argument was especially prominent when Congress 
declared itself in favor of complete independence and sent Gandhi as a delegate to the 
second session of the round table talks.  
 The Saturday Review described Congress, ―the politically minded and educated,‖ 
as ―merely a trivial part of the population numerically, but comprise the slave races of India 
as against the fighting races.‖123  Congress only represented ―a small political interest to 
which the overwhelming majority of their fellow-subjects are absolutely indifferent,‖ the 
Daily Express claimed. 124   The Daily Mail also described Congress as ―a handful of 
excited Nationalists who do not amount to 1 per cent. of their number.‖125  Churchill in the 
Mail contended that Dominion status 
cannot be attained while the political classes in India represent only an 
insignificant fraction of the three hundred and fifty millions for whose 
welfare we are responsible.126 
 
 The Congress Party only ―represents an infinitesimal part of the Indian population,‖ the 
Sunday Times insisted.127  The Morning Post portrayed Congress as ―neither national or 
representative‖ and ―it is not even elected by the small group of Western educated Hindus 
for which it stands…but the Mohammedans stand aloof.‖128   
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 Certain papers admitted that Congress was prominent and influential while also 
describing it as unrepresentative.  The New Statesman depicted Congress as ―a hotch 
potch of political extremists representing a mere handful of the population of India.‖  The 
Statesman, however, conceded that Gandhi ―speaks for millions‖ and ―he alone makes the 
Congress Party really important,‖129  while the Economist insisted that ―the Congress 
represents no inconsiderable part‖ of politically active Indians.130  In contrast, Time & 
Tide depicted Congress as a ―non-representative group of extremist politicians,‖ but 
admitted that its cooperation would have to be secured in order to make the reforms process 
a success.131 
 More specifically, the English press universally viewed the Indian National 
Congress as the greatest obstacle to Indian self-government.  The organization was 
branded, implicitly or explicitly, as solely composed of and representing the Hindus.  The 
negative portrayal of Congress began with the naming of the Statutory Commission and its 
arrival in India.  The Times claimed that non- inclusion of Indians on the commission was 
only a pretext for agitation.132  The Daily Telegraph criticized organizers of the boycott of 
the Commission for basing their actions upon misconceptions133 and cautioned them to 
recollect ―the grave disorder which in the past has attended the attempt to enforce such a 
proclamation by violence and threats.‖134  The boycott of the Commission, the Sunday 
Times stated, was ―a hysterical agitation to no purpose‖ which would ―only give the outside 
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world reason to ask whether India is really fit for the liberty which she claims.‖135  In the 
Sunday Times Lord Meston contended that Parliament rightly excluded ―extremists‖ from 
representation on the Commission as ―the value of the Nationalists‘ co-operation has been 
gauged by the consistently negative character of their own attitude.‖136  The Manchester 
Guardian charged the ―Nationalists‖ with ―a bankruptcy of leadership‖ for refusing to 
cooperate with the Simon Commission, which the paper described as a real opportunity of 
stating their case.  The hartal was ―a symptom of essential irresponsibility which cannot 
be ignored,‖ the New Statesman argued.  The boycott only demonstrated ―in a wholly 
gratuitous manner their unfitness for any further immediate installment of 
self-government.‖137   The Commission would receive, Truth predicted, a ―torrent of 
Bengali abuse, which is the only form of criticism known to the baboo.‖138 
 The Irwin Declaration elicited little comment on how Indians reacted to the 
statement or how it would impact the nascent reforms process.  Only three papers, the 
Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, and British Weekly noted that Indian nationalists interpreted 
the declaration to guarantee immediate Dominion status, with the proposed conference to 
draft a constitution.  The three papers chastised Indian leaders for purposefully 
misinterpreting the proclamation. 139   The Manchester Guardian  and Yorkshire Post 
viewed the Viceroy‘s declaration as letting Britain and India start the reforms process with 
a clean slate.  The Post claimed that the statement outlined the path ahead and expressed 
hope that it ―would restore to the saner Indian leaders their control of the movement and 
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enable them to moderate the hot-headed enthusiasm of ‗Young India.‘‖ 140   The 
Manchester Guardian stated that Indian leaders had a new opportunity to change its tactics 
and cooperate with the British Government: 
The method of stormy agitation has been tried out.  It has achieved little 
but demoralisation…There is therefore some ground for hope that India‘s 
educated class may…decide after all to swing away from those leaders who 
are inviting them to a course which may lead straight to violence and to try 
the effect of a few years of patient construction work within the 
Constitution.141 
 
 The English press met the Congress declaration of independence on 1 January 1930 
with widespread criticism.  The Times described the Lahore convention as essentially 
organized anarchy: 
The scenes and speeches…the chaos amid which the Congress conducts its 
business, the wildly revolutionary sentiments of its orators, the resolute 
detachment of the Moslem minority…the half-hearted endorsement of 
violence and the universal contempt for practical progress.142 
 
The Economist also depicted the Congress meeting as ―a picture of vociferous agitation 
and irresponsible enthusiasm in abundance; but certainly not one of a united national will 
or a constructive practical policy.‖143  The New Statesman agreed: 
Congress is in no sense a representative assembly.  A considerable 
proportion of the political leaders are there with their immediate followers, 
but as a whole its composition is extremely haphazard, and many of its 
‗delegates‘ are self-appointed, representing nobody but themselves…its 
decisions carry only a strictly limited authority and sometimes almost no 
authority.144 
 
The British Government would not be ―hustled and bullied by threats of outrage‖ by 
Congress, the Saturday Review contended.  It described the party as ―powerful out of ratio 
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to its numbers; it has fired the imagination of young India widely and deeply; it has no 
hesitation in playing on the passions of the mob.‖145  The Spectator expressed hope that 
the results of the first round table conference would ultimately reconcile the Indian 
extremists.  The paper believed that ―a crumbling process will set in which will detach an 
increasing number of Indians from the extremist position.  In the end that position will 
become untenable.‖146  The Manchester Guardian described the supporters of Congress 
as ―inarticulate millions‖ and blind followers, while the Morning Post depicted the party as 
a criminal organization, unfit for running a self-governing India: 
the leaders of [the Congress] Party and some twenty thousand of its deluded 
followers, are now in prison, either for breaking the law or incitement to 
break it…they have opposed every measure taken by the Government to 
suppress [murder and terrorism].147 
 
The pro-reform section of the English press, implicitly or explicitly, expressed hope that 
the reforms process would channel Congress into responsibility.  This idea was best 
expressed by the Daily Telegraph in February 1935: 
the Bill now before Parliament has forced Congress members to fight the 
elections and return to the Legislatures.  For any section to stand aside 
would be to throw rule into the hands of its opponents.  Self-government 
contains within itself the force that compels co-operation.  Responsibility 
for legislation begets responsibility among the members of the 
Legislatures.148 
 
The Irwin declaration would guide millions of young Indians into ―useful constructive 
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channels,‖ the Yorkshire Post anticipated.‖149  The Manchester Guardian contended that 
Congress would ultimately decide to come into the reforms process and work the 
machinery of government ―possibly in a hostile and even wrecking temper, but at least to 
work it…and finding some satisfaction in working it, forget, perhaps, that they had even 
wanted to wreck it.‖150  The Manchester Guardian declared with the Irwin-Gandhi Pact  
Mr. Gandhi has the power to turn the forces he has so successfully used in 
opposition to the Government into creative channels. He has most 
effectively used the weapon of passive resistance; now it is for him to show 
that he can do as well with creative co-operation.151 
 
The Manchester Guardian  affirmed ―the sooner the new Constitution can be got 
going and provide Indians with something to work for the sooner the spirit of 
non-cooperation will disappear.‖152  It was the task of the British Government, the Sunday 
Times claimed, to turn ―agitators into administrators, and so framing a constitution as to 
prevent disaster until responsibility sobers.‖153  The Yorkshire Post expressed hope that 
during the two years until the India Act went into effect in early 1937 it would be ―time 
enough for Indian public opinion to take stock of the new position and, especially, of the 
vastly increased responsibilities which Indian public men must assume.‖154 
Some sections of the English press expressed praise, if grudgingly given, for 
Congress.  Lord Meston, writing in the British Weekly, praised Congress for its 
―driving-power, tenacity; and no constitutional scheme would be complete unless those 
qualities are enlisted in its service.‖  Meston hoped that these qualities were now 
―available for constructive, instead of destructive, patriotism‖ and in the end all depended 
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―on the sense of responsibility which the extremist leaders now d isplay.‖ 155   The 
Manchester Guardian described Congress as the ―largest and best-organised political 
movement in India.‖156  While Indian nationalism was not all pervasive, the Sunday Times 
claimed, the Congress minority was ―entitled by intellect to very respectful 
consideration.‖157   Congress was ―not solely composed of extremists‖ and would be 
influenced by the cooperation exampled at the first round table conference,  the Times 
admitted. 158   Even the anti-reform Saturday Review expressed grudging respect for 
Congress: 
whether you like it or not, it is undeniable that the only effective political 
party in India to-day is the Congress Party.  Like me you may have no 
sympathy with some of its actions, but neither can we forget its existence.  
It is definitely there, and future constitution makers have to reckon with the 
Indian Nationalists.159 
 
Gandhi and Congress often appeared in the British press as one and the same. 
British journalists depicted the Mahatma as the undisputed leader of the Congress Party 
and of Indian nationalism.160 The British Weekly described Gandhi as having ―a strong 
hold on the ignorant masses.‖161  In its view ―men of violence‖ used Gandhi‘s ―high 
reputation for their own desperate purposes.‖162  The Spectator expressed fear that Gandhi 
was ―letting loose forces which may pass entirely out of his control.‖163  Gandhi was an 
―unscrupulous agitator…guilty of conspiracy against the Government of India,‖ according 
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to Truth.164    Time & Tide claimed that the ―Gandhi- ites are playing with the high 
explosive of lawlessness, disorder and communal riots; and they know it.‖165  In 1930 the 
Nation & Athenaeum warned that Gandhi was traveling down the same disastrous road he 
trod in 1922: 
That veteran saint (whose motives it is doubtless impious to analyze, but 
whose activities it may none the less be a duty to resist) has apparently once 
more convinced himself, in spite of bitter experience to the contrary in the 
past, that non-co-operation and non-violence are compatible terms.  Can 
the hot-heads be sure that there will not be another orgy of penitence and 
self-disgust on his part when the blood begins to flow?166 
 
Many papers were particularly vicious in their condemnation of Gandhi and his 
tactics.  The press commonly portrayed Gandhi as a ―half-naked leader‖ armed with 
―Machiavellian craftiness,‖ 167  ―fanaticism and impracticality,‖ 168  ―a lunatic or a 
humbug,‖169 the ―Oriental Pied Piper of Hamelin,‖ ―the implacable enemy of the British in 
India;‖ or simply a ―fanatic‖ and a ―megalomaniac.‖ 170   More specifically, papers 
described Gandhi‘s salt march as ―partly childish‖ and ―partly ecstatically fanatical,‖171 
―Gandhi‘s war upon British authority,‖172 a revolutionary act led by Gandhi ―under his 
tattered flag of non-violence‖173 and the ―first act of the ‗war of civil disobedience‘ against 
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the Government of India.‖174  
The Spectator stated that there was no need for conflict between British authorities 
and Gandhi as ―the goal Mr. Gandhi has proclaimed for India is the goal accepted, in 
everything but some secondary details, by the Government of Great Britain.‖  The paper 
added that ―immense will be [Gandhi‘s] responsibility if he refuses peace and chooses war 
now.‖175  Truth stated that Indians needed to renounce Gandhi and Congress in order to 
demonstrate their fitness to work the machinery of self-government.176  Gandhi was the 
antithesis of a British statesman, according to Time & Tide, as he had ―no gift for the kind 
of constructive work necessary for the working out of the new policy.  His genius finds 
free play and spiritual refreshment only in obstructive or destructive agitations.‖177   
 The Times criticized Gandhi for his protest backed by the threat of suicide against 
the Communal Award.178  It was a pity that Gandhi needed to put his life in danger in 
order to bring his fellow Hindus into agreement, the Manchester Guardian contended.179  
The Daily Mail expressed modest relief that Gandhi ended his fast following the Poona 
Pact, though claimed that ―his influence is seldom used except to do mischief, and as a 
political leader he is almost invariably wrong.‖180  The Yorkshire Post praised Gandhi for 
accomplishing ―something that many who know India judged to be impossible.‖  
However, the Post added that Gandhi, by reviving civil disobedience, ―showed himself to 
be once again a poor statesman and a worse judge of men and events.‖ 181  Truth used the 
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opportunity of the Poona Pact to condemn Gandhi as a hypocrite: ―in all the years that 
Gandhi has been prominent in British-Indian politics, though he has talked more than 
enough, he has not lifted a finger, or sacrificed one glass of goat‘s milk, to lighten the lot of 
the Untouchables.‖182  The Economist described the fast as ―not only painful but also 
unreasonable‖ and disputed Gandhi‘s claims to represent the Depressed Classes, stating 
that they had their own organization and representatives.183  Gandhi was not a political 
prisoner but in jail because ―he refused to dissociate himself from the law-breaking 
campaign of civil disobedience.  He can release himself to-morrow morning if he will 
give a simple undertaking not to break the law again,‖ the Daily Express declared.184 
 Many English papers on the pro-reform side of the debate actually expressed 
respect, if not outright praise, for Gandhi.  However, any positive sentiment was usually 
coupled closely with criticism.  The Manchester Guardian  depicted Gandhi as having a 
―larger personal following than any other individual now alive in the world.  His influence 
is the more remarkable in that it is based entirely on moral qualities…He is their prophet, 
the prophet of Indian nationalism.‖185  The Daily Telegraph depicted the Poona Pact as ―a 
success that may have historic consequences.‖186  Gandhi‘s salt march, the Economist 
claimed, would be seen as a farce if he was not ―a man of unusual distinction.‖  However, 
the Economist also described him as ―childish and irresponsible.‖187  The Daily Herald 
commended Gandhi but also contended he needed to change tactics: 
Mr. Gandhi has shown in the past, amongst other qualities of greatness, a 
fine courage in realizing and avowing his own mistakes.  He has now an 
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opportunity of rendering another great service to his country by realizing 
that the wise policy… [is] co-operating with the British Government.188 
 
C.F. Andrews, one of the few dissenting voices expressed in the British press, writing in 
the Nation & Athenaeum, criticized the Simon Report because it was hostile to Gandhi.  
He claimed that the report  
entirely fails to realize how his supreme personality has moulded and 
fashioned the Indian nation which is now coming to birth and has restored 
Indian national courage…Mr. Gandhi is regarded by the Commissioners 
throughout almost as an intruder, whose only object is to upset the best- laid 
constructive political reforms which the British Government has to offer.189 
 
 The picture the English press painted of India was one of a country unable to rule 
itself and in need of British tutelage.  India was depicted as fundamentally different from 
the West and unlike any other dominion in the empire.  The divide between Hindus and 
Muslims loomed wide.  All sides of the press agreed that the Congress Party and Gandhi 
were unrepresentative of India as a whole.  Coupled with the overwhelming positive view 
of the British imperial mission, the negative portrayal of India and Indians would seem to 
lead to the press to oppose the reforms process across the board.  However, as will be seen 
in the next two chapters, the majority of the English press supported the reforms process. 
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 Chapter 5 
Fulfilling or Scrapping the Imperial Mission? 
Views of the Reforms Process, 1927-March 1931 
 
We are satisfied that Lord Irwin, one of the best Viceroys who have ever 
presided over India, did not point to the inevitable destination of the 
Indian reforms without very good reason.  As the man on the spot he 
had a better opportunity than anybody else to judge the opportuneness of 
his words. 
 “The Indian „Crisis,‟” Spectator, 9 Nov. 1929, 653.  
 
We cannot give democracy and self-government to India.  We have got 
to force it upon her and force it in our own way, listening to those over 
there who are willing to co-operate with us in our self-imposed task, but 
paying no attention whatever to those who are not. 
 “Boycott the Boycotters,” New Statesman, 4 Jan. 1930, 409. 
 
The Viceroy‟s statement, intended to mean nothing here at home, was 
intended to mean – o r to be taken as meaning –  a great  deal in India.  
Lord Irwin, with the best intentions, has been betrayed into a piece of 
opportunism that has, or will have when its true character is understood, 
seriously damaged the prestige of the British Raj in the eyes of a people 
that is already suspicious. 
 “Notes of the Week,” Saturday Review, 16 Nov. 1929, 569. 
 
As the previous two chapters have demonstrated, the English press firmly believed 
in the British imperial mission and held negative views of India and its peoples.  
Nevertheless, by August 1935, the majority of papers supported the reform measures.  
Granted, they still viewed the process as a tremendous risk; success for the most part 
depended upon Indians finding their sense of responsibility.  In the end, the pro-reform 
press calculated that the gamble was worth taking, often citing the precedent of Ireland as 
an example of the dangers of withholding reforms too long.   
 The argument over the reforms process terminating with the India Act of 1935 
came down to a basic idea in respect to the British imperial mission.  The pro-reform 
section of the English press contended that the reforms were the culmination of the 
imperial mission: the reforms would allow the Indians finally to demonstrate their 
responsibility and knowledge of self-government imparted by their tutors.  The reforms 
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would solidify India‟s position within the British Empire based on mutual cooperation and 
respect.  The diehards, however, argued that the reforms repudiated the imperial mission: 
Britain was shirking its duties to provide just rule to the subcontinent and its many divided 
races and creeds.  The reforms would lead to inevitable disaster: chaos on the 
subcontinent, the dissolution of the empire, and ultimately the ruin of Britain.  Diehards 
recommended slowing the reforms process to a glacial pace, if not a dead stop.  The 
impetus for moving forward should originate with Indians and not be imposed by Britain.  
Both pro-reformers and diehards saw their solution as the salvation of India and the empire 
and regarded their opponents‟ resolution as guaranteed ruin for India and Britain as well.   
 The diehards were an amorphous group of parliamentarians, aristocrats, former 
members of the Indian Government and Indian Civil Service, and former military officers.  
Notables included Winston Churchill, Lord Rothermere, Lord Carson, Rudyard Kipling, 
Lord Meston and Lord Sydenham.  They were united in their desire to keep India firmly 
within the British Empire.  Diehards spawned two lobbying organizations to promote their 
cause: the Indian Empire Society, formed in 1930, and the Indian Defence League, 
founded in June 1933, growing out of the Parliamentary India Defence Committee.  
Former members of the Government of India, such as provincial governors, dominated the 
former group while parliamentarians directed the latter organization, comprising 
fifty-seven MP‟s and twenty-eight peers. 
To complicate the situation there was also a third group, that I have labeled the 
British moderates, that floated in between the reformers and diehards.  The British 
moderates supported the reforms process but also called for a more strict enforcement of 
law and order in India, particularly against Congress.  This group, which included 
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defectors from the anti-reform side (the Spectator, New Statesman, Sunday Times, and 
Truth) did not criticize Irwin though it seemed to disagree with his conciliatory policies.   
The British moderates justified their call for a crackdown by reasoning that only the 
extremists and law breakers would receive the brunt of British justice while the loyal 
masses would be unaffected by such measures.  Somewhat unexpected was the lengths 
that many British moderate papers were willing to go to impose reform by force, if 
necessary.  The pro-reform papers were willing to trust the “men on the spot” as the best to 
deal with unrest on the subcontinent. The diehard papers assumed that harsh discipline was 
just a matter of course in the empire; Britain had authority and needed to exercise it. 
 Although the reforms process began in 1927, the press did not even begin to 
consider the reforms policy as an ongoing process until the Irwin Declaration in 1929.  
The views of the reforms on both sides were inextricably tied to the negative view of 
Indians and British domestic politics.  From 1929 through March 1931 the debate can best 
be described as a clash between Irwinism and the diehard thesis, between concessions and 
repression: 
The Viceroy…has become a bone of contention at Westminster and in the 
Press, some saying openly that this idealistic, conscience-controlled 
Cecilian is leading India towards a grave effusion of b lood, while others 
approve his attitude and declare that England will agree to the demand for  
self-government.  On the whole, the outlook is not reassuring.1 
 
Hence, while the Daily Herald claimed that the Irwin Declaration changed the political 
situation overnight and converted “a dangerous situation . . . into one more hopeful than 
has existed for many long months,”2 the Daily Mail regarded the Declaration as a repeat of 
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“the disastrous policy of 1919” in which the Government of India gave in “to their avowed 
enemies instead of enforcing the law against those who announce their intention of 
breaking it.”3   
 The Economist, Daily Herald, Manchester Guardian, and Times described the 
Viceroy‟s statement as a fresh reassurance to Indians, a reaffirmation of British policy 
towards India laid down by Montagu twelve years earlier.  Irwin‟s statement was 
a clear announcement to the people of India that the purpose and object of 
the Government‟s India policy are identical with those have been repeatedly 
affirmed by their own political leaders.4 
 
Answering the critics who contended that the declaration might be misinterpreted, the 
Economist stated that immediate Dominion status was not Irwin‟s intention. 5  The Times 
also expressed optimism about the Irwin Declaration.  It stated, referring to the conference 
proposal, that “the atmosphere is better because a fresh door has been opened to 
cooperation.”6  The Times expressed regret at the choice of the words “dominion status” 
but reminded its readers that the words had been used before, by such notables as Montagu 
and Lords Reading and Birkenhead.7   
 The pro-declaration section of the English press also shrugged off any claims that 
the Viceroy had failed to treat the Simon Commission with respect as without substance.8  
The Nation & Athenaeum, for example, claimed that the authority of the Statutory 
Commission was not impaired by the Viceroy‟s declaration, as the Commission was “not 
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concerned…with the ultimate goal of our policy in India.”9  The Spectator praised Irwin 
as “one of the best Viceroys who have ever presided over India :” such a man “did not point 
to the inevitable destination of the Indian reforms without very good reason.”   
These papers also hailed Irwin‟s call for a round table conference.  The Spectator 
not only welcomed the proposal for the round table conference but argued it was the most 
important part of the Viceroy‟s declaration. 10  The Observer contended that there was no 
dispute over the final goal of self-government for India but only over “the rate and tempo 
of progress.” 11   As early as 1929 the Manchester Guardian warned of the risks of 
withholding reforms from India: “the growth of a national spirit make it unsafe for the 
British Parliament to seek to prolong indefinitely its present control over India.”12 
The majority of the press, however, disparaged the Viceroy‟s declaration as 
well-meaning but fundamentally misguided and guaranteed to damage “the prestige of the 
British Raj in the eyes of a people that is already suspicious.”13  Truth, for example, 
described the Viceroy‟s actions as “mischievous” but stated that “no doubt his intentions 
were the best.”14  The Daily Telegraph contended that the Viceroy„s gamble to corral 
Congress into cooperation would not pay off: “if the Government and Lord Irwin hoped to 
ameliorate an anxious situation in India…they are likely to be disappointed.”15  The New 
Statesman insisted that nationalist Indians would misunderstand  the vague phrase 
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“Dominion status” to mean immediate self-government and, moreover, that “Lord Irwin 
must have known that it would be taken that way in India and must have intended that it 
should be.”16 
Many papers opposed Irwin‟s declaration on the grounds that it undermined the 
Simon Commission.  The Saturday Review suggested that the British Government wait 
for the committee to give its report as the commissioners may or may not see Dominion 
status for India as feasible.  The paper contended that the Government needed to choose 
between the commission and the declaration. 17  The Daily Express declared that the Simon 
Commission opposed the Viceroy‟s statement and claimed that the commission, being a 
statutory one named by all parties of Parliament, was more important than the Viceroy.18  
The Sunday Times criticized the British Government as tactless for the declaration 
impinged on the authority of the Statutory Commission.  The Sunday Times claimed the 
statement was a fait accompli and that the Viceroy “urged the step upon the 
Government.”19   
Others, however, did not see a conflict between Irwin‟s Declaration and the 
Commission.  The Daily Telegraph depicted the declaration as “a departure from the 
course of prudence” but agreed with the Yorkshire Post that the Viceroy‟s use of the phrase 
Dominion status “was not intended, and could not be intended, to cut the ground from 
under the feet of the Simon Commission.”20   
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This tug-of-war between the Irwin Declaration and the Simon Commission turned 
out to be meaningless when Congress declined Irwin‟s offer and opted for a declaration of 
independence, made at their Lahore conference on 31 December 1929.  Opponents of the 
declaration claimed that the Viceroy‟s statement led directly to the Congress 
pronouncement for independence; supporters of Irwin disputed that contention.  This 
dispute was best summed up by the Nation & Athenaeum: 
There will be some who hold that had the Viceroy‟s pronouncement not 
been subjected to criticism in Parliament it might have reaped its full fruits 
in the adhesion of the Congress leaders to the plan of a 
round-table-conference.  There will be others to maintain that this 
pronouncement itself, by raising false hopes and expectations, was among 
the causes that precipitated the Congress into its act of perilous madness.21 
 
The British moderates did not blame Irwin for Congress‟s declaration but did call for a 
tougher stance, though they were careful to differentiate their conception of law and order 
from old-fashioned repression. 
Criticism of the Irwin Declaration persisted into January 1930, reignited by the 
Congress declaration of independence.  The British Weekly and Saturday Review argued 
that the independence declaration resulted from Congress‟ misinterpretation of the Irwin 
declaration while Time & Tide and Daily Mail contended that the Viceroy‟s attempt to 
appease the Indian nationalists had failed miserably.  The British Weekly sniffed that Lord 
Irwin “probably regrets that he did not guard his words more carefully” now that Congress 
had taken his reference to dominion status to mean self-government.22  The Saturday 
Review also blamed the “well- intentioned error of the now famous Viceregal declaration” 
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for pushing Congress into a policy of complete independence. 23  Time & Tide was far less 
generous: Irwin “no doubt knew what was in the wind when he declared dominion status to 
be India‟s goal…the time and manner of his statement invested it with significance that 
could hardly have been unintentional.” 24   The Daily Mail contended that the Irwin 
declaration which “was taken by Hindus as promising a grant of Dominion status to India, 
has not appeased the extremists but only whetted their appetite for mischief.” 25   The 
Morning Post did not mention Lord Irwin by name but blamed the conciliatory policy of 
the Government of India, a policy that not only failed to placate Congress but encouraged 
revolution: “British authority might almost be said to have abdicated, since it permits to 
pass such insults and challenges to its prestige and power.”  The Post claimed that if 
Congress achieved its goal of independence “there would be civil war, anarchy, endless 
dole for the Indian people, as in those times before we governed India.”26  Lloyd George, 
writing in the Daily Mail, presented the choices for the British in India in Manichean terms: 
“Shall we abandon our Empire in the East, or do we intend to stand by our undoubted 
responsibilities whatever the hazard or cost?”27   
 The Economist was the only paper to defend Irwin at this time by stating that the 
Viceroy made his declaration with “the hope that his great influence might be used to help 
India in her peaceful progress along the road of political self- realisation.”28  The paper also 
took the larger view of the reforms process and why it should proceed in spite of the 
Congress declaration: 
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The promise of 1917 was made by a country grateful for the assistance of 
India during the war and convinced that political freedom is the only 
tolerable condition for nations.  It is a thought still far from the mind of the 
British nation that it is possible for a free country such as ours to continue to 
hold in political subjection, indefinitely against its will, a vast country such 
as India.29 
 
Without mentioning the Viceroy, the Manchester Guardian and Times supported 
the reforms in spite of the Congress declaration.  The Manchester Guardian attributed the 
reforms process to Montagu, not Irwin, and highlighted the difficulties that needed to be 
overcome on the road to self-government.  In spite of the difficulties the Guardian 
advocated accelerating the process with the “Montagu scheme for the gradual transfer of 
the functions of government piecemeal” as the most practicable method. 30  There was 
nothing new or surprising in the actions of Congress, the Times claimed, and therefore it 
should not “deflect in the slightest degree the course of British policy.”31   
 The Spectator, switching from the anti-reform to moderate stance, strangely took 
the view that the reforms process must carry on although with increasingly enforced order 
and regulation; essentially Britain is going to impose more self-government with an iron 
fist whether the Indians liked it or not: 
Great Britain must…behave „firmly‟; but we use that word not in its earlier 
bad sense of suppression as a sufficient policy in itself, but in the sense of 
consistency in keeping the real objective in view.  The real objective is that 
the peoples of India shall be brought without unnecessary delay to the state 
in which they shall be recognized as a community in all respects equal to the 
great self-governing Dominions of the British Commonwealth.32 
 
The Spectator sought to differentiate the limits of law and order to protect law abiding 
subjects and punishing terrorists.  It stated that “law must never lapse into restrictions and 
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repressions which become vexatious and provocative.  Freedom to express political 
opinions must be distinguished from freedom to do evil deeds.”33  This sentiment was 
echoed by the New Statesman.  Until the goal of forcing self-government upon India had 
been achieved: “We must continue really to govern India until we have taught her to 
govern herself…we must continue to show her what government means.”34  Britain should 
pursue the reforms process, working with those willing to cooperate, and ignoring “such 
exhibitions of political irresponsibility and extravagance as have b een given by the 
Congress.”35  The Times, Sunday Times, and Daily Herald also linked the reforms process 
with a strict enforcement of the law: 
so far as this country is concerned, there can be no more question of going 
back upon it than there is of tolerating the anarchy which the Congress both 
preaches and illustrates in its own affairs.36 
 
Truth called for harsh measures to be taken against Congress as Gandhi and his supporters 
were guilty of conspiracy versus the Government of India and Britain: 
The time has come to call a halt.  We have reached…the limits of 
concession…they should be dealt with as conspirators.  If strong measures 
are not taken, and taken quickly, the firebrands will set India ablaze, and the 
conflagration will only be quenched at great cost in lives and misery.37 
 
 Irwin‟s conciliatory policies in India came under great scrutiny during Gandhi‟s 
salt march in March 1930.  The big question at this time revolved around whether or not to 
arrest Gandhi.  Supporters of the Viceroy argued that ignoring Gandhi would lead to his 
march and movement to peter out on its own.  Arresting Gandhi would only turn him into 
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a martyr and lead to native resistance and bloodshed.  Irwin‟s detractors contended that 
his policy was one of weakness that would only encourage the extremists to plot further 
troubles that invariably led to violence.  Only a firm crackdown on Gandhi and his 
followers and a stern enforcement of the law would end the latest civil disobedience 
movement and engender loyalty to the Raj amongst Indians. 
The pro-reform section of the English press grew during the salt march.  The 
Yorkshire Post praised the Viceroy for his conciliatory policy and claimed that the British 
people supported him and his policy: 
Lord Irwin‟s policy throughout his Viceroyalty has been to endeavour to 
enlist moderate opinion against the Gandhi methods, in the hope that sane 
Indian opinion would perceive that in co-operation and collaboration lies 
India‟s route to self-government.  It is not denied that he has met with 
considerable success, and it obviously cannot be denied that in that policy 
he has behind him the weight of public opinion in this country.  If his 
policy now put to the test has its deserved success Gandhi‟s highly 
dramatised march to the coast will have such little political effect…that it 
will need no repression.38 
 
The Times and Daily Telegraph defended Irwin as he was the “man on the spot.”  The 
Telegraph reasoned that since the Viceroy had not arrested Gandhi he would be “amply 
justified” as “he regards the situation as well in hand” while the Times contended that 
“those who are directly responsible for public order” were better qualified to deal with 
Gandhi and his disciples than critics in Britain who lacked direct knowledge of the 
subcontinent.39  The prompt arrest of Gandhi would not end the agitation in India as 
Irwin‟s critics propounded.  The Viceroy‟s detractors did not understand “the psychology 
of the Hindu masses:” Gandhi‟s disciples would follow him into prison if Gandhi were 
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imprisoned.40  The Spectator attempted to rally its readers to support the Viceroy while 
chiding his detractors: “The Viceroy deserves the support of all Englishmen and the very 
careful restraint of those who are his critics.” 41  Gandhi, the Economist claimed, was 
seeking martyrdom and therefore courted arrest.  The paper praised the Government of 
India for not playing into Gandhi‟s hands. 42  Time & Tide, jumping to the pro-reform side 
of the debate, backed the Viceroy for following the correct course of not arresting 
Gandhi.43   
 Many papers in the moderate camp remained unswayed by the pro-reform 
arguments during Gandhi‟s march.  The Daily Herald supported the enforcement of law 
and order “but law and order respected by a people that feels itself free.  Not law and order 
based on fear and impression.”  The Herald regarded repression as the Birkenhead and 
Rothermere way and concluded that “official terrorism is as wrongheaded as it is 
wicked.”44  The Manchester Guardian equivocated over how to deal with Gandhi and the 
salt march.  The Guardian feared that anything could happen if Gandhi was allowed to 
pursue his goals unchecked yet expressed caution that “the friction generated in restraining 
his activities” may excite violence in explosive areas of the country.  The paper rode the 
fence in expressing hope “that the Government of India will hit upon the right admixture of 
firmness and discretion -- the mixture so easy to prescribe in words, so difficult to arrive at 
in action.”45  In spite of its hedging, the Manchester Guardian condemned the institution 
of imperialism: “The rule of one country by another is and is now felt to be a monstrous and 
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indefensible system.”46 
 Three of the four English moderate papers, the Sunday Times, New Statesman & 
Nation, and Truth continued to support the reforms process while criticizing the Irwin 
conciliation methods, though the Statesman and Truth would later withdraw their calls for 
the arrest of Gandhi.  The Sunday Times rode the fence during the salt march: the paper 
supported the reforms process in general, blamed the Irwin declaration for stirring up the 
extremists, and called for sterner measures: 
There is only one way to deal with this kind of thing, and that is to oppose it 
firmly and it put it down.  There can be no compromise in a matter of this 
sort…Britain is full of good will to India, and is proving it by her policy of 
reforms; but the tactics of the extremists are bound, if they persist, to make 
her enforce her will absolutely.  Lawlessness can only be met by rigid 
enforcement of the law.47 
 
The Sunday Times wanted the policy of reforms to move forward but did not want Britain 
bullied into “ill-considered concessions” by the extremists. 48   The New Statesman & 
Nation also equivocated over the best course of action in dealing with the salt march.  
Initially the paper stated that Gandhi‟s arrest, followed by the incarceration of other 
Congress leaders, would lead to the collapse of the whole movement.  Perhaps to justify 
its own stance, the Statesman claimed that some Indians called for harsher methods against 
Gandhi: “In certain quarters in India, both British and Moslem, there is a cry for swift and 
comprehensive measures of repression.”49  However, at the conclusion of the march the 
paper seemed to countenance the Viceroy‟s tactics in dealing with Gandhi: “The Mahatma, 
instead of being a martyr, has become slightly ridiculous, and the inevitable effect of that 
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has been to weaken his campaign.”50  Truth also advocated the immediate arrest of Gandhi 
as the paper equated civil disobedience with rebellion which would inevitably lead to 
violence.  Gandhi‟s arrest would lead to the abrupt collapse of the entire movement and 
nip any trouble in the bud.51  Gandhi was a “megalomaniac,” according to Truth, and if he 
were able to carry out his plans “there is no limit to the harm he might do by inciting the 
inflammable and ignorant masses to resist the Government.”52  However, a week later the 
paper rescinded its request to have Gandhi incarcerated; instead the paper stated that “he 
should be put under medical, not penal, restraint” as he was suffering from “folie de 
grandeur.”53  Of the moderate papers only the Sunday Times and Truth attacked Irwin for 
policies that Indians were bound to misread as British weakness.54   
 The diehard press remained recalcitrant in its negative opinion of the Viceroy, his 
tactics, and the reforms process.  The Daily Mail condemned the Viceroy for not arresting 
Gandhi especially after Gandhi‟s ultimatum.  The Mail denounced Irwinism in its 
entirety: 
The latest performance of Lord Irwin…has deepened the impression of 
weakness produced by his notorious proclamation of last October, with its 
foolish talk of Dominion status for India.  His proclamation, as the world 
knows, has since been exploited in every possible way by the seditious and 
disloyal.  But the Viceroy has even now not learned wisdom…Thus does 
Lord Irwin continue the tradition of timid surrender to the extremists which 
he has set up, and thus does he show his complete incapacity to dea l firmly 
with a grave situation.55 
 
The people of Britain wanted Gandhi arrested for effectively declaring war on British 
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authority.56  The Mail was stringent in its advice regarding Irwin‟s policies in general: “the 
policy of surrender to the extremists in India must stop.”57  The Morning Post echoed the 
Mail‟s advocacy of harsh repression against Gandhi and condemning Irwin‟s appeasement 
policy.  Extremists plotted rebellion and burnt the Union Jack  
while Lord Irwin has confined himself to strong words and the occasional 
prosecution of subordinates.  This is to repeat the disastrous policy of Lord 
Chelmsford and if the results are similar the Indian Government and the 
British Government will have themselves to blame.58 
 
Similarly, Lord Meston, writing in the Saturday Review, criticized the Viceroy for his high 
and mighty language about peace and order while “the Union Jack is being pulled down, 
the red flag hoisted, Independence Day proclaimed, and preparations made for widespread 
breaches of the peace and a general defiance of the law.”59 
 The argument over the reforms intensified when the Statutory Commission, after 
nearly three years work, issued its report in June 1930.  The pro-reform papers in general 
praised the Simon Report, with one glaring exception.  The unanimity of the 
Commissioners in issuing their recommendations, the Times contended, meant that there 
should be no dispute in Britain over “the essential features of the problem to be solved.”60  
Lord Peel, writing in the Sunday Times, praised the commissioners for framing their 
recommendations in the report “in a spirit of genuine sympathy” with the hopes, claims, 
and aspirations of Indian public men.  The paper also described the transplanting of 
Western parliamentary institutions into India as “a daring constitutional effort” and 
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commended the commissioners for adapting them to their new home. 61  While the Nation 
& Athenaeum supported the reforms, it criticized the Statutory Report for not going far 
enough: 
The Report as a whole is exactly what might have been expected from a 
group of able politicians viewing India from the British standpoint…it is 
clear that the Commissioners are not specially endowed with sympathetic 
understanding or imaginative insight.  They may give us sound advice on 
the machinery of government but if the active co-operation of Indian 
leaders is to be secured, it must be through the Round Table Conference.62 
 
 Some papers supported the reforms policy without giving explicit countenance or 
censure to the report.  Many of them placed the burden of progress on Indians to develop 
responsibility.  The New Statesman & Nation supported the reforms policy, albeit through 
the Indian moderates, by stating that repression of Indian opponents of reform as the only 
dire alternative.  The Statesman suggested a constitution “which the reasonable elements 
in the body of Indian nationalism will accept” or Britain should be prepared to govern in 
the face of active and passive resistance.  It concluded that “sooner or later this will lead to 
the breakdown of peaceful government and the rule of the sword.”63  The Spectator‟s main 
concern was over the issue of Dominion status for India.  Dominion status had been 
promised and there “can be no going back upon that pledge of British intention.” 64  
However, the Spectator argued that Dominion status was not a concrete thing that could be 
granted but instead a “condition of co-operative independence within the British 
Commonwealth which has been achieved by the people of a Dominion themselves.”65  
The British Weekly, too, put the onus of responsibility for moving forward with the reforms 
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after the report upon Indians.  The Simon Report closed no doors or fixed any barriers 
against India gaining autonomy within the empire, the British Weekly claimed.  The pace 
of reform depended “entirely upon the good will and responsibility of all parties,” a 
scarcely veiled reference to the Congress party.66 
 Some papers preferred to equivocate over the Simon Report.  Both the Economist 
and Manchester Guardian supported the reforms by contending that the report split the 
extremes and offered a middle course between them.  The document would be 
unsatisfying to those who hoped for a shortcut to responsible government, the Economist 
argued, and also those who advocated autocracy as the best method of rule for India.  The 
paper claimed the Simon Report advocated a solution adapted to India‟s special 
circumstances. 67   The Manchester Guardian stated that the Simon Report offered no 
“encouragement to those who think it possible to demonstrate that the people or peoples of 
India are permanently incapable of self-government.”  But the report also dashed the 
hopes of those who wished to see British rule withdrawn immediately “by the mere use of 
the words Dominion status.”68  Truth appeared to support the Commission‟s Report but 
contended little could be accomplished without the support of Indians.  However, it is 
difficult to decipher the paper‟s views of the reforms process: “The Simon Report is a 
guarantee that we intend to proceed in the future as we have acted in the past.”69 The New 
Statesman refuted Lord Rothermere and the Morning Post, which wanted to abandon all 
political advance in India, by claiming that the Simon Report declared “the Diehard creed 
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is dead.”70   
 The anti-reform press interpreted the report as condemning the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and almost all the policies that followed in their wake.71  
Time & Tide denounced the 1919 reforms while comforting the diehards: 
Those -- and they are in the great majority -- who do not see how the British 
can hold India by abdicating in effect, and handing over to the hostile Indian 
Nationalist Party, are reassured by a Report which cuts a lot of dead wood 
away from the Indian Constitution and improves it, while retaining in the 
hands of the Viceroy and the Provincial Governors the real power.72 
 
The Simon Report would disappoint those in England and India who hoped for 
recommendations for a rapid transition to self-government.  The Morning Post described 
Britain‟s pledge to give self-government to India as conditional, a “Jephtah‟s vow;” as 
Indians had not cooperated, Parliament could restrict, if not withdraw the pledge.  A 
pledge fulfilled, the paper argued, would lead to anarchy in India and the financial ruin of 
Britain: “Would it be a breach of faith to change a policy which -- as the Commission 
hardly troubled to conceal -- has been disastrous from every point of view?”73  The Daily 
Mail also predicted that the implementation of the reforms policy would “mean the ruin of 
India and of the British Empire;” Yet in an apparent shift in perspective, the paper accepted 
the inevitability of the reforms but argued that the progress towards responsible 
government must be slow.74 
The conclusion of the first Round Table Conference in January 1931 gave the press 
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a new opportunity to comment upon the reforms process.  The reaction to the meeting was 
largely positive, with the conference roundly praised as “a monument of good will and 
constructive ability.” 75   The Nation & Athenaeum, Daily Herald, and Manchester 
Guardian took a similar line: speed up the reform policy and place much responsibility in 
the hands of Indians.   
 The Government of India lacked popular support, the Nation & Athenaeum argued.  
Because “desperate conditions demand desperate remedies” a new constitution should be 
written “as speedily and methodically as possible” by trusting implicitly “those Indians to 
whom we intend to transfer our responsibilities,” i.e. the moderates. 76  The Nation & 
Athenaeum objected to the diehards‟ “bayonet theory of government” for two reasons: 
First, there is not a scrap of evidence to show that they have the beneficent 
effect so confidently predicted by Lord Rothermere, and secondly, the 
present generation of Englishmen is less prone to this form of activity than 
was the last. 
 
After the horrors of the Great War, “modern England is not likely to embark on a policy of 
repression upon the advice of a few disgruntled old officials and soldiers.”77  The Daily 
Herald claimed that there was little difference between the official British and the 
Congress positions, even though Congress did not attend the conference.  The official 
stance, responsible government with safeguards, was “surely that very „substance of 
independence‟ for which Mr. Gandhi asks.”  The paper reasoned that “Indians will not 
disregard that substance to struggle for a shadow.”78   
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Some papers were evasive in their analysis of the meeting.  The Times expressed 
pessimism at the conclusion of the conference.  The paper claimed that much was debated 
but very little defined and many formidable problems went unsolved in spite of much 
battling and quarrels.79  The Saturday Review claimed that there was a consensus that the 
conference was neither a success nor failure as no one had their worst fears or highest 
hopes realized. 80   The Sunday Times declared the results of the conference 
“indeterminate”: neither a complete failure nor achieving any definitely formulated 
result.81  Truth seemed to try to reconcile its opposition to the reforms with the pledges 
Britain made for Indian self-government:  
Truth has always been of the opinion, and still is, that for Britain to 
surrender its present position in India will not be for the benefit of India and 
Indians.  But the fact remains that Indian nationalism has grown so strong 
in recent years that it can make, in the name of millions, certain demands.  
In reply we made promises on which we cannot now go back, even if we 
were so dishonest as to want to do so.82 
 
 Diehards remained stalwart against the reforms, even after the first round table 
conference.  Lord Lloyd, writing in the Daily Mail, claimed that “responsible 
self-government with safeguards” was a contradiction in terms.  The results of the first 
conference meant “nothing less than the surrender of our Indian Empire” and the end of 
Britain‟s influence not only in India but also in Asia.  Lloyd believed that Britain„s 
influence was the same as its imperial mission: “That influence has for years upheld the 
things that we in this country think good -- justice, honest dealing, and as far as possible a 
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fair field for every individual and race and religion.”83   
The Gandhi-Irwin Pact proved to be the last major act of Irwin‟s Viceroyalty and 
one of the more controversial of his actions in India.  The Gandhi-Irwin Pact, essentially 
an armistice between the Government of India and Congress, was agreed to by the Viceroy 
and Gandhi after weeks of negotiations in early March 1931.  Gandhi and the Viceroy 
came to the negotiating table as both feared that Congress may have to resort to violence to 
break the stalemate with the Government of India.  By the agreement Congress suspended 
its campaign of civil disobedience.  Gandhi agreed to attend the second Round Table 
Conference in exchange for the release of political prisoners, the return of confiscated 
property, and a relaxation of some emergency coercive powers.  The pact split the English 
press into three camps. Supporters hailed it as great work towards peace and understanding 
but opponents described the truce as an abject surrender, while the British moderates rode 
the fence by praising and condemning the pact and/or the Viceroy in equal measure. 
 On the pro-reform side, the British Weekly perhaps went a bit overboard in praising 
the accord and its makers:  
The first week of March, 1931, will be counted among the great works of 
British and Indian history.  We congratulate Lord Irwin on the triumph of 
his patient diplomacy, and Mr. Gandhi on his realisation of the needs of the 
hour.  Each of these statesmen is at heart an idealist, and they are well 
fitted to understand each other.84 
 
The New Statesman & Nation and the Daily Herald praised the agreement as a “victory for 
common sense,”85 and the Yorkshire Post praised Irwin for establishing an atmosphere of 
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reason and restraint.86  The Economist echoed this sentiment.  The paper depicted the 
settlement as “an honourable agreement substituting reasoned discussion and negotiation 
for intransigent resistance and the repressive measures consequential upon it.”87  Time & 
Tide and the Times both argued against the diehard view of the pact as a surrender; the 
Viceroy did not yield “anything of real importance in exchange for the valuable assistance 
of the Congress party in the resumption of the Round Table Conference.”88  All sensible 
people in both countries would welcome the pact, Truth claimed, though the paper also 
described the agreement, perhaps derisively, as a “fait accompli.”89   The paper later 
explained its rationale for supporting the pact as the alternative course would lead 
invariably to disaster:  “It is obviously impossible to hold down an awakened India by 
force…Such an attempt would lead [to] a period of horrors [and] capitulation.”90   
 The moderates preferred to remain evasive.  The Sunday Times praised the 
Viceroy, but with reservations: “His integrity is undoubted, and he was worked for the kind 
of settlement which he conceives to be the right one with a singleness and tirelessness that 
command the respect of all.” 91   The Sunday Times expressed uncertainty that the 
compromise was “really best suited to the implacable realities of the situation” but 
admitted that the alternative to the accord was “too plain and too sinister for anyone to 
contemplate without horror.”92   Lord Meston, writing in the British Weekly, reserved 
judgment on the agreement.  He stated that if Gandhi could convince his followers to 
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honor his pledge then Irwin‟s policy of patient diplomacy would be rewarded.93  The 
Gandhi-Irwin agreement was a truce at best to the Daily Telegraph.  Congress did end its 
civil disobedience campaign but at the same time, by forcing the Government of India into 
concessions, Gandhi had successfully challenged the authority of the Raj and lowered the 
prestige of the Government of India.94 
 The diehards were even less convinced of the pact‟s benefits.  Lord Peel, in the 
Sunday Times, while affirming Britain‟s respect for the Viceroy, argued that the need for a 
settlement was “a condemnation of the conduct of affairs in the past,” i.e. Irwinism.  
Examples Peel gave were “the attempt to create an atmosphere…for the Simon 
Commission, and some relaxation in the strict assertion of the law” and concluded that 
these actions “had only too much influence on the prolongation and development of these 
disturbances.”95  The Saturday Review depicted the accord as a surrender by the Viceroy 
to Gandhi which would cost Irwin‟s successor dearly.96  The Morning Post railed against 
Irwinism without, oddly, mentioning the Viceroy.  The paper decried the Government of 
India negotiating on equal terms with a rebel “if not in arms then with boycott and „civil 
disobedience‟ in hand” who “abated nothing in his demands of „complete independence‟ 
and the elimination of British rule.”97  The Post regarded the pact as a great victory for 
Gandhi which had lowered the prestige of the British and weakened the cause of law and 
order.  Mourning the accord as a “tragic blunder” and a new low in British rule in India, 
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the Daily Express indirectly attacked the Viceroy: 
Is British authority so low that we could not bring [the end of civil 
disobedience] about through respect for the law?  Is our administration so 
feeble that we must bribe the Indians to obey the law?  British prestige in 
the East has been struck a terrible blow.98 
 
The Daily Mail was not so oblique in its condemnation of Irwin and his methods.  It 
condemned the “sentimental weakness of Lord Irwin” and charged that Irwin had allowed 
Gandhi “that convicted criminal and avowed enemy of the British Empire to dictate to 
him.”99  The Mail declared civil disobedience the victor on the subcontinent, a weapon 
that Congress only effectively holstered, not thrown away.  
Why did so many papers dead-set against the Irwin Declaration in November 1929, 
welcome the reforms process, albeit with stringent security measures attached, by March 
1931?  With the end of Irwin‟s Viceroyalty, the British moderates melded into the 
pro-reform camp.  Why did so many Conservative-leaning papers support the Labour 
Government on the issue of imperial reform?  Was the British moderate position just a 
weigh-station, a temporary stop to cover a rather sharp u-turn in policy?  Perhaps that is 
why so many papers condemned the Viceroy‟s policies without mentioning Irwin.   
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Chapter 6 
Speed Up or Slow Down?  
Views of the Reforms Process, December 1931-5 
 
To Mr. Churchill the scheme appeared as the imposition upon India of 
‗a system wholly unsuited to the welfare of its people and abhorrent to 
all who speak in their name.‘  Sir Austen Chamberlain sees in it a 
steady pursuit of the British tradition of ‗welcoming as they become fit 
the assistance of what have been subject peoples in the government of 
their own country.‘ 
 ―Parliament‘s Voice on India.‖ Editorial. Daily Telegraph. 13 
December 1934: 14b. 
 
By way of facilitating the passage of this thoroughly unpopular and 
mischievous measure through Parliament Ministers are playing a kind 
of confidence trick on the country.  They are going to and fro asserting 
that Great Britain is  already pledged to give India parliamentary 
government here and now.  This is pure bunkum.  Great Britain is not 
pledged to do anything of the kind . 
 ―Pure Bunkum.‖ Editorial. Daily Mail. 7 February 1935: 10b. 
 
No one can reasonably criticize their [Diehard opposition] anxiety as to 
the possible consequences of the coming change…but supporters of the 
Federal Scheme are right in their conviction that risks must be faced 
now if for the more serious risks are not to be faced in years to come. 
 ―Le Roy Le Veult.‖ Editorial. Times. 3 August 1935: 11b. 
 
The late summer and autumn of 1931 witnessed a dramatic upheaval in British 
politics, with the resignation of the Labour Government and the formation of the National 
Government in August; and the general election of October, which reduced the number of 
Labour opposition seats in the Commons to 52.1  With the establishment of the National 
Government, a new Secretary of State, Samuel Hoare, took over the India Office.  Hoare, 
who held the office until June 1935, successfully steered the reforms through the difficult 
shoals of Parliament, culminating in the Government of India Act of 1935.   
After August 1931, for the most part, the press ceased to debate whether reform in 
India would happen but rather what shape reform should assume.  The main contentious 
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issues over the reforms were whether Indians would receive full autonomy on the 
provincial level (including control of important portfolios such as the police), to what 
degree, if any, of responsibility Indians would get in the central government, and what 
safeguards were deemed necessary to preserve good government in India.  Another key 
issue was how to deal with the Congress Party and its campaigns of civil disobedience.  
The press debate became more polarized, with the moderates moving fully into the pro-
reform column, leaving the Daily Mail, Daily Express, Morning Post, and Saturday 
Review in the diehard camp.  The main bone of contention was the issue of safeguards to 
allow the Viceroy and Provincial Governors special powers to intervene whenever 
necessary to maintain British responsibilities and interests.  Both sides saw the 
safeguards, as spelled out in the White Paper, as necessary.  The pro-reform papers 
viewed them as strong enough while the diehards considered the safeguards insufficient.   
With Irwin‘s five-year Viceroyalty expiring in 1931, India received a new 
Viceroy, Freeman Freeman-Thomas, the first Marquess of Willingdon. Willingdon 
proved to be a total departure from his predecessor.  He scrapped the reconciliatory 
policies of Irwin and favored much stricter policies against Congress.  The new Viceroy 
incarcerated Gandhi in 1931 (until 1933) and suppressed Congress‘s civil disobedience 
campaign by filling the prisons with thousands of Congressmen.  Willingdon also sought 
to conciliate moderate Indians willing to cooperate in the reforms process.  Yet of all the 
papers, only the Daily Herald objected to Willingdon‘s crackdown.  The Herald warned 
that Indians were suspicious that Willingdon was ―preparing not only the suppression of 
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terrorism but the repression of the Congress movement,‖2 a drastic step that would drive 
moderate Indian opinion into the arms of the extremists. 
The second Indian round table conference, noted for Gandhi‘s attendance as the 
sole representative of Congress, wrapped up its deliberations in December 1931.  The 
meeting accomplished little; discussions quickly devolved into bickering over reserved 
seats for religious minorities.  The majority of the press, however, viewed the meeting in 
a positive light and praised the Prime Minister‘s closing speech.3  The Observer and 
Sunday Times both reaffirmed the British pledge to Indian self-government, albeit with 
safeguards.4  While the Economist expressed pessimism at the results of the conference, 
the Times and Daily Telegraph commended MacDonald for not committing the country 
to a surrender and reassured ―those who hoped (or feared) that a full grown Federal 
Constitution for India could be conjured like a rabbit out of a hat.‖5  Time & Tide attacked 
the opponents of progress: 
the romantic folly of our oratorical and journalistic diehards, who fancy 
that a handful of foreigners can, by brute force or low cunning, continue 
for an indefinite period to repress or uplift a population of three-and-a-half 
hundred million after it has come under the influence of Western political 
ideas6 
 
Speaking for the ―journalistic diehards,‖ the Morning Post claimed that the 
conference accomplished nothing and worried that the reforms policy was ―dangerously 
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rash.‖7  The conference was a wasted effort, the Daily Express claimed, as it contended 
that India‘s problems were economic, not political: ―The masses of India are not 
clamouring for a new status – they are clamouring for food and a chance to live like 
human beings.‖8  Truth was adamant that there should be ―no yielding to the demand for 
the immediate responsibility at the centre‖ because of the problems posed by the 
communal divide.9  The Daily Mail used the opportunity to praise the sterner methods 
employed by the new Viceroy, Lord Willingdon, and to renew its attack against Irwin and 
Irwinism: 
drastic measures against terrorism, such as are already producing so good 
an impression among the loyal in Bengal.  The first duty of the 
Government in India is to govern.  If it has shaken off the disastrous levity 
which it has shown in the immediate past that will be a great gain…The 
weakness shown in India in the last two years has lowered our prestige 
and credit throughout the world.10 
 
Two important developments in 1932 — the Communal Award and the Poona 
Pact — generated a series of press leaders. The press response to the Communal Award 
of August 1932 was largely uniform. Most editors viewed the Award as the necessary 
consequence of the failure of Indian communities to come to an agreement amongst 
themselves.  The Spectator and Truth hailed the Award as another example of British 
justice,11 and the Economist congratulated the Government for ―finding a solution 
which…should…appeal to all moderate-minded men as a sane and judicial settlement.‖12  
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In contrast, the Daily Telegraph described the imposed settlement as ―vitally 
unsatisfactory‖ but noted that the representatives of the Indian communities had 
requested the Government to assume the responsibility; thus ―no more cogent proof could 
be given of the sincerity of British intentions in the matter of Indian reform.‖13   
Not all editors praised the Communal Award.  The Morning Post expressed 
disquiet at the award as it was an imposed scheme: ―There is a fundamental antimony in 
the idea of conferring freedom by compulsion.‖14  The Daily Mail disapproved of the 
award as it was not democratic.  It also claimed the agreement would lead to bitter 
struggles between the communities and, eventually, to chaos.  The Mail advocated its 
usual solution: slow down the pace of reform: ―we hope that the Government will move 
very cautiously in carrying out its present proposals…Its most earnest supporters are 
most uneasy at this new scheme and with good cause.‖15  The New Statesman & Nation 
agreed that the representation of separate communities offended democratic doctrine but 
was necessary as the Indian communities would not cooperate with each other.  Until the 
―lambs and lions in India‖ will lie down together ―a uniform system of joint electorates 
remains Utopian.‖16 
Because it was an agreement between Indians, the Poona Pact did not lead to the 
same sort of debate over British policy.  The Manchester Guardian alone felt it necessary 
to recommend that the British Government accept the agreement as it was a settlement 
between Indians; the Communal Award was only made because Indians had originally 
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failed to reach a settlement on separate electorates.17  While not advocating that the 
British Government should reject the Poona agreement, the Morning Post expressed 
concern that the effects of Gandhi‘s fast had set a bad precedent.  Gandhi had been 
imprisoned for ―seditious conspiracy,‖ the Post claimed, and that he threatened to take 
his own life ―unless he had his own way.‖  This maneuver, the paper declared, was 
another crime as ―no subject has the right to take his own life, and to make such a threat 
was to levy a sort of blackmail, to which no Government can submit without a certain 
loss of prestige.‖18  On the other hand, the New Statesman & Nation declared the Poona 
agreement as a victory for Gandhi and the Untouchables not over the British Government 
―but over his own people‖19  while the British Weekly expressed hope that Gandhi would 
return to public life with ―his efforts will be directed towards the practical relief of the 
Untouchables.‖20   
 Other press leaders attempted to justify the British Government‘s actions or to 
portray the British as the true heroes of the tale.  The untouchables should recognize the 
British, not Gandhi, as the true author of ―their charter of emancipation,‖ Truth stated.21  
Gandhi‘s fast was not against the British Government or the Communal Award, the 
Spectator emphasized, but against the ―privileged castes of Hinduism‖ in order to compel 
them to face ―the hideous fact of Untouchability.‖22  The Times commended the 
Government for refusing to back down and modify or suspend the Communal Award 
under Gandhi‘s protest backed by the threat of suicide.  The paper considered the Poona 
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Pact as evidence that justified the Government‘s position on the matter and also its policy 
towards the minorities of India in general.23  Even the Daily Mail claimed that the 
agreement at Poona represented the essentials of the British Communal Award.24 
 The final installment of the round table talks concluded in December 1932; the 
meeting, like its predecessor, accomplished little.  British apathy towards this Indian 
conference is reflected in the lack of press comment.  In the aftermath of the round table 
conference, however, safeguards became a vital issue.25  Proposed safeguards included 
British control of India‘s defense, day-to-day government in the hands of the Viceroy and 
provincial Governors, and British management of Indian finance. 
 Papers on both the pro-reform and diehard sides attempted to minimize the 
potential results of the safeguards, though for opposite reasons: the pro-reformers 
contended that the safeguards would be minimal and only exercised in emergencies while 
the diehards claimed that they were weak and useless.  The Daily Telegraph restricted its 
conception of self-government to include ―such safeguards as provide against all serious 
possibility of disorder.‖26  Indians should work the new constitution, the New Statesman 
& Nation suggested, as most of the safeguards ―are not likely to be effective, and that 
many of the present obstacles will disappear automatically.‖27  The Morning Post, too, 
contended that the safeguards were worthless pointing to Ireland as a precedent.  The 
paper considered this especially dangerous as Lord Willingdon declared Congress the 
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only party in India that could be expected to work the constitution.  The Post also 
claimed that all gestures designed to placate Congress from Montagu to Irwin had 
failed.28 
 Pro-reform papers preferred describing the reforms process in general terms.  
Truth declared that with the end of the final round of the conference India drew closer to 
its goal of responsible government within the empire.  The paper highlighted the slow 
evolution of the new constitution that would ultimately be implemented by the Imperial 
Parliament in a new Government of India Act.29  The Daily Herald expressed hope that if 
the coming India Bill were ―bold in essentials‖ and ―courageously fulfil[led] the pledges 
given to India‖ then there would be no need for arguing over details.30  The Economist 
best summed up the pro-reform stance by describing the reforms process as the 
greatest constitutional experiment of modern times.  The attempt to 
transfer responsibility by peaceful evolution from alien rulers to an 
Eastern people….and to implant Western ideas of democracy in an Asiatic 
country…that is effectively administered as a single unit, is a unique event 
in history…Its success or failure will profoundly affect the history of the 
world, and…will influence for good or ill the future relations…between 
the white and colored races.‖31 
 
On 17 March 1933 the British Government published its White Paper on Indian 
constitutional reform, essentially a first draft of a new constitution.  The overwhelming 
majority of papers supported the proposals; only four lined up in opposition.  The major 
bone of contention in the debate over the White Paper in the English press was the issue 
of safeguards.  The pro-reform section viewed the safeguards as necessary and effective 
while the diehards argued that the safeguards were too weak and ineffectual.  The Daily 
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Mail and Daily Herald agreed, for opposite reasons, that responsible self-government 
was simply not possible with safeguards. 
 The pro-reform press praised the document and railed against the diehards for 
wanting ―to put the clock back to a time before the Reforms.‖ 32  All depended ―on 
whether the volume of support from sober and practical men in both countries is 
sufficient to put the British and Indian extremists in a minority too inconsiderable to be 
dangerous.‖33  It was too late to turn back or stand still on the reforms process.  As the 
Economist explained, 
there can be no turning back on the road upon which we have set our feet.  
For better or worse Britain is pledged to give India her chance to attain, 
with such measure of transitional guidance as is essential to the beginning 
of a great experiment, the full status of responsible self-government.34 
 
The majority of the press supported the safeguards contained in the White Paper, 
especially the powers of provincial Governors to rule by decree without approval of the 
Indian-controlled legislatures.  Editorialists described the safeguards as ―very extensive‖ 
and ―very powerful;‖ yet ―really no more than appropriate to the scope of the changes‖35 
and supported by the ―better part of British opinion.‖36  Britain was undertaking ―an 
experiment in democracy without parallel…at a time when democracy seems somewhat 
discredited in Europe itself,‖ the Yorkshire Post stated, and ―therefore we are bound to 
neglect no precaution to secure success.‖37   
 Papers of the Left and far Right agreed in opposing the safeguards, though for 
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differing reasons: too strong versus too weak.  For the left-leaning press, the safeguards 
constituted nothing short of an insult to Indian national hopes.  The Daily Herald 
depicted the White Paper scheme as the fulfillment of the pledge to grant responsible 
self-government to India.  However, the Herald confusingly criticized the safeguards as 
the negation of responsible self-government, though the paper concluded that the 
existence of the safeguards may be wise.38  The White Paper reforms were drawn up, 
claimed the New Statesman & Nation, with an ―absurd over-emphasis upon the question 
of ‗safeguards‘‖ without any regard for the millions of Indians but for domestic political 
reasons, i.e. placating the Conservative diehards.39   
Yet the Conservative diehards refused to be placated. The Daily Express 
unequivocally described the White Paper as a ―document of surrender;‖ the British 
Government was effectively hoisting the white flag over the Indian Empire.40 In the 
diehard view, the White Paper scheme was overly complicated and self-government with 
safeguards was either oxymoronic or dangerous: ―If the safeguards are effective then 
India is not going to have self-government.  If they are ineffective then the risk to India 
and the Empire is going to prove terrific.‖41  The scheme assumed that ―the Indian 
extremist politicians‖ would work with the new constitution in a spirit of partnership.  
The diehards, however, knew that Congress would approach the reforms ―in the spirit of 
wreckers.‖42   
 Diehard opposition failed to stop the parliamentary process.  A joint 
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Parliamentary Select Committee chaired by the future Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, 
reviewed the White Paper proposals and published its Report in November 1934.  The 
committee made minor changes to the White Paper, mostly strengthening the safeguards.  
The revised document became the basis of the Government of India Bill.  The issue of 
safeguards remained contentious.   
 The pro-reform press commended the committee and described the document as a 
great state paper.  They described the report as a fair appraisal with a ―full sense of 
responsibility‖ to India43 as well as a ―leap in the dark‖ with obvious perils but contended 
that the dangers of not taking that leap were more ominous.  44   The Economist advocated 
accelerating the timetable of the reforms process as ―speed is now the essence of the 
problem‖ as India was relatively quiet and it feared that Indians would lose patience with 
the deliberate pace of the reforms. The pro-reform press also criticized the diehards.  The 
report was not as ―a concession forced at the bayonet‘s point or as a weak yielding to the 
forces of disorder‖45 and viewed the only alternative to the reforms policy was to hold 
India by coercive force which would only eventually unite the Indian people against the 
Raj.  Any such policy would fail within only a few years.46 
 Safeguards remained a focus of press concern.  The pro-reform papers insisted 
that the safeguards would vanish as Indians mastered the art of self-government, but were 
absolutely necessary at the outset ―in the interests of India herself.‖ 47  The Sunday Times 
best summed up the pro-reform view of the safeguards: ―our task in India is to give the 
                                                                 
43
 ―The New India,‖ Economist, 24 Nov. 1934, 967.  Also see ―India‘s Future Government,‖ Truth, 28 Nov. 
1934, 820. 
44
 ―The Future of India,‖ Spectator, 23 Nov. 1934, 780. 
45
 ―The New India,‖ Economist, 24 Nov. 1934, 967. 
46
 J.L. Garvin, ―India and the Issue,‖ Observer, 25 Nov. 1934, 18c. 
47
 ―A Great State Paper.‖ Editorial. Manchester Guardian. 22 Nov. 1934: 10b. 
  
 
 
 
146 
 
utmost measure of political freedom that is consistent with her safety and well-being.‖48  
The existence of safeguards was justified since Indians had yet to demonstrate whether 
the British conception of self-government was suitable to the ―Indian character.‖49  More 
specifically, they agreed with the Linlithgow committee‘s recommendation that strong 
safeguards were necessary to prevent political interference with the discipline or the 
ordinary work of the police force.50  The police should be put under the control of native 
provincial ministers as without Indian control ―there could be no education of Indian 
party-leaders in the sterner meanings of practical responsibility.‖51   
Turning aside its pro-reform stance as it saw the reforms as not going far enough, 
the Daily Herald argued that the latest report would lead to a constitution that would only 
exacerbate, not end, the bitter struggle between the Raj and Indian nationalists.  The 
report‘s proposals were ―shot through and through with timidity and distrust‖ designed to 
give away as little as possible.  The new constitution should be framed ―as to enable India 
to reach Dominion status by a process of internal development without recourse to further 
Acts of Parliament.‖  Such a constitution, the Daily Herald contended, would ―have been 
accepted and worked with enthusiasm.‖52   
The diehards remained steadfast in their opposition to Indian reform, though their 
numbers in the press were dwindling rapidly; the Daily Mail would be the only paper to 
oppose the joint committee‘s report.  The Daily Mail contended that the report proposed 
handing over of India ―to the control of men thoroughly hostile to Britain – to the 
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Congress Party, who have been sweeping the board in the Indian elections with violent 
denunciations of British villainy.‖  As far as the safeguards were concerned, the Mail was 
adamant that the police remain in British control to ensure the maintenance of law and 
order.53  The Morning Post iterated its contention that the reforms process should slow 
down, if not halted entirely.  The paper claimed that ―there is no obligation to go an inch 
further or a minute faster than prudence would allow‖ and expressed hope that there 
would be no more irrelevant talk of violating pledges.  The Morning Post, like the Mail, 
warned that the committee effectively recommended handing over the Government of 
India to Congress domination.  The paper supported the report‘s call for additional 
safeguards on the grounds of a ―well-justified mistrust of such politicians.‖  Safeguards 
were essential as maintaining law and order was difficult enough even with a strong 
Viceroy at the helm, the Post claimed.  The paper speculated that this would be nearly 
impossible with Congress in charge of the police: 
How much more difficult when many if not most of the real powers are 
transferred to the Ministers of an aggressive and truculent political party, 
ready to resign or appeal to a well-controlled electorate at any act of 
gubernatorial opposition!54   
 
According to the Saturday Review, the committee, MacDonald, and Baldwin were giving 
away ―the reality of power to our enemies in India.‖  The Review added that there was not 
a single clause that strengthened British strength or prestige but hundreds that paved the 
way ―for the loss of our Indian Empire.‖55  The White Paper ―is now waste paper,‖ the 
Daily Express declared, as it was effectively torn up by the committee.  The Express also 
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decried the committee for its lack of unanimity.56   
 The Joint Select Committee Report came up for debate in Parliament in mid-
December 1934.  The pro-reform press acknowledged the risks of reform but continued 
to argue that the risks were worth taking.  The Times supported Lord Halifax (as Lord 
Irwin had become) for his firm conviction that the ―scheme of the Report is wise and 
workable.‖  The paper also, equally unsurprisingly, defended Halifax from the unmerited 
abuse he received for ―his great work of appeasement.‖57  The Yorkshire Post refuted 
diehard fears that Indian racial characteristics and religious distinctions rendered them 
unsuited for self-government.  No one denied these factors created risks and difficulties; 
hence the safeguards recommended by the Joint Committee, the Post argued.  The paper 
countered the diehards by favoring moving forward in spite of the hazards: ―to suppose 
that we can escape risks and difficulties by doing nothing, or by giving India so little that 
no Indian would work what we gave, seems to us…a delusion.‖58  The Economist also 
claimed that the road of reform was full of difficulties and great risks ―but they are less 
serious than those of any alternative course.‖  The British public ―has given only casual 
attention to the discussion‖ as it already came to the conclusion ―that the question of 
principle is decided once for all.‖59  The diehards could only delay, not stop, the reforms 
process, the Daily Telegraph argued.  The paper affirmed that Britain was not committed 
by promises or pledges ―but by the whole past course of our governing of India.‖60  Truth 
contended that for the past seven years every government official in India has been 
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anticipating change.  The longer debate could be prolonged in Parliament it would only 
give an opportunity for opinion against the new order in India to gather headway 
ultimately making it more difficult to inaugurate the new constitution.61   
The Daily Mail proved to be the only paper to oppose the joint committee‘s 
report.  The British people heartily disliked the Government‘s India policy, the Mail 
claimed, and praised Churchill for his ―damaging indictment‖ of that policy in the 
Commons debates.  The Joint Select Committee proposals were simply a repetition of the 
plan tried in the Irish Free State that ended in a complete failure.  The Daily Mail argued 
that the Irish policy did not steady the ―wild men‖ and ―the risk that they will do the same 
in India is obvious.‖62  
 The Government introduced the India Bill to Parliament in February 1935.  The 
Bill was simply the culmination of the reforms process, the Times claimed, dating from 
the 1919 Act.  The Bill followed ―the plain straight course which has been clearly laid 
down for the last fifteen years…from which successive British Governments, of all 
shades of domestic politics, have never for a moment turned aside.‖63  The Daily 
Telegraph declared that all parties in Britain understood that any change in the form of 
the Indian government must give the Indian people more control over their own affairs.  
There was no controversy over the grant of self-government to India but only over the 
pace of the advance: ―Labour would proceed with less caution…Mr. Churchill and his 
friends would lengthen the period of experiment.‖64  India will be kept in the empire 
voluntarily or not at all, the Yorkshire Post argued, as the British public would not 
                                                                 
61
 ―The Commons and India,‖ Truth, 19 Dec. 1934, 936. 
62
 ―The Indian Gamble.‖ Editorial. Daily Mail. 19 Dec. 1934: 10b. 
63
 ―The Goal of India.‖ Editorial. Times. 7 Feb. 1935: 15b. 
64
 ―India Within the Empire.‖ Editorial. Daily Telegraph. 12 Feb. 1935: 12b. 
  
 
 
 
150 
 
consent to a reconquest of an India determined to repudiate its connection with the 
Crown.65  The Economist declared that the moral of Britain‘s imperial history was the 
polar opposite of the diehard thesis of stopping the clock of progress.  The India Bill was 
an act of constitution-making on a stupendous scale especially at a time when the 
principles of parliamentary democracy were under challenge in many countries around 
the world.  This fact added to the significance of the ―effort to take a great Eastern people 
another step along the road of self-government.‖66  Time & Tide described the standoff 
over safeguards: Indians did not like or want the safeguards but Parliament would not 
remove them but neither side wanted to restart the reforms process from scratch.67  
 Not everyone was happy with the final Act.  The Manchester Guardian and Daily 
Herald expressed regret that the Dominion status pledge, contained in the preamble of the 
1919 Act and the Irwin Declaration, was not included in the latest Bill; the papers hoped 
the promise would be added before the Act became law.68  The Herald added that 
―pledges are of little value if fulfilment can always be deferred to some dim future.‖69  
The Morning Post disputed the contention that Dominion status was implied in the Bill 
and railed against the ―paper safeguards‖ that would fail to conciliate ―a seditious 
Congress…in full cry after a retreating Government.‖70  The Daily Mail disagreed with 
any assertion that Britain pledged itself to give India parliamentary government here and 
now contending that Government Ministers were ―playing a kind of confidence trick on 
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the country‖ in order to assure the passage of ―this thoroughly unpopular and 
mischievous measure through Parliament.‖71  The New Statesman & Nation opposed the 
Bill and attacked one of the assumptions of British rule: the Raj brought economic 
prosperity to India.  No good could come of an imposed constitution.  The Statesman 
claimed that India would not be reconciled to the proposed constitution nor could ―any 
Indian Government emerge from it capable of grappling creatively with the desperate 
social and economic problems of a sub-continent that is little better than a vast rural 
slum.‖72 
 The diehards would not accept defeat easily and go quietly into the night.  The 
Morning Post viewed the Indian reforms as a symptom of the decline of the Conservative 
Party specifically and Britain in general, without speaking specifically of the joint 
committee report: 
This country would be safer with men of less subtlety and more courage 
and the British public, or we are much mistaken, will be heartily grateful 
to Mr. Churchill for his vigorous protest against the defeatism of the 
Conservative leader.  As for the result of the debate, it seems to us of less 
consequence than the fact that there is against this surrender a solid 
phalanx which may be the made the core of a great movement of national 
revival.73 
 
The Post reasoned that many Conservatives voted for the reforms because they feared 
Socialism and wished to ensure the safety of the National Government, rather than 
because of the merits of the question at issue.74  The British people heartily disliked the 
Government‘s India policy, the Daily Mail asserted; a feeling strengthened by Churchill‘s 
scathing indictment of the scheme in the House of Commons.  The Mail applauded the 
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seventy-seven Conservatives that defied their party and voted against the Government as 
well as the twenty that abstained.  The paper concluded that the ―Conservative revolt 
against the disastrous and ill-timed India measure is most remarkable.‖75   
The diehards hoped to scuttle the reforms process by convincing the Indian 
princes to pull out of the scheme for federation, the cornerstone of the Indian reforms. 
Gwynne of the Morning Post used contacts in India to accomplish this goal directly.76  
The Daily Mail claimed that the Princes disliked the reforms scheme so much that ―they 
have to be bribed or threatened into a show of acceptance of its blessings…They are not 
deceived by the credulous optimism of our British sentimentalists and defeatists.‖77  The 
Princes opposed the report, the Morning Post declared, despite claims to the contrary by 
Hoare.78  The Daily Telegraph chastised the diehards for encouraging the Princes to 
reject the plan for Federation.  The effort failed and added that ―an attempt to bring 
pressure upon the British Government by stirring up opposition in India is a new feature 
in political manoeuvre, and none could be less desirable.‖79  The Economist applauded 
Baldwin for thwarting the diehard attempt to pry the Princes out of Federation.80  The 
Manchester Guardian chastised the efforts of ―some Conservatives and their newspaper 
supporters‖ to stir up the Princes to oppose the reforms; they deserved the scathing 
rebukes they received in Parliament.81  The Sunday Times questioned why the diehards 
were ―ready to break up the unity of a great party‖ over a difference of opinion over 
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India.  If the diehards persisted in their opposition they would ensure ―the return of a 
Labour Government and bring real danger not only to India but at home.‖82  
In August 1935 the Government of India Act became law and the pro-reform 
press congratulated the government.  The Times praised the act as the greatest 
constructive measure undertaken by the British Government this century.  It continued to 
criticize the Conservative opposition for contesting the bill without offering an alternative 
program but the paper also claimed to understand the diehard anxiety regarding possible 
consequences of the impending changes.  In the end, the Times supported the India Act 
by arguing that it is better ―that risks must be faced now if for more serious risks are not 
to be faced in years to come.‖83  The India Act was not an example of rash or hasty 
legislation, the Economist declared, as it was the result of eight years of continuous 
argument and consultation.84  Truth gave a backhanded compliment to the coalition 
government by describing the measure as a great achievement of the National 
Government but only in the strictly Imperial sphere.85  The Sunday Times evidently could 
not go too far in gushing over the act: the paper depicted it as a great task, ―the greatest 
and most historic to which any British Government and Parliament have set their hands‖ 
and the act itself as ―one of the great constitutional documents of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.‖86 
 True to form, the diehards fought the Indian reforms tooth and nail to the bitter 
end.  The Daily Mail called the Act Britain‘s ―goodbye to India‖ and the ―betrayal of 
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India‘s peoples‖ and claimed that it was just another illustration of the empire slipping 
away, pointing to the examples of Ireland and Egypt.87  The act brought to an untimely 
end ―150 years of British achievement which gave our Indian Empire security, justice and 
progress such as were unknown in long years past.‖  The centrifugal forces on the 
subcontinent would gain in power ―and in the last resort the strong arm of the fighting 
man will count for more than the voice of the politician or the vote of the ballot box…We 
should see again the India of the eighteenth century – anarchy within and probably 
invasion from without.‖88 
The majority of the English press supported greater self-government for India as 
envisioned in the 1935 Act.  Both reformers and diehards envisaged self-government 
within the empire as cementing the relationship between Britain and the subcontinent 
along cooperative lines, much like the White Dominions.  The dispute was simply over 
degree.  The diehards argued that Indians had yet to demonstrate enough responsibility to 
merit an extension of power and called for strict measures to channel the native 
extremists into responsibility.  The diehards‘ time frame for India achieving Dominion 
Status measured in centuries.  The reformers essentially argued that Indians would be 
forced to act responsibly with more power in their hands.  Even the pro-reformers viewed 
this transfer of limited power as a risk, hence the need for safeguards to protect British 
interests, but as a risk worth taking.  India achieving full self-government to the reformers 
would most likely be measured in decades.  Neither side could conceive of Britain 
without India, and vice versa. 
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Chapter 7 
Struggle for the Soul of the Conservative Party: 
British Domestic Politics, the Press and India, 1927-35 
 
It has been painfully apparent throughout this controversy that the fear of 
Socialism and the safety of the Government are considerations of more 
influence on the minds of many of our legislators than the merits of the question 
at issue. 
 “Can They Afford It?” Editorial. Morning Post. 19 Dec. 1934: 10b. 
Doubtless many who in their hearts may have sympathised with the Diehard 
thesis that the rejection of the reforms would „save‟ India for the Empire were 
still more impressed by the fear that an adverse vote would lose Britain for the 
Conservative Party. 
 “Diehards‟ Defeat,” Economist, 8 Dec. 1934, 1085. 
 
Tied inextricably to the India reforms process was British domestic politics, especially 
the internal struggle within Conservative ranks for the soul of the party.  The Conservative Party 
was continuing the process of redefinition already in progress before the war: from the party of 
the aristocracy and landed estates it was becoming the party of the middle class and business.  
The Tories had traditionally been the party of empire, but what that meant in the party after the 
Great War was up for debate.  The soul of the party would be largely determined by the press 
and India.  The reformers were personified by the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, and Conservative Party 
leader Stanley Baldwin.  Both men championed Indian constitutional reform with the conviction 
that it would ensure that India remained peaceably in the empire.  The diehards, embodied by 
Winston Churchill and Daily Mail proprietor Lord Rothermere, viewed the reforms as a repeat of 
the catastrophic policy that led to the loss of most of Ireland.  Rothermere and his fellow press 
lord, Beaverbrook, sought to use their papers to incite a popular revolt among Conservatives to 
oust Baldwin from his perch of party leader and replace him with someone more in line with 
their views of empire and their opposition to the Indian reforms process.   
In the election of May 1929 the Conservatives suffered defeat; Baldwin resigned and 
Labour formed a minority government.  The Tory rank and file attempted to ascertain who or 
what was responsible for the shock defeat at the polls.  Many blamed their leader and what they 
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saw as his bland leadership style exemplified by his choice for party electioneering slogan: 
“Safety First.”  Local Conservative Associations in the Tory stronghold of the south of England 
propounded protection and the development of the empire as the key to regaining office.  
Baldwin, however, in late 1929, kept the shadow cabinet in line and maintained the party‟s 
support for free trade because he feared that adopting the mantle of protection would alienate as 
many voters as it would attract.   
In opposition to the free trade status quo preached by Baldwin, Lord Beaverbrook, a 
Conservative peer, championed his vision of an imperial customs union of the Dominions, 
Crown Colonies and Britain which he termed his Empire Free Trade (EFT) crusade.1  
Beaverbrook, a Canadian by birth, had been in Andrew Bonar Law‟s inner circle (though more 
as an observer than participant).  He had lost his influence in the party leadership circles with the 
accession of Baldwin as party leader in 1923 and therefore bore Baldwin no small amount of ill 
will; this animus increased with the Tory defeat of 1929.  Through EFT, which would establish 
an imperial free trade zone while erecting a barrier to outside competition, Beaverbrook hoped to 
encourage imperial solidarity, revive British industry, and protect the British farmer.  The last 
goal aroused the most resistance in Britain as it would result in a tax on foreign food and roused 
the fear of “dear bread.”  The fact that the dominions did not want EFT, as they had nascent 
industries they wanted to protect from British competition, did not deter Beaverbrook in the 
least.2   
Complicating an already complex situation, Beaverbrook was also a press lord, the 
proprietor of the Daily Express.  His friend and fellow press lord, Lord Rothermere of the Daily 
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Mail, also wanted to oust Baldwin and redefine the Conservative Party, but saw India, not EFT, 
as the issue to accomplish these goals.  Rothermere envisioned a Conservative Party and 
government that cracked down on Indian nationalists (and presumably nationalists elsewhere in 
the empire) and slowed the reforms process to a glacial pace.  Not only did these two press lords 
use their newspapers to promote their agendas they started their own political movement, 
combining Beaverbrook‟s EFT and Rothermere‟s United Empire Party: the Empire Crusade.  
Rothermere was the dominant persona in the movement; hence, India trumped EFT as the most 
important issue in the Empire Crusade.  Empire Crusade was never an independent political 
party nor was it a movement within the Conservative Party; the press lords attempted to co-opt 
the party by attracting the support of Tory backbenchers and voters via running Empire Crusade 
candidates at any and all by-elections. 
There was also the peculiar position of the Times.  In spite of its relatively small 
circulation, the Times was widely acknowledged as the unofficial official paper of the 
Conservative Party, or at least the most respected of the Tory papers.  Moreover, the editor of the 
Times, Geoffrey Dawson, was in a unique position as a close friend of Viceroy Lord Irwin.  In a 
voluminous correspondence during his five years in India, Irwin utilized Dawson as his 
unofficial advisor, sounding board, and emissary to Westminster.3  Dawson also established a 
close working relationship with the Labour Government‟s Secretary of State for India, 
Wedgwood Benn, and had a close friendship with Conservative leader Baldwin.  The Times 
editor used the leader columns in his paper counter rumors and bad press about the Viceroy and 
his policies.  He also met privately with the editors of other papers in efforts to persuade them to 
adopt views on India in line with his and Irwin‟s.   
The struggle within the Conservative ranks was important to the press because the vast 
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majority of leading papers were press was overwhelmingly Conservative.4  Therefore, in the 
press Tory issues were equated with national ones; since the Conservative press saw India as a 
defining issue it became a nationally defining issue as well.  Fundamentally, the press diehards 
wanted to turn India into a domestic party issue while the remainder of the Tory press, as well as 
their Liberal and Labour counterparts, wanted to keep the issue out of the domestic political 
arena.   
The pro-reformers and the diehards looked to the precedent of Ireland: pro-reformers 
believed that the British Government withheld reform from Ireland far too long which resulted in 
a bloody civil war and the loss of Southern Ireland, while for the diehards saw reform, not the 
lack thereof, as the root cause of Ireland‟s troubles.  It is unsurprising that both sides used Ireland 
example as the Troubles there were still painfully close both temporally and geographically, just 
across the Irish Sea, to Britons.  In the balance, the diehards used the Ireland precedent much 
more than the pro-reformers, perhaps because many India diehards were also fervent unionists.   
The Manchester Guardian best expressed the Irish argument for the pro-reformers: 
The real blot on English dealings with Ireland was not that we gave Ireland 
„strong‟ or „weak‟ Governments, but that for many generations we consistently 
refused to give her any Government at all which Irishmen would consent to back.  
It is the efforts of Lord Carson and all his friends of the past that we have to thank 
for the existence of Mr. De Valera to-day.  Are we to repeat the same hoary error 
in our dealings with India?5 
 
The Morning Post encapsulated the diehard stance: “We remember the ignominious failure of 
the attempt to coerce Ulster, and we venture to predict that any such attempt in India would fail 
even more disastrously.”6  Gandhi was the “Eastern de Valera,” a rebel masquerading as a saint: 
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His formula of „civil disobedience‟ is well-calculated to give him all the prestige 
of a rebel leader, with none of its disabilities; when his followers so far 
misapprehend his meaning as to shoot or be shot he is genuinely grieved that they 
should have misinterpreted his spiritual message.7 
 
The diehards used the Irish case on two points: to draw a parallel between the religious divisions 
of Ireland and those of India and to argue against the effectiveness of the proposed safeguards of 
the India reforms.8 
Only five months after the Tory electoral defeat, the Irwin Declaration set off a domestic 
political firestorm.  The Daily Mail seized the Irwin Declaration as an opportunity to pry 
Baldwin from his position as Conservative Party leader.  The Mail, supported by the Daily 
Express sought to rally Conservatives against their leader.  The other Conservative or 
Conservative leaning papers, the Times, Sunday Times, Morning Post, and Daily Telegraph leapt 
to Baldwin‟s defense and sought to refute the Mail‟s accusations.  The remainder of the press 
argued over the culpability, or lack thereof, of the Labour Government in the declaration. 
The Daily Mail accused Baldwin of making “an extraordinary blunder” and plunging “the 
country into a political crisis of the first magnitude on the vital question of the British 
administration of India.”  Baldwin had deliberately committed “to support the Socialist 
Government‟s policy of granting full Home Rule and Dominion status to the natives of India” 
without consulting the shadow cabinet.  The paper considered the ex-Premier in a deeply grave 
predicament and claimed that  
In highly influential Conservative circles…the feeling was strongly expressed that 
his inexplicable vacillation in a matter of such gravity has placed the leadership of 
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the party in urgent question. 9 
 
Criticizing the Viceroy served as another means of attacking the Conservative leader.  The Mail 
first highlighted the pair‟s long connection -- describing Irwin as “an intimate political friend of 
Mr. Baldwin” and reminded readers that Baldwin had named Irwin Viceroy – and then attempted 
to sully Irwin and his declaration by suggesting he was tainted with the contagion of socialism: 
Lord Irwin has always belonged to a section of the Conservative Party which 
manifested dangerous leanings towards platonic flirtation with Socialism.  Since 
the general election this tendency has apparently developed for the Viceroy has 
met his new political chiefs more than half-way by urging on them the extremely 
risky course of pledging themselves to give complete self-government to 
[India].10 
 
The Mail blamed Irwin for being the prime mover of the declaration; however, Churchill 
(writing in the same paper) blamed the “Socialist Government,” not the Viceroy, for the 
declaration.11  The paper also described the declaration as part of a “Socialist policy” which it 
stated could lead to the dismemberment of the entire British Empire.12  The Daily Express 
accused Baldwin of reverting “to what might be called his pro-Irwin attitude” in dragging the 
Conservative Party into approving the Viceroy‟s declaration.13   
Other Conservative papers leapt to the defense of Baldwin.  The Sunday Times criticized 
the Daily Mail for diverting so much attention to its “red herring,” accusations against Baldwin, 
in the controversy that arose over Indian policy.  The paper essentially accused the Mail of 
shoddy journalism when it stated that: 
It was reasonable to suppose that a newspaper of any standing and respectability 
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would not have committed itself to a statement of this gravity on a matter of 
Imperial concern without the fullest inquiry and confirmation, checked and 
counter-checked.14 
 
The Yorkshire Post announced that it did not know where the Daily Mail obtained the alleged 
information concerning Baldwin, “nor do we know what steps may have been taken to seek 
verification.”  The Post charged: 
Attacks on Mr. Baldwin have been too consistent to be accidental, and they have 
come widely to be regarded as constituting a veritable vendetta against the person 
of the Conservative leader.  Some of Lord Rothermere‟s papers have not hesitated 
openly to suggest Lord Beaverbrook as his successor.15 
 
Yet the Post was not a fan of Baldwin: 
we should be prepared to welcome such changes in party organization as might 
appear, upon due and calm reflection, to appear desirable and in the true interests 
of the party.  But these personal attacks do not conduce to such due and calm 
reflection, nor do they advance the cause of Conservatism in the country.16 
 
The sensational rumors and assertions regarding Baldwin‟s responsibility for the declaration 
would only “confuse the main issues in the eyes of the public, and possibly also to produce even 
more dangerous results.”17  The Morning Post claimed it was searching for “the origin of the 
vendetta against Mr. Baldwin” and declared there was a remarkable strengthening of opinion in 
support of the Conservative leader.18  The Daily Telegraph described the Mail‟s attack as “a 
calculated attempt to discredit and hold up to contempt the leader of the Conservative party.”19 
Papers also praised Baldwin for his unyielding refutation of the Mail‟s accusations in 
Parliament.  Compelled by questions rumors about the Daily Mail article swirling around the 
House of Commons, Baldwin made a brief, concise statement that effectively ended the 
controversy: 
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I rise for a moment to ask the indulgence of the House to make an observation 
with regard to an article which has been brought to my notice as having appeared 
in to-day's issue of the "Daily Mail." It is sufficient for me at the moment to say 
that every statement of fact and every implication of fact contained in that article 
is untrue, and in my opinion gravely injurious to the public interest, not only in 
this country, but throughout the Empire. I shall have occasion, I hope, at an early 
date, to examine and make clear the whole position.20   
 
The Daily Telegraph depicted Baldwin‟s denial as direct and comprehensive and predicted it 
would “be generally warmly supported.”21  The Times praised Baldwin for his powerful 
Commons speech in defense of his actions which, the paper claimed, “raised the whole 
controversy to a level of high statesmanship.”22  The Morning Post described Baldwin‟s 
refutation of the Daily Mail‟s allegations as “a complete and crushing denial” enthusiastically 
cheered by MP‟s on all sides.23  The Yorkshire Post described Baldwin‟s denial as “one of those 
speeches with which he occasionally delights the House and country.”  The paper considered 
Baldwin fully vindicated from the Daily Mail‟s personal attacks and declared that the 
Conservative leader “will have still further enhanced the affection and esteem wherein he is held 
by the country.”24 
Other papers either ignored or sidestepped the Daily Mail versus Baldwin clash and 
instead used the declaration controversy to make partisan attacks.  Some preferred to attack both 
Baldwin and the Labour Government.  The main issue for these papers was the culpability of the 
Labour Government for the Irwin Declaration.  This was the Labour Party‟s first effective 
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government and its political opponents used the crisis to attempt to discredit it.  The Manchester 
Guardian stated that the Labour Government had the best of intentions regarding the Irwin 
Declaration, namely sparing India another campaign of civil disobedience, but claimed that the 
statement was unfair to the Simon Commission, Parliament, and, ultimately, to India.  The 
Guardian reasoned that the Government gambled “on a mere hope without waiting to study the 
evidence which has been laboriously collected.”  The paper described the incident in dramatic 
terms, also taking a swipe at the diehards personified by Lord Birkenhead:  
The Labour Government wished to see Great Britain and India pledge each other 
in a cup of reconciliation.  There was a flaw in the cup.  It was broken before it 
has reached our lips, and Lord Birkenhead has derived considerable amusement 
from kicking the pieces about the floor.25  
 
The Daily Telegraph claimed that the Government, the Secretary of State for India in particular, 
mishandled the situation.  The Telegraph contended that the Government did not inform Baldwin 
that the Statutory Commission disapproved of the declaration for a month after the fact.26   
Some papers used the opportunity to contrast the Conservative imperial policy with that 
of Labour.  The Saturday Review continued to make domestic political hay by praising the 
Conservatives and deriding Labour.  The Review contrasted the parties‟ India policies as “the 
patient building with facts which is the distinctively Conservative contribution to politics” versus 
the Labour “stark abstract theory” and the “imposition of political formulae.”27  The Daily 
Express claimed that MacDonald created “a crisis of the first magnitude” as both the Liberals 
and Baldwin withdrew whatever assent they may or may not have given to the declaration.  The 
Express considered the greatest danger to the Labour Government was within its own party.28  
The Yorkshire Post criticized the Labour Government for picking and choosing when and where 
                                                                 
25
 “Lord Reading and the Indian Debate.” Editorial. Manchester Guardian. 6 Nov. 1929: 10b. 
26
 “Mr. Baldwin and His Attackers.” Editorial. Daily Telegraph. 8 Nov. 1929: 12c. 
27
 “The Government‟s Prospects,” Saturday Review, 9 Nov. 1929, 532. 
28
 “The Political Situation Boils Over,” Daily Express, 2 Nov. 1929, 1a. 
164 
 
to defer to the “man on the spot.”  The Post claimed that the “Socialist Government” only 
supported men on the spot who shared their views, i.e. Irwin, and ignored or recalled those who 
did not, namely Lord Lloyd from Egypt.29  While condemning both the Government and the 
Viceroy for the crisis surrounding the declaration; though Truth ultimately blamed Irwin for 
suggesting the proclamation to the Government.  The paper claimed that both parties knew that 
the Simon Commission and the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties opposed the 
proclamation but they went ahead with the declaration anyway.30 
Partisan politics also played a role in the debate over the Irwin Declaration.  The 
conservative Times defended the Labour Government, represented by Benn, during the India 
crisis.  The paper blamed the Liberal leaders, along with “their would-be Conservative recruits” 
for the uproar and stated that neither party would “come with any great credit out of their „India 
crisis.‟”31  Thanks to Dawson‟s close relationship with Irwin, the Times editor cultivated a 
working relationship with Benn in preparing for and dealing with the aftermath of the Viceroy‟s 
declaration.32  The Daily Herald initially reserved its venom for Lord Reading and the House of 
Lords in its entirety as the most malicious attacks against the declaration emanated from the 
Lords.  The paper described the body as “the reactionary Upper House” and the former Viceroy‟s 
criticism of the declaration as a “mischievous attack.”33  At the end of the crisis the Herald 
attacked the Conservative Party as a whole.  The paper suggested that Lords Birkenhead and 
Rothermere failed in their efforts to discredit Benn and only succeeded in “stirring up new 
domestic troubles for the harassed and unhappy party of which they are distinguished, if 
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turbulent, members…The Opposition may be left to deal with its own dirty linen.”  In the end, 
the Herald claimed that the roguish machinations of a handful of “reactionary politicians” could 
not spoil the “Benn-Irwin policy” as they were no longer responsible for government.34 
Pro-reform papers wanted to keep the issue of Indian constitutional reform outside the 
realm of domestic politics.  The Economist stated that the method of the Simon Commission was 
successful in keeping India out of British politics but despaired that the Irwin declaration brought 
India back into the political arena.35  The Spectator expressed disbelief that rational men would 
want to substitute an all-party India policy for “factious strife…when they must know that the 
price will be the wrecking of any settlement in India.”  The paper asserted that the result would 
be the Government unnecessarily forced from office and contended that the India issue “has been 
distorted either for the sake…of injuring the Government or for the sake of injuring Mr. 
Baldwin.”36 
The Daily Mail used the Congress declaration of independence in January 1930 to 
intensify diehard efforts to dislodge Baldwin and change the shape of British party politics.  The 
Daily Mail connected the Viceroy‟s conciliatory policies, which it blamed for inciting Congress 
to act, with Baldwin‟s leadership.  The paper still aimed to pry Baldwin from his post as 
Conservative Party leader and make India a party issue: 
Conservatives throughout the country should keep this chapter of events steadily 
in mind.  They will then realise how large a share of responsibility attaches to Mr. 
Baldwin for the present critical state of affairs in India…At any moment in the 
next few months a general election may be sprung upon Parliament by the 
Socialists.  If such an election is precipitated, is the Conservative Party to go to 
the country with as its head, a leader who has so grave a share in shaking the 
British position in India to its foundations?37 
 
                                                                 
34
 “India.” Editorial. Daily Herald. 8 Nov. 1929: 6a. 
35
 “The Indian Problem in Parliament,” Economist, 9 Nov. 1929, 856. 
36
 “The Indian „Crisis,‟” Spectator, 9 Nov. 1929, 652. 
37
 “Mr. Baldwin and India.” Editorial. Daily Mail. 2 Jan. 1930: 8b. 
166 
 
Then in March 1930 Rothermere entered politics directly with the creation of his United Empire 
Party (UEP).  Rothermere blamed blunders by both Labour and Conservative Governments that 
not only brought “the break-up of India…within the bounds of possibility” but even raised the 
specter of the “break-up of the whole British Empire.”  The goal of the UEP was best summed 
up as “no more surrenders to Indian agitators.”38  The UEP would run candidates in by-elections 
in the Conservative heartland of London and its suburbs from 1930 through 1935, most famously 
at St. George‟s, Westminster in March 1931.   
Domestic politics became an issue again at the conclusion of the first round table 
conference.  The basic question was whether or not the Conservative Party accepted the reforms 
process at the conclusion of the first round of talks.  The British Weekly and New Statesman 
claimed that the Conservative Party, because of the statements by its conference spokesman, 
Lord Peel, came into line with the reforms process at the conference.  The Statesman added 
emphatically that the Conservatives “have moved to a position from which they cannot in 
honour, or in common decency, recede!”39  However, the Morning Post interpreted Lord Peel to 
mean that the Conservative Party committed to nothing at the conference but would await the 
“finished picture” before pronouncing judgment on the reforms process.  The Post stated that “It 
would be fatal to commit ourselves to crude projects which are rejected and feared by a great 
part of the population.”40  The Sunday Times also seemed to opt the Conservative Party out of 
accepting the results of the conference.  It stated that when the Labour Government formulated 
its India policy it would be speaking only for itself, not necessarily Great Britain as a whole.  
Liberal and Conservative statesmen, according to the Sunday Times, may or may not adhere to 
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the general principles or details of that policy either now or in the future.41 
In the wake of the first roundtable conference, pro-reform papers ridiculed the diehards 
for their ill-fated attempt to split the Conservative Party.  They noted with relief that despite 
diehard efforts, the Conservative Party “has shown very little sign that it shares the fear and 
indignation of these eminent fanatics.”42  Churchill and Lord Lloyd were only “two voices crying 
in the wilderness” who should not be allowed to overshadow the resolutions approved by 
delegates of all three British parties at the conference.43  Hence Time & Tide attacked 
Rothermere for his interventions in Indian affairs but reasoned “there is little danger that such 
articles…will have any more serious effect on opinion in this country than his previous abortive 
political stunts.”44   
The Gandhi-Irwin Pact coincided with the St. George‟s by-election in which Beaverbrook 
and Rothermere supported the anti-Baldwin candidate Sir Ernest Petter.  St. George‟s became a 
national issue when the Conservative candidate dropped out of the race because of his lack of 
confidence in the Tory leader.  The party scrambled to find a replacement candidate and Baldwin 
briefly considered contesting the seat himself as a test of confidence in his leadership.  In the 
end, Duff Cooper stepped forward as the official Conservative candidate and won the seat easily.  
Tensions, therefore, were high, as the press rhetoric illustrates.   
The Daily Mail questioned how Baldwin would react to the Gandhi-Irwin Pact: 
Will it be the policy of confirming every surrender by the Viceroy and handing 
over India to the tender mercies of a bitterly hostile Congress party…?  Or will it 
be the policy of Mr. Churchill which is the manly course of putting the foot down, 
and refusing the scuttle in shameful manner from our duties and responsibilities in 
the East?45 
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The British Weekly accused the diehards, both in Parliament and the press, of striving to 
“keep the flames of hatred alight in India.”46  The Economist criticized both Churchill 
and Rothermere‟s opposition to the pact and the reforms process in general.  It described 
Churchill‟s advice to “put back the clock” in India as impractical and Rothermere‟s 
advocacy of the firm hand in dealing with India as ill-informed.  If realized, Churchill‟s 
and Rothermere‟s suggestions would lead to nothing less than the loss of India.47  The 
New Statesman & Nation stated that it did not attach much importance to the “vulgar 
abuse of Gandhi and the Viceroy in which Lord Rothermere‟s newspapers are indulging 
themselves.”  The paper expressed hope that the Conservative Party would accept the 
pact and recognize “that a courageous and generous policy is the only possible policy in 
India to-day.”48 
Sections of the conservative, and even the Labour, press continued to defend Baldwin 
against diehard attacks.  The Statesman claimed that the Conservative diehards were badgering 
Baldwin to disavow the Viceroy “and in effect to abdicate in favour of Mr. Churchill.”  The 
paper concluded that if the Conservative leader were driven from office on the issue of India, “it 
will be the most creditable incident of his career, but a bad day for England and the Empire.”49  
Truth argued that Baldwin‟s defeat in the St. George‟s by-election by the diehards would have 
disastrous effects in India.  The paper contended that the election was being used as a “dirty 
instrument” by the Tory diehards.50  The Yorkshire Post claimed that Irwin had justified the 
country‟s confidence in his statesmanship as well as refuted 
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the violent personal attacks made on him less…on account of any knowledge of 
his own characteristics than because it was hoped that popular distrust of him 
might reflect directly upon Mr. Baldwin, who appointed him.51 
 
The Times accused Churchill of being the epicenter of the press attacks against Baldwin in his 
efforts “to „marshal British opinion‟ in support of a policy of repression” in India.  The paper 
claimed that no one could deny his sincerity, but stated that in Churchill‟s “attitude there is a 
certain suspicion of „anti-Baldwinism,‟ and it is quite clear that the anti-Baldwin claque in the 
Press is merely following his lead in the furtherance of their personal vendetta.”52 
The specter of a Conservative Party split rose up again with the publication of the Joint 
Select Report in November 1934.  The basic issue remained the same: the diehards attempted to 
make India a party issue while the reformers sought to keep it out.  The Manchester Guardian 
claimed that the diehards had gained little in the debates over the report as the stiffening of the 
safeguards was only a matter of form, not substance.53  Attlee, writing in the New Statesman & 
Nation expressed disbelief that the diehards would feel alarmed by the report as the Labour 
leader considered the safeguards “very ample.”  Attlee asserted that the Labour opposition would 
oppose the report for this reason.54  The Observer criticized the Labour opposition for treating 
the report as a capitulation to the diehards; the paper also disparaged the diehards and their 
contention that the document was “an abject surrender to sentimentalism.”55  On the diehard side, 
the Daily Mail contended that the safeguards were worthless and would “do the Government 
great harm and alienate Conservative votes wholesale.”  The Mail also cheered Churchill in his 
fight to defeat the reforms “and thus save the Empire from such a catastrophe as the loss of 
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India.”56  The Morning Post declared that the White Paper policy aroused grave fears and 
threatened to divide the Conservative Party.57   
 The India debate reached its crescendo in the domestic political sphere with the 
Conservative Party meeting at Queen‟s Hall, London.  Representatives of all the Conservative 
constituencies across Great Britain met in early December 1934 to settle the issue of the 
Conservative Party‟s stance on India and the reforms process.  The pro-reform papers praised 
Baldwin but most also expressed sympathy for the diehards in an effort to maintain a united 
party front. A split in the Conservative Party would have led to many Tories withdrawing from 
the National Government and a probable collapse of the Government. 
 Pro-reform papers hailed the meeting as a success and heaped praise on Baldwin for 
holding the party together.  The Times described the support for Baldwin and the reforms policy 
as overwhelming at the Queen‟s Hall meeting.  The paper added that even an adverse vote would 
not have halted the Government‟s Indian policy or would have been fatal to Baldwin‟s position 
as party leader.  The Sunday Times agreed that if the vote had gone the other way it would 
probably not have changed the Government‟s India policy.  However, an unfavorable decision 
“would certainly have affected the alignment of the political parties, and probably ruined the 
prospects of the National Government in the future”58  The Daily Telegraph portrayed Britain‟s 
Indian reforms policy as fostered by Conservative statesmanship.  The Manchester Guardian 
described the Queen‟s Hall vote as a veritable vote of confidence for Baldwin as the 
Conservative leader identified himself with the reform proposals; the paper claimed that the Tory 
rank and file recognized this and voted accordingly in support of their party leader.59  The 
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Economist claimed that many Conservatives expressed sympathy for the diehard thesis but voted 
for the reforms for fear of splitting the Tory Party.60   
The pro-reform press, for the most part, also expressed sympathy for the defeated 
diehards.  The Yorkshire Post, for example, warned against “any sort of „crowing‟ over the 
defeated minority.  They are good Conservatives and sincere men.”61  Somewhat less generously, 
the Manchester Guardian stated that no one doubted Churchill‟s sincerity but expressed its wish 
“that on this occasion his sincerity could have been allied to a better judgment on the issues at 
stake and rather more insight into the minds of his countrymen.”62  The Daily Telegraph claimed 
to understand the diehard fears and anxieties but hoped that the diehards‟ dissent would be 
marked by restraint as not to encourage Indian extremists.63  A minority of papers condemned 
the diehards outright.  The Sunday Times feared that a diehard victory at Queen‟s Hall would 
have split the party or, worse still, identified the party with reaction64  and the Observer insisted 
that if the diehards had succeeded in defeating the party‟s India policy, the result would have 
been “to bring a Socialist Government into power.”65   
On the diehard side, the Morning Post rationalized the defeat at Queen‟s Hall as 
Conservatives being blinded by the love of party to vote for proposals that “could hardly stand 
the cold right of reason.”  The Post also cheered the diehard minority for their valiant struggle 
“to save India from a foolish and ruinous project” and declared that the fight had only just begun.  
The paper hoped that before the battle was over “the prudence and caution which we used to 
think characteristic of the British nation will again prevail.”66  The Saturday Review was a bit 
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more harsh and apocalyptic in its assessment of the Queen‟s Hall vote: 
Mr. Baldwin does not know India.  He is unacquainted with the East.  He is 
always wrong…His leadership of the Conservative Party has been a succession of 
disasters, culminating in this.67 
 
The Review also described the India reforms as a “Socialist policy” and a “betrayal of the Party.”  
The Daily Mail claimed that the Government spokesmen “administered a large dose of soothing 
syrup” to the Conservative delegates about a policy which would “throw India into chaos.”68   
The diehards were also not willing to give up their fight for the identity of the 
Conservative Party.  The Daily Express surprisingly described the diehard effort in Parliament as 
a poor showing.69  The diehards sought to prolong the India debate “unless there is a revolt in the 
Conservative Party itself against tactics that must play directly into the hands of the Socialists.”  
Any diehard success would only encourage the Congress Party in its attempts to destroy the 
proposed constitution.70  The Labour opposition voted with the diehards against the reforms 
process.  The “Socialist attitude” could only add to the difficulties that needed to be overcome in 
India while the Times contended that the contrary vote only did the Labour Party harm.  Though 
the general public was disinterested in India, the Labour vote would be condemned by “every 
good judge of political competence.”71   
The diehards, through Rothermere‟s United Empire Party, sought still to turn India into 
an electoral issue by running candidates at by-elections as late as February 1935.  In the 
Wavertree by-election the UEP candidate, Randolph Churchill, son of Winston, split the 
Conservative vote and allowed Labour to take a previously safe Conservative seat.  The Times 
asserted that an overwhelming majority in Britain favored the India Bill and thus there was no 
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reason that the legislation should be withdrawn in order to placate “the prodigals of the 
Conservative Party.”  The Wavertree by-election demonstrated that “every conceivable effort to 
rouse the electorate on the India question proved an utter failure on the most favourable 
ground.”72  The Observer criticized Randolph Churchill, who caused the loss of the Wavertree 
seat to a Socialist, and Lord Rothermere, who the paper accused of “chiefly kindled and fuelled 
the anti-Ministerial agitation.”  The paper considered their work as sabotage “attempted by a 
furious faction against the fabric of the Empire itself.”73  In sharp contrast, the Daily Express 
described the Wavertree election as a severe blow against the National Government and its India 
policy, one that would “fortify the right wing opposition in the Conservative party to the India 
Bill.”74  For the Morning Post, Randolph Churchill‟s 10,500 votes at Wavertree constituted a 
victory and a portent of things to come: 
With youthful impetuosity he expressed what so many English people must feel 
about the surrender of India.  And this feeling, it is obvious, will not diminish, but 
is bound to increase if the surrender proceeds as the calamitous results are brought 
home to the British public.75 
 
Baldwin and the pro-reformers won the war versus the diehards culminating in 1935 with 
a new India Act that expanded powers for Indians at the provincial level and in the central 
government, though the act did not provide for dominion status.  The reformers also kept India 
out of the arena of domestic politics and maintained a Conservative Party identity that embraced 
constitutional reform in order to strengthen ties with India and the empire.  The diehards could 
neither bring the party leadership nor rank and file Tories into line with their line of thinking.  In 
the struggle for the soul of the Conservative Party Baldwin and the reformers emerged victorious 
and the diehards relegated to the fringe; Churchill floundered in the political wilderness. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 A curious article appeared in the 9 December 1931 issue of Truth.  The item, with no 
identified author, entitled “The Diehard v. Great Soul” depicts a man listening dance music on 
his wireless after reading the report of the House of Commons India debate.  As he drifts off to 
sleep he dreams that a BBC announcer interrupts the music to introduce an imaginary radio 
debate between “two of the most eminent protagonists in the Indian controversy,” Winston 
Churchill and Gandhi.  The debate began with the two adversaries exchanging pleasantries: 
Gandhi making sure his spinning during the debate would not disturb his opponent while 
Churchill lit a cigar.  The meat of the discussion consisted of each side laying out their position: 
Churchill argued that Britain could not renege on its promises to India, but granting India 
dominion status would inevitably result in anarchy on the subcontinent.  He added that though he 
only had forty-three MP’s vote with him that did not mean “that old John Bull isn’t of my way of 
thinking.”1  Churchill also accuses the Prime Minister, MacDonald (and by extension the entire 
National Government) of being dishonest to both his own country and India regarding the 
reforms.  Churchill states MacDonald “wants it both ways – soft soap for India and a reassuring 
wink for his Tory back-benchers.”  Gandhi wanted the British government to make up its mind 
concerning Indian self-government: “Are your repeated pledges of Dominion status all humbug 
or are you delivering the goods?”  Cooperation and hypocrisy could not co-exist, Gandhi stated, 
“Deliver the goods and I’ll co-operate all right.”  The two proceeded to bicker about the pace of 
reform, status of minorities, and, significantly, democracy itself.  According to imaginary 
Churchill:  
We are sick of democracy in the West just at the time when you Indians are 
displaying a morbid craving for an overdose of it.  Believe me, counting noses is a 
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childish method of government.  It has nearly ruined us.  Unfortunately, people in 
a democracy won’t let their noses be counted except at a price – doles and other 
legislative bribes. 
 
Pretend Churchill also had an interesting vision of a democratic India.  He claimed that the 
Hindus would be a “poor look-out for the British Empire,” meaning that they would not 
adequately defend British interests in India, hence the need for the ample safeguards.  The article 
and the debate concluded with the author startled awake. 
 The odd little article raises a number of central issues discussed in this dissertation: the 
paradoxical relationship between the diehards and democracy both in Britain and India, the 
essential lack of debate in the press concerning the future of India, the unspoken issue of race, 
and the limits of Britain’s imperial culture.  This dissertation shows that India was the major 
issue of interwar Britain as the press recognized its importance through its voluminous coverage 
of events on the subcontinent and reforms processes.    
 Imaginary Churchill’s outburst demonstrates his, and the other diehards, distrust of 
democracy.  Universal manhood suffrage did not go into effect in Britain until 1918 and many 
Conservatives, especially the diehards, had a hard time acquiescing to the new reality.  The 
diehards slowly shifted to accept democratic Britain and they attempted to use the issue of Indian 
constitutional reform as a means of co-opting the newly enfranchised masses.  The days of the 
ruling elites monopolizing political power were long gone; the diehards needed to bring the 
masses over to their way of thinking in order to remain in power.  “Old John Bull,” fantasy 
Churchill’s view of the English everyman, must have included working class voters, and 
diehards believed that empire was an important issue to them.  The ultimate aim of the diehards 
was to make India a political issue, use it to dislodge Baldwin from the party leadership, place 
one of their own in that position, and make the empire a keystone of the Conservative platform in 
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the next general election and in the new Tory identity.  And Churchill, the incurable imperial 
romantic, saw the Indian constitutional reform issue as his personal path to power.  He was 
confident enough in the India issue as his that he gave up his seat in the shadow cabinet in 
January 1931 in order to be free to speak against his party’s India platform.  The diehards 
believed that the British public shared their traditional conceptions of empire and were only 
ignorant of the reformists’ plans for India.  Once the public realized what was going on, the 
diehards believed, it would demand a change in government policy and in Conservative party 
leadership.  The press diehards, Rothermere especially, with papers seeking out and catering to a 
mass readership, sought to be the medium to publicize the diehard message to the newly 
enfranchised masses.  Clearly the proprietors of the Daily Mail and Daily Express thought India 
a subject of interest to attract and keep readers as both papers wrote on the topic amply.  The 
United Empire Party was not intended to become a rival to the Conservative Party but as a 
vehicle for voters to express dissatisfaction with Tory imperial policies and so prod the party to 
alter its stance on Indian reform.  So committed to the cause was Rothermere that he continued to 
run UEP candidates well into 1935, long after the India issue had effectively been decided.  
Evidently “Old John Bull” was not of their way of thinking after all. 
 It was ironic that the Truth article imagined a debate between two men with widely 
divergent views on Indian constitutional reform because no English paper allowed any divergent 
opinions in their pages.2  When I started this project I expected a lively press debate: a wide 
variety of opinions and views of British imperialism, Indians, the Raj, and the future of British 
India.  Instead, I found unanimity across the political spectrum, across Britain, and throughout 
the seventeen years under investigation.  Papers, diehard and reformist alike, agreed that British 
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imperialism brought peace, justice, and prosperity to the subcontinent, the Raj maintained order 
and served as an impartial arbiter, India was made up of myriad races and religions perpetually at 
odds with one another, and the Indian nationalists were irrational, incorrigible, and retarding 
India’s progress towards dominion status.   Diehard papers, like pretend Churchill, agreed that 
Britain could not go back on its promises to India.  The dispute with the reformists was simply 
over timing and extent of reform.  The press debate in the end boiled down to the reformists 
viewing reform as the way to guarantee Indian cooperation and engender responsibility while the 
diehards wanted proof of cooperation and responsibility as the sine qua non of constitutional 
reform. 
 The dreamer in the Truth article was obviously a representative from the middle class as 
who else would read a report of the India debate in the House of Commons, especially while 
listening to the radio?  No consensus exists among British imperial historians over the breadth 
and depth of an “imperial culture.”  John MacKenzie and the so-called “Manchester school” 
contend that the empire was ubiquitous in British society and that a strong imperial culture 
embraced the working class.  He points to a veritable flood of imperial flavored popular 
literature, especially juvenile literature, school texts, empire exhibitions, music hall ballads, 
advertisements, and product packaging as evidence that the empire pervaded everyday British 
life.  Surely MacKenzie would most likely also point to the great interest by the press in India 
during the interwar era, as evidenced by this project, as further proof of a culture soaked to the 
gills with imperialism.  Bernard Porter and the other imperial skeptics, however, argue that the 
empire was only of interest to the upper and upper middle classes; the working class was both 
ignorant of, and disinterested in, imperial issues.  Porter disputes the idea of an imperial culture 
as the majority of the population was concerned with other things rather than empire.  The fact 
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that there was a lot of children’s and young adult literature with imperial settings, world maps in 
schoolrooms with British possessions colored red, or imperially themed songs did not indicate, 
let alone prove, that the working classes cared about imperial matters.  A crucial point of dispute 
between the two sides is the issue of consumption.  Porter and the imperial skeptics argue that a 
person who bought a tin of biscuits with an imperial scene of India on the lid did not necessarily 
mean that person was necessarily buying into the imperial ethos as well.3 
 Porter’s argument falters on a basic point: one does not need to care or be concerned 
about empire to live in an imperial culture: it influenced and shaped culture and ideas whether 
people were aware of it or not.  The press is a perfect example of this.  A Briton could hardly 
pick up a domestic newspaper in the interwar period without being confronted with empire.  As 
this dissertation shows editors talked about constitutional reform on the subcontinent a lot.  In 
addition to the leaders examined here, regular news articles, letters to the editor, and special 
interest stories frequently focused on events in India.  It was an unavoidable topic.  No matter 
which paper a Briton chose to read, he or she received the same vision of the empire and British 
rule: an imperial culture that agreed on the basic conceptions of India and the Raj.  The press was 
open to all, and even the popular press saw India and empire as an important topic.   
 This dissertation, however, lends support to a key aspect of Porter’s argument: only the 
upper and middle classes cared about empire; the general public did not.  Evidence for this view 
is best illustrated by the diehards.  The diehards believed that Britons across the social spectrum 
were concerned with empire.  They were convinced once the public understood Labour and 
Conservative plans to dismantle the Raj there would be an outraged response leading to a change 
in Tory leadership and a recasting of Conservative party identity in the diehard mold.  The 
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diehard plan failed repeatedly in the face of an overwhelming wall of public apathy.  The middle 
class, represented by newspaper and journal editors, did care about empire and particularly India.  
The majority of editors supported the government’s view that reform would engender 
cooperation and responsibility over the diehard contention that Indian cooperation and 
responsibility were preconditions of any reform attempt.  The reformers wanted a more 
progressive view of empire to be a background issue in the new Conservative party, and they 
especially did not want empire to be a prominent party issue. 
 The issue of India, and the press, molded the new Conservative Party.  India was a 
deciding issue over what the interwar Tory party would look like: Churchill and the diehard view 
of a traditional empire forefront in party identity versus the Baldwin and the reformer view of an 
empire based on cooperation kept out of the political arena.  It was in the press that this decision 
was largely decided as newspapers and journals were the medium that reached the voters of 
Britain.  Through the press readers learned of the divergent conceptions of the Conservative 
party and, based on that information, made their choice.  The evolution of the debate can be seen 
in the English moderates between 1929 and 1931.  The English moderates overlapped both the 
reformers and the diehards by supporting the reforms process but also calling for a more strict 
enforcement of law and order in India, particularly against Congress.  The gradual movement of 
the English moderates to the reform side by late 1931 indicates the steady triumph of the 
reformist view of the empire and party.  The fact that a Labour journal, the New Statesman, was 
part of the English moderates and also gravitated to the pro-reformists may indicate that this 
debate was not restricted just to the ranks of the Conservative party.  Evidently the emigration to 
the moderate position of reform for India transcended party boundaries.  But the reformist press 
clearly saw the diehard challenge as a threat.  This is evident in the myriad leaders disputing the 
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diehard thesis well into 1935. 
 One curious aspect of the English press and India during this time is that certain 
assumptions were explained at great length, such as the beneficial aspects of the Raj for Indians 
and the irresponsibility of Congress, while others were left implicit, such as race and the benefits 
of the empire for Britain.  Evidently editors believed some suppositions needed to be explained 
or at least their readers reminded of them, while others were so basic as to be understood by all.  
The issue of race is the proverbial elephant in the room; editors seem to dance around the subject 
but never explicitly state that Indians were racially ill-equipped for self-rule.  This is best 
exemplified by the debate over dominion status; papers agreed that India was in essence unlike 
the White Dominions.  They did not need to justify how or why the White Dominions earned or 
deserved dominion status as this was too straightforward to merit explanation.  Australians and 
Canadians are “just like us” and can be trusted implicitly with self-government.  Indians are 
inherently different: racially, religiously, and culturally; they cannot be trusted with preserving 
and protecting British interests on the subcontinent; hence phantasm Churchill’s charge that 
Hindus would be a “poor look-out for the British Empire.”  
Also left unexplored were the benefits of the Raj to Britain.  The English press rarely, if 
ever, mentioned the advantages Britain accrued from its control of India.  India’s role as an 
important trading partner, a source of gold to stabilize Britain’s balance of trade, and a major 
pillar of British military might and prestige remained undiscussed.  There are three possible 
explanations for this.  One, the press believed in a completely one-sided picture of British 
altruism with India reaping all the benefits of the Raj with Britain receiving nothing in return. 
Two, the press assumed implicitly that the newspaper-reading public knew and understood what 
Britain gained from controlling the subcontinent.  Third, the press glossed over the exploitative 
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aspects of the Raj in order to persuade its readers to support their side of the reform argument; 
editors did not want their readers to doubt the veracity of Britain’s imperial mission in India. I 
reason a combination of the second two, as the newspaper editors were far too knowledgeable of 
India and the empire to believe such a simplistic and self-serving portrait of the Raj. 
 The Truth article illustrates the importance of Indian constitutional reform to the English 
press and to the British political class; it was the issue of interwar Britain, as opposed to 
appeasement.  However, it was only of interest to the chattering classes; the general British 
public did not concern itself with the intricacies of India and the reforms debate.  But the great 
interest that the press showed in the India question demonstrates the strength of British imperial 
culture; the ubiquitousness of English press coverage indicates the omnipresence of empire in 
Britain.  In this British culture the press unanimity of beliefs of the Raj, the nature of British rule, 
and of India shows that the British imperial culture was united when it came to empire.  All the 
papers shared the same assumptions and left the identical topics implicit.  The India issue also 
helped mould the identity of the interwar Conservative party and the newspaper debate took that 
discussion to the British public.  The fact that the subject of Indian constitutional reform inspired 
a fictional article in a periodical about an imagined debate between the two most prominent 
antagonists on the issue shows that the matter was of prominent importance to the chattering 
classes of Britain. 
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